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Abstract 
__________________________________ 
 
 
 
 
 
The non-credit bearing and ongoing education and development of 
mid- to late-career corporate executives is known by the compound term 
executive education. Reductively stated, executive education, for its 
corporate consumers and its business school providers, is predicated on 
the relationship between an order (as a command) and its execution (its 
carrying out); a relationship I call the “order-execution cognate”. With the 
word execution derived from Greek for sequence, and with the sequence 
of an execution following-on from its corresponding order, sequentiality 
is the essence of execution, and the cognate. Executive education involves 
the amelioration of this order-execution cognate, to the ends of increased 
profits and competitiveness for the corporation concerned, and increased 
career prospects for the individual executive. Concerning sequentiality, 
and as a thesis on the philosophy of executive education, I apply a strand 
of ontological reflection to examine this cognate, namely philosophy 
concerning time and temporal succession. To aid in this task I use the 
English translations of writings on time by the German philosopher Martin 
Heidegger (1889-1976). Emerging from Heidegger’s thought are two 
temporal types that acknowledge and critique temporal succession; 
chronological (chronic) time and Kairotic time respectively. By associating 
Heidegger’s philosophic method with that of early German Romantic 
philosophy, I articulate how it is possible to reconceive the temporal 
sequence of the order-execution cognate as a productive oscillation 
between chronic and Kairotic time; I call this oscillation “ironic 
temporality,” and its productivity “ironic productivity”.  
My philosophical analysis of commercially lucrative and neoliberal 
executive education is at odds with traditional knowledge-based analyses, 
affording a critique of the capitalist order which the educative event 
serves. Disrupting temporal notions of that event then becomes a 
dangerous political act; becomes the means to frame the educative event 
for the management of our age; and becomes the new orders for 
executive education.
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Introduction 
__________________________________ 
 
 
 
 
 
 
However, time in the sense commonly understood, which is our topic here, is indeed only one 
derivative, even if legitimate, of the original time, on which the Dasein’s ontological constitution 
is based  
 
(Martin Heidegger, Basic Problems of Phenomenology, p. 325) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Executive Summary 
Order and execution are cognates1: they are born together, in that orders are the basis of 
executions. In the primary sense of orders as commands, and in the corresponding sense of 
executions as the carrying out of those orders, order and execution are co-constituted, or what I’m 
terming, “cognates”. In other words, orders do not pertain without their execution at least being 
implied. The relata of this relationship emerge, I propose, only as poles of the overall interactive 
structure of this cognate. Held in tension by these poles is a temporal precedence of one or other 
of the relatum in this structure, thereby establishing the basis of a temporal sequence that becomes 
both the commanding force of this cognate, and my reason for studying it. This temporal sequence 
is, unsurprisingly, chronological in nature and conception. The purpose of this thesis is to violate 
this standard chronological conception of sequential time, and to begin to imagine more opportune 
temporal conceptions.  
The question remains, as with twins, even if the relata of the cognate are apparently born 
together, which was actually born first; order or execution? By way of an early bid to establish 
                                                          
1 The sense of the cognate I am concerned with here is not etymological, nor is my interest in the specifically linguistic 
sense of the term cognate: I am interested not just in how the two terms “order” and “execution” relate, but how they 
better support each other in their being conjoined, into a cognate. I am indebted to Janet Roitman, and her book Anti-
Crisis (2014: p.8), for bringing to my attention the concept of cognate, taken as it is from the work of the Heidegger-
inspired historian Reinhart Koselleck, in a book, the title of which introduces his own cognate (translated from the 
German) called Critique and Crisis (Koselleck, 1988). My interest in the work of Koselleck – given that it was specifically 
Heidegger’s exploration of time throughout his oeuvre that motivated Koselleck – is touched on briefly in Chapter 5 of 
this thesis. 
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which pole is prior, it is worth noting that the Latin transitive verb sequor, which means “to follow” 
or “to come after,” lies in the midst of the word executive, as in ex-sequi. Thus, with ex- meaning 
“out of” and sequi meaning “to follow up” or “carry out,” the notion of sequentiality (L. sequens) 
is at the very root of the word executive, as in the individual case of the corporate executive, the 
subject of my study. While not precluding the possibility that an execution could still be prior to an 
order, it would seem that execution, and therefore the actions of an executive, follows an order. I 
would like to establish, at this early stage, the notion of time as an important – and overlooked – 
constituent in any analysis of the interactive structure of the cognate I have introduced. So, by way 
of drawing on the dreamy double genitive in the thesis title, who are these managers of time, these 
executives, and which orders do they represent and prepare to execute? 
Briefly stated, in this thesis I seek to understand the kinds of work that a philosophical 
reflection on this cognate can do, principally in the context of philosophy of education; specifically 
in the context of philosophy applied to the education of late-career corporate executives – a 
process otherwise known by the compound term executive education; and more specifically still 
by using, as a framework for an analysis of the temporal constituents of this cognate, the English 
translations of  writings on time and temporality conducted by the philosopher Martin Heidegger 
(1889-1976) in his book Being and Time (Heidegger, 1962), published in Germany in 1927, as well 
as other works across the span of his philosophical career. While the downside of restricting my 
conceptual analysis to Heidegger’s identification of “time as the possible horizon for any 
understanding whatsoever of being” (ibid: p.1) lie with the famously difficult prose style of 
translations of his thinking, my hope is to offset this negative against the positive of employing his 
thinking to usher in a novel ontological re-conception of the purpose of executive education. And 
rather than see this prose style as a barrier to be surmounted, I’d like to put this so-called negative 
aspect of his writing to work to effect this ontological re-conception. This will be an ontological re-
conception that represents a departure from the standard ethics-based criticisms of 
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managerialism2, and an equal departure from a heavily psychological framing of management3 
studies4; one that is at odds with the singular instrumental telos of executive education, capitalism; 
and where this novel ontological approach also brings into question practical applications of this 
telos, namely improvements in individual executions of orders, as well as improvements in 
corporate productivity, which in turn service the capitalistic imperative that motivates all 
corporations, the pursuit of greater profits; in lieu of more pressing societal ills, such as the effects 
of extreme wealth inequalities. My ultimate purpose is to investigate an ontological ground – 
namely the ontology of time – from which business school-based executive education can 
challenge its existence, begin to redeem itself philosophically, and as a result offer wider society 
the fruits from new orders of executive education. 
 
Background to the Study 
Before we begin to unpack the obvious burden of explanation demanded from the variety 
of concepts introduced in this executive summary, some background as to the context from which 
this thesis has been written is in order, if only to ease the reader in to the site of the work I hope 
to undertake in the this thesis. After this initial contextual overview, I will begin to unpack the 
individual constituents of the order-execution cognate.  
I work at the Cranfield University School of Management (hereafter, Cranfield), a graduate-
only business school in the UK. The Management School is one of the schools within Cranfield 
University, the UK’s only wholly postgraduate university, which specialises in the disciplines of 
engineering, energy, agrifood, aerospace, transport, manufacturing, defence and security, and 
                                                          
2 I’m aware of the strength of anti-managerial feeling in the academy, and the overwhelming suspicion with which my 
juxtaposing of “education” and “business” is viewed by some critics, who have reason to claim that the existence of a 
“business school” is itself an oxymoron, or logical non sequitur. For instance, Marina Warner, who was sufficiently 
dissatisfied with the “for-profit business model” of universities in the UK for her to resign her chair in literature at Essex 
University in 2014, in her article “Learning My Lesson” in the London Review of Books (Warner, March 2015), reveals this 
strength of feeling, thus: “The new managerialist philistinism is spreading. Even as it claims to be keeping universities 
alive and well and inclusive, it is wrecking the ideal of emancipation through learning. If universities continue to go the 
way of the corporations, a fine system of public stewardship, evolved over the decades to educate citizens for their good 
and the good of society in the present and the future, will have been perverted and disfigured” (ibid: vol.37, n.6, p.8-14, 
my emphasis). This thesis is situated at the heart of this debate. It is a response to this accusation of “philistinism,” and 
offers as a form of “emancipation” what I will call ironic temporality. This “emancipation through time” is offered as an 
equivalent mode of degeneracy to Warner’s “perverted” and “disfigured” corporatisation of higher education, but a form 
of degeneracy just as equivalent to what business world would class as the degenerate non-productivity of philosophy. 
3 The reader may be confused about the distinction between manager and executive. Quoting from James Burnham’s 
The Managerial Revolution (Burnham, 1942), the author revealingly restricts the title of “manager” to those in charge of 
technical production processes, and the cherished title of “executive” to the highest paid and highest ranking company 
official in charge of guiding the company to profit (Burnham, 1942; pp.72-73). Even today this distinction is 
representative. 
4 For examples of standardly conceived ethics-based critiques of management studies discourse, see Mats Alvesson and 
Hugh Willmott’s Critical Management Studies  (Alvesson & Wilmot, 1992), Christopher Grey and Hugh Wilmott’s Critical 
Management Studies: A Reader (Grey & Willmott, 2005), and the fiercely provocative book by Peter Fleming and Marc 
Jones, The End of Corporate Social Responsibility: Crisis and Critique (Fleming & Jones, 2013). 
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management. The School of Management at Cranfield confers its own degree-awarding 
programmes (Masters degrees in management, finance, marketing, supply chain, organisational 
performance and leadership: and a doctoral programme of PhDs in management-related topics, as 
well as a part-time Executive Doctorate programme), though Cranfield also run a wide range of 
unaccredited programmes of executive education5 that are of roughly equal proportion in revenue 
and student numbers to the accredited programmes. Within the field of executive education at 
Cranfield my role is as Director of Networked Learning in Cranfield’s Centre for Customised 
Executive Development. This centre (who, I should say, are the sponsors of my studies and of this 
thesis) provides non-credit-bearing executive education and development for the management 
and senior executive6 populations of large, mostly international, corporations. The teaching faculty 
for these customised programmes is drawn from Cranfield’s academic faculty who teach on 
Cranfield’s flagship Masters of Business Administration (MBA), as well as from the other 
programmes mentioned above. My current role in the Centre for Customised Executive 
Development at Cranfield is as the person responsible for co-designing and incorporating onto 
these non-accredited and customised programmes of executive education forms of technology-
based material and support that are deemed appropriate for that programme and population, 
decided in consultation with the corporate client. Thus, as executive education, this thesis will only 
be considering these non-accredited and customised programmes of executive education. A typical 
(if parodied) individual consumer of this executive education – in distinction to the corporate 
consumer who may commission such a programme for a population of senior executives – is often 
though not always male, early-forties to fifty-something in age, grey haired, wearing a dark suit, 
working for that large corporation, highly paid, and principally as someone who gives and receives 
orders. 
In order to build on the unusual and non-credit-bearing status of the executive education 
that I’m involved in running, and which forms the context of my argument here; and in order for 
the reader to gauge the nature of education referred to in this thesis – if the reader, in fact, deems 
this education at all – it is worth reiterating  (for the sake of mainstream educator say, or possibly 
those unaccustomed to non-credit-bearing graduate-only teaching, or those unfamiliar with 
customised education for executives in corporations) that while I am based in higher education I 
am not addressing in this thesis the executive as the business-studies student normally conceived: 
not undergraduates, nor postgraduate students, nor part-time students. My referencing of the 
                                                          
5 While this may only become apparent to the reader of this thesis in the course of their reading, I will use my institution’s 
form of executive education as representative of what can be considered a global phenomenon of executive education, 
as designated by the influential Financial Times Executive Global Education Rankings published annually, i.e. as a standard 
form of executive education, in this case arraigned before my argument concerning its ontological re-conception. 
6 See footnote 2 above, for an explanation of the distinction between manager and executive. 
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executive’s late-career juncture is not simply to differentiate amongst institution-oriented 
provisions of executive education – where, say, some institutions, for whatever andragogic 
reasons, favour training a workforce in preparation for their subsequent employment, versus those 
which offer ongoing education to those already in employment – but rather to differentiate 
between the different attitudes towards the workplace, and towards the society in which work in 
general does or does not make sense for them, and how these depend on successive life stages. As 
will be seen later, the (sometimes comic) spectre of a mid-life crisis, and a late-career executive’s 
corresponding appetite for existential reflection in the midst of their hyper-capitalist endeavours7, 
are all important contributing factors in how and whether executive education is conceived. 
Crudely speaking, our appetites for existential reflection increase along with our age, placing my 
study here firmly at the far end of a simplistic educational spectrum that begins with primary, then 
secondary, thence to tertiary and higher, but proceeding to what I am tempted to call “terminal” 
education – a coinage in contrast to the more palatable descriptors in common use such as ‘life-
long learning’8 or “adult education” or “professional-“ or “workplace-learning”. As bleak and as 
nihilistic as the terminal note sounds, the subject of this thesis – given the Heideggerian theme that 
I will be using as a framework to examine the order-execution cognate – will not flinch from such 
time-related topics as death and finitude as they operate on the corporate executive tasked with 
executing, not to mention operating under, the capitalist order. Quite the contrary; as the reader 
will have glanced from the contents page, my analysis of the order-execution cognate will emerge 
through the rather melancholy-sounding Heidegger-inspired themes of death, anxiety, boredom, 
as well as through the less melancholy but still time-related themes of technology, history, and the 
event. 
So, to recap, a typical client of executive education would be a large multinational 
corporation, whose Human Resources department is often responsible for commissioning a 
programme, and for whom there is often a highly senior company official, a senior vice president, 
acting as a sponsor to the development initiative. A typical participant of a programme of executive 
education would be the forty-something senior executive, who are usually drawn from populations 
of between one-hundred and up to one-thousand executives: the cohort size of a typical 
programme is around twenty; and the content of the programme will vary depending on the client, 
but usually include management-oriented themes such as strategy, finance, supply chain, 
marketing, leadership, and change. What then is the purpose of one of these programmes of 
executive education? As an initial example, a corporation may be moving into new geographic 
                                                          
7 See Thomas Piketty’s book Capital in the Twenty-First Century (2014), one that I will be referring to shortly. 
8 See John Field’s book Lifelong Learning and the New Educational Order (Field, 2006) for a spirited defence of the 
integration of lifelong learning into UK government policy. 
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areas and markets, thereby revealing a shortfall in the competence of its existing executive echelon 
to service either these new opportunities, or to back-fill responsibilities in the established markets 
and geographies left vacant by moving the best people to the new territories: or it may be 
responding to concerns of its shareholders as to the longer-term viability of its overall management 
competence. Whatever the stated intention of such a programme, all programmes of executive 
education are intended to improve the corporation’s competitive advantage in its marketplace: a 
basis of productivity which I will challenge, using Heidegger. 
 
 
The Problem 
After this brief exposure to a typical executive education programme, and whilst the 
readers’ opinions are still in the process of forming – possibly crystallising around questions such 
as whether this is, in fact, more a form of craft-skills training, or indoctrination, or corporate-
sanctioned tourism, or just a clever scam on the part of business schools – I would like to begin to 
articulate why I believe the so-called executive education that I am involved in running is in radical 
need of revision, at the same time as identifying just what this thesis is a reaction against. The 
following reflections are presented at this stage as cursory and in need of refinement, which is the 
purpose of the thesis, but I offer them as an early explanation as to why I feel the need to question 
what executive education – and quite possibly business schools generally, though this is an out-of-
scope topic given their wider remit than simply delivering executive education – is doing with, for, 
to and on behalf of the senior executive populations within the multinational corporations that act 
as its clients. My identification with a need for revision is expressed in 3-ways; as a concern, as a 
relation and as an expectation.  
Firstly, it is expressed as a concern that the monological, hegemonic and iniquitous nature 
of contemporary western capitalism has become the only ordering principle of our times. Although 
a huge topic and one beyond any detailed analysis in this thesis, as a basis of this so-called master 
order, I will align with the thesis put forward by Thomas Piketty in his book Capital in the Twenty-
First Century, that financial inequality in the twenty-first century is on the rise and gaining pace 
(Piketty, 2014: p.27); that the majority of us in the future will be much poorer in every way (ibid: 
p.122); that this rising inequality will have tempestuous political implications (ibid: p.269); and that 
this order is the single and most supreme motivating force in our current age, to the exclusion of 
any alternative world view (ibid: p.451).  
Secondly, expressed as a relation, my identification with the need to revise the thinking of 
executive education stems from its relation to this iniquitous master-order that Piketty has 
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evidenced, most notably a relation that is framed by the rise of what Piketty calls “super-managers” 
(ibid: p.265) – the absurdly and unjustly rich chief executive officer (CEO) class of senior corporate 
executives, vying with the property-owning and asset-owning class of billionaires to compete on 
who produces and deserves the most wealth – in a form of “meritocratic extremism”9 that stands 
as the highest good an executive should strive to achieve. The extravagances of ever-increasing 
executive salaries are often the topic of scrutiny in our newspapers. I am not claiming a causal 
connection between executive education and meritocratic extremism, nor am I establishing 
dependence between the former and capitalism, between as it were, the classroom and 
boardroom. Rather, I wish to establish that a relationship between executive education and 
capitalism is the most prevalent reason to explain the existence of executive education at all, and 
that capitalism is the sole organising principle for such educative programmes, whether knowingly 
addressed or not.  
Thirdly, my expression of a revisionist agenda is motivated by an expectation that 
education, the processes of education, the investment in and outcomes from education, can and 
should act as an appropriate site for the task of reconceiving (whether and) how that relation can 
mitigate, arrest and/or transform the negative effects of that order. And this, ultimately, so that I 
can isolate the highly influential senior corporate executive – one that is ten-or-so years from 
retirement, slightly more relaxed in attitude, sufficiently skilled managerially and experienced 
commercially to effect, individually or collectively, radical changes to their enterprise or collective 
sectorial enterprise – as the prime agent of change. This thesis will build on an example of just such 
an influential individual. 
To achieve this highly ambitious revision, via a specifically philosophical analysis,10 I will be 
using a reductive approach that attempts to formulate the manifest activities of executive 
education – of the style mentioned above – into a single explanatory unit: what I am calling the 
order-execution cognate, which I will introduce more fully in the following section. I do not think 
of myself as a reductionist thinker, preferring to believe instead that we should always let a 
thousand flowers bloom, that the universe is a richer place than our nascent reductionist impulses 
suggest: however, my involvement with executive education has made me realise that 
philosophically, dealing in reductive essences, distinct to complex compounds, for my audience, is 
the most effective way of opening a space to think philosophically, at all. Essentializing a complex 
topic is, in fact, a skilful means of instruction for the time-poor executive education audience, 
                                                          
9 Quoted by Thomas Piketty in an interview by Andrew Hussey, published by the Observer newspaper on 13 April 2014, 
as the cover story for The New Review section, under the title “It Just Doesn’t Add Up”. 
10 That is, a philosophical analysis distinct from a political analysis or an economic reappraisal, or an activist 
destabilisation, or a revolutionary decentralisation and restructuring of capital-dominated power relations: all of which 
are outside the scope of this thesis. 
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notwithstanding the preferences of the instructor who may deem such dealings in simplicities as 
untruthful to the topic under examination, or disrespectful to the more thoughtful learner in 
possession of more time: there is an intellectual probity to this kind of foundational thinking. As 
something of a dealer peddling a reductionist fix using this approach, as it were, the successful 
executive education lecturer11 is someone who opens a space with his or her learners using an 
approach which outlines a convenient ‘essence’ of a chosen topic; only after which he or she 
further engages his or her audience in a broader and deeper dialogue. There will be time later to 
consider why I am suggesting this reductionist approach is prevalent in current executive 
education, alongside an appraisal as to the suitability of my single explanatory unit of the order-
execution cognate as a device to conceive, and reconceive, executive education philosophically for 
those late in their corporate careers, using Martin Heidegger’s understanding of the role of time in 
our being. 
Before turning to how (and whether) Heidegger even establishes time as a framework 
worth considering in my chosen context, and while I am still in the mode of introduction to what 
must appear to be a rather odd caravan of concepts, let me expand on my reductively conceived 
cognate and begin to unpack its component parts. There are three main constituents in my opening 
introduction to the order-execution cognate: the two respective relata, together with the 
articulating concept of sequence. 
 
 
The Order-Execution Cognate 
Firstly, to consider the relata “order,” it is necessary for the reader to gain a broader 
awareness of the meaning of the term order. Even a relatively quick dig into the Oxford English 
Dictionary (The Compact Edition, 1979) reveals forty-two discrete senses of the word, only a 
portion of which can be grouped under what is my primary and overarching sense of order as 
‘command’ referred to earlier. Senses under this grouping include orders of battle; marshal orders; 
orders of business; bringing to order; law and order; ordering as controlling, such as a court order; 
and martial orders of the day. Secondarily, there are a range of other senses, which could be 
conveniently grouped under the overarching senses of “rank,” “grade” or “class” which are also 
pertinent to my study. These include the mathematical sense of order as in a rank, a series or an 
array; monastic or holy orders; a class of authoritative institution; a class of mis-functioning or a 
                                                          
11 I am talking about first orders of success here, where what constitutes a successful lecturer is gauged by the (positive) 
satisfaction as stated by those whom the lecturer is addressing, distinct from any more widely conceived measures of 
success for an organisation or a society. 
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grade of conduct, such as “out-of-order,” or “out of order” in relation to an authoritative direction; 
or to conduct, or “to order oneself”. And, of course, there are very many ancillary and order-related 
terms such as ordinal, denoting a place in a series; ordinary, such as in conformity with the general, 
rather than special, rule or custom; co-ordinate, primordial, disordered, to name but a few – and 
at risk of boring the reader, I should emphasise that this is hardly an exhaustive etymology. Suffice 
to say that even this shallow etymological excavation at least serves to illustrate both a degree of 
commonality across the term, as well as a distinctive breadth in which the term could be used, and 
which I will use. 
Drawing on this breadth, and drawing breath, at this stage I will refrain from selecting a 
precise definition of order from the above, and instead ask the reader to carry into these chill early 
pages his or her own senses of the term against which the order-related aspects of my argument 
can be gauged. Far from a cop-out, but in keeping with the existentially oriented and terminally 
minded nature of time that I will be using in my upcoming temporally oriented analysis of the 
order-execution cognate, all of the following uses of order in the context of execution make sense: 
“I was only following orders”; “making profit is the order of the day”; “globalisation and 
neoliberalism are the new world orders”. Yet the senses of these (truncated and admittedly 
orphaned) phrases betray a wide array of meaning, such as, inter alia, in the first instance a 
disturbing lack of moral courage that has a profound historical precedence; in the second instance, 
a governing rationale that indemnifies against a range of societal ills, including grotesque 
imbalances in wealth and humanitarian provision; and in the third instance, a myopia that prevents 
consideration of the promotion of alternative political, cultural, economic and environmental 
potential world cultures. Without laying the blame for these ills, deficiencies and artful deceptions 
at the door of corporate executives, or any educative process these executives may or may not 
undergo, nor denying that executions in response to the orders represented in the above three 
examples could be altered or abated via the educative process, it is difficult to imagine – as I hope 
the reader will attempt – to conceive of these three senses of order without a corresponding 
intention of execution. For instance, in the troubling first example, a Hamlet-like inaction12 is just 
as much a form of execution as action in this case; in the second, execution can take the form of 
simply adopting, unquestioningly, the norms of a society; and in the third, gracing and legitimising 
these particular banalities via academic discourse, say, is just as much a form of execution as 
defending the barricades in the streets outside of a G20 summit. 
                                                          
12 See Simon Critchley and Jameson Webster’s The Hamlet Doctrine (Critchley & Webster, 2013) for an extended 
portrayal of Nietzsche-inspired justification for inaction in the guise of Shakespeare’s famous Prince of Denmark. 
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This, secondly, brings me onto addressing the relata “execution” in my order-execution 
cognate. Along with the figure of the handsomely paid corporate executive - for whom few have 
much sympathy – let us think of other figures involved in execution per se, before we come on to 
examine how these acts of execution can be partly explained via the notion of sequence, if only to 
broaden what an examination of execution could involve.  
For instance, think of the executive branch of government, those high ranking senior 
officials tasked with carrying out the orders of the current government; or the state employed 
executioner tasked with carrying out the capital punishments of the courts of law; or the lawyer as 
executor, tasked with carrying out the wishes of the deceased; or the (theorized) executive function 
of the brain, tasked, as it were, with the carrying out of our individual cognitive processes; or the 
musical executant, tasked with playing the score of a composer vocally, or on a musical instrument. 
Simply put, and for the sake of introducing the reader to the execution pole of the order-execution 
cognate, the common theme running behind all of these examples of execution is that of 
sequences of “following through,” or sequences of “carrying out”. While the next section will 
provide a more detailed treatment of sequentiality per se, remaining for the moment with the 
foregoing roll-call of the senses of executive, and leaving out the figure of the corporate executive 
for the time being, the (simplified) natures of the sequences of carrying out are as follows: with 
respect to the senior official in the executive branch of government, the sequence of carrying out 
is in the form of initially understanding the specific policy, then of setting this policy in train via 
appropriate channels in the daily administration of a country’s affairs: with respect to the state 
executioner, the carrying out sequence takes the form of understanding the verdicts of the courts 
and undertaking the capital punishment that proceeds from the sentencing of the accused; for the 
legal executant, carrying out takes the sequential form of discovering and interpreting the 
directions of the wishes of the deceased, and effecting those wishes in accordance with the law for 
the sake of the deceased; for the executive function of the brain, the carrying out is purported to 
be the response to a particular stimulus (so called); and for the musical executant, carrying out 
manifests itself in the sequence that starts with gaining mastery of the musical instrument or voice, 
through engagement with a composer’s score, to a technically proficient and, one would hope, 
pleasing executions13. 
Space will not permit a detailed examination of any of these other forms of execution, e.g. 
the governmental and legal, etc. Suffice to say that the purpose of presenting these rather stilted, 
unelaborated and hopelessly simplified examples is so that the reader gains an understanding of 
                                                          
13 See Edward Said in Music at the Limits (Said, 2008) for eleven such examples of the use of the term “execution” to 
describe the art of music performance. See also my forthcoming paper in Kyoto University’s journal of the philosophy of 
education, the Record of Clinical-Philosophical Pedagogy. 
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the wider provenance of the terms “execution” and “executive,” against which the sense of 
“corporate executive” can stand in my analysis of the order-execution cognate. Specifically, I am 
interested in the notion of sequences as they relate to orders becoming executed, since it is here 
that the philosophical work of examining the cognate delivers (what I hope to be) its maximum 
ontological utility with respect to reconceiving the time of executive education, which is the 
purpose of this thesis. Once the notion of sequences is introduced, I will move on to why I believe 
the interactive structure of the cognate is the optimum loci for a philosophical examination of 
executive education, and just how I propose to use Heidegger’s temporal understanding in Being 
and Time as a beneficial framework for what will be a departure from, and not a resolution to, the 
normative and teleological aspects of executive education that are couched as generally improving 
vocational and professional capability14. 
 
Time for Some Sequences 
It should be apparent to the reader by now that my philosophical interest is piqued not in 
the content or appropriateness of the actual order, or the specific practicalities of the execution of 
that order, nor specifically in the quality of that execution, nor its fidelity to the original order: to 
concentrate thus would require a different, and evaluative, tack to the one I am taking here. My 
interest is in the fact that the sequentially laden (L. sequens as “following”) etymology of execution, 
on such prominent display in terms like executive and executive education, can offer itself up for 
an outright philosophical analysis that sets, at the same time, the agenda for an analysis of the 
telos of an education in its own name. It is the philosophical equivalent of finding a jewel washed 
up on a beach: how could one fail to be tempted to look into the sequence-like structure both of 
the carrier-out (the executive) and the carrying out of an educative process (executive education) 
aimed at assisting the carrier-out to carry out? The question remains; what is being carried out and 
why? 
Thus, let us spend a while considering that which I propose articulates the relatum of the 
cognate, namely the sequence. In the case of the cognate the sequence runs from order to (and 
through) execution, however that process of execution, or the person(s) of the executive, is 
conceived. It makes no sense to say that such a sequence exists in space – aside from the spatial 
dimensions of the actors, actants and actions involved – though it does make sense to say that such 
a sequence exists in time. Being able to attribute temporal predicates to the cognate, such that 
                                                          
14 See Gerard Lum’s book of that title, Vocational and Professional Capability (Lum, 2009), which credits a liberal 
education, distinct from a purely instrumental instruction, as contributing to comprehensive vocational preparation 
(Lum, 2009: p. 183). 
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order A was given at time T1, and execution B was carried out at T2, makes more sense than 
suggesting that something substantial and extended was transported between A and B. This does 
not preclude the possibility of execution B at T2 being ineffective in meeting order A: neither does 
it mean that execution B is the perfect – however that is measured – execution of order A, nor the 
possibility of there existing multiple executions of order A, all carried out simultaneously at T2, such 
as may occur in the field of battle. In the case of so-called “standing orders,” even where there 
appears to be spontaneity of action, which could only loosely be called execution, it is still possible 
to attribute a causal sequence that can be expressed as an extended sequence of moments, 
however brief, between an order and its execution. This counting of time as a numerical succession 
of moments is a way of reckoning with time, with chronology, that we have inherited from Aristotle 
(Aristotle, Physics, 4.10.217b29 – 4.14224a17, in McKeon, 2001). For Aristotle, time is an infinite 
one-dimensional line of isolable moments, at one end of which time runs off into the past, where 
at the other end moments come towards us. It takes a considerable effort to envisage time in any 
other way than this, such is the hold that the Aristotelian notion of time has on our temporal 
reckoning. Now I am typing thisT1 word: and now I am typing thisT2 word. The first of these was 
typed at time T1, and the second at time T2. I will go on to type lots more words, each one following 
on after another in a temporal sequence of before’s and after’s, of what can be called instances or 
“nows”. But what is this singular now?  Is that now an instant, say, of infinitesimally small duration, 
followed soon after by another such now of equally small duration? Is that now, as in the minute-
long span of the description, somehow a span of minute – miniature – proportions? Is it, say, a 
nanosecond15 in duration? A picosecond16; femtosecond17 or attosecond18 in duration? Or is it 
duration-less, so as to be a single non-dimensional point in time? Or is that “now” just the 
orthodox, and thereby conventional, singular, designation of the conditions of the universe at that 
moment – which itself is of an infinitely small duration? 
Lack of space in this thesis prohibits an extended discussion of the contribution that the 
respective fields of quantum physics and cosmology, for which the measurement and 
understanding of time as sequences is core, would make. But that is not the case for a brief venture 
into the study of military doctrine, which is a slightly more pertinent field to a consideration of 
what constitutes an order and its execution. Returning to the earlier example of the sequences of 
                                                          
15 A billionth of a second. “A typical personal computer will take one third to two nanoseconds to execute a single 
instruction, such as adding two numbers” (David Labrador, Scientific American, vol.21, no.1, Spring 2012, p.58). 
16 A thousandth of a billionth of a second. 
17 A millionth of a billionth of a second. “A femtosecond is a very, very small amount of time. More femtoseconds elapse 
in each second than there have been hours since the big bang” (Scientific American, vol.21, no.1, spring 2012, p.67). 
18 A billionth of a billionth of a second. “Although the interval seem unimaginably brief, it is an aeon compared with the 
Planck time – about 10¯43 second – which is believed to be the shortest possible duration. See Lee Smolin’s Time Reborn 
(2013) for an engaging defence of the reality of time, against the consensus in contemporary physics of time as an illusion. 
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executions undertaken in a battle-space: aside from the spurious comfort of establishing, in the 
military example, what appears to be a definite instance of an order, what can we learn about the 
cognate from an arena where the following of orders is often a matter of life and death? 
Symptomatic of the shift in military thinking in the last 20 years is the debate which contrasts 
traditional conceptions of war with contemporary conceptions tempered by experiences of 
counter-insurgency: for instance, between the conception of military theorist Carl von Clausewitz 
(1780-1831) in his book On War (Clausewitz, 1830), and a modern day military theorist Emile 
Simpson, in his book War From the Ground Up (Simpson, 2012). Says Simpson of the Clausewitzian 
paradigm: 
 
…conventional war is often understood as a decisive, finite, event; the flow of direction 
is one way, from policy through various levels to tactical execution; the military execute, 
but do not question policy…that view is misguided; policy makers should be as close as 
possible, realistically, in the vicarious sense, to the political pulse of the conflict on the 
ground (Simpson, 2012; p.92). 
 
 
The sentiment expressed here serves to blur the boundaries between what constitutes an order, 
or in this case its genus in the guise of political expedient called “policy,” and likewise its execution: 
it even hints at a reversal of direction, with tactical execution informing policy. With the one-way 
relationship between policy and unquestioning tactical execution itself under question, given the 
exigencies of guerrilla warfare in Afghanistan and the need for the top brass to experience the local 
political conditions from the ground up for the policy they set to make sense, does this sunder the 
sequence in our order-execution cognate, and perhaps shatter it altogether? The threat does not 
stop there. Is the overall interactive structure of the cognate made equally redundant by the 
etymological ambiguities attendant on “order” in our brief excursion into military theory, where 
military force, however it is conceived, is equated with “establishing order,” “maintaining order,” 
or with “order as political equanimity” (Simpson, 2012; p.79)? How can one even posit, let alone 
defend, the sequential nature of relata that do not relate? Executing policy is one thing, but 
executing political equanimity? The latter is surely missing a trigger (no pun intended), an 
instruction, namely that on the basis of which political equanimity is founded. 
It is at this point, with the notion of sequence on hold, as it were, that I can begin to 
champion a different utility redolent within a distinctly temporal conception of sequence; the 
possibilities offered by a disruption to the Aristotelian notion of one-dimensional line of isolable 
moments (Aristotle, Physics, 4.10.217b29 – 4.14224a17, in McKeon, 2001) that constitute our 
common conception of linear time. This leads me to introduce the reader to the philosopher Martin 
Heidegger, and his work on time. Since the bulk of the remainder of this thesis will involve a 
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weighty, arcane and sometimes tortuous analysis of large tracts of Heidegger’s difficult thinking on 
the subject of time and being, and since we are in the last throat-clearing phase of introducing the 
overall topic of my so-called order-execution cognate, I wanted to take this opportunity to give a 
more folksy account of my own introduction, over the years, to the philosophy of Heidegger, which 
may serve the reader by explaining the source of some other motivations running throughout this 
thesis. 
I first encountered Heidegger’s writing in my early twenties when I was an undergraduate 
studying philosophy. At the time I was preparing to enter a Zen Buddhist monastery19 in the north 
of England, and I came across repeated references in Heidegger commentaries about the proximity 
of his thinking to that of (intellectualised) Zen Buddhism20. I spent a lot of my undergraduate time 
investigating and corroborating these connections prior to actually entering the Zen monastery21, 
though at the commencement of my monastic career no further study of Heidegger was possible, 
or defendable. After six years I left the monastery and pursued interests that eventually led me to 
work at Cranfield School of Management, by which time my dalliance with Heidegger’s thinking 
had not only returned but been strengthened. In recognising the potential for executive education 
to impact the lives of a highly influential class of individuals, I saw in Heidegger’s work the 
possibility for a philosophical reconsideration of the purpose of such a late occurring – career-wise 
that is – educative undertaking. Thus it is, as part bildungsroman, part anthropological approach, 
that I commend this thesis to the reader, who may begin to understand my wish to have executives 
understand their role in affecting unthinkable changes in our world order. 
I have no misconceptions about the restricted palatability of Heidegger’s thinking, or his 
person, on even the most pro-philosophy audience, least of all on the anti-philosophic and motley 
group of stakeholders addressed by my argument, most of whom would not expect to hitch their 
profit-making horse to such considerations as mine. I beg the reader’s patience in what I hope will 
be regarded as a gentle introduction to the time-oriented thinking of Heidegger, spread as it is 
across most of his philosophical career, and headed by six comprehendible themes of Heidegger’s 
own, which I take to be highly illustrative of his unique thinking about time: these six time-related 
                                                          
19 The reader should be aware that whilst this thesis will not explicitly foreground (the philosophy surrounding) 
Buddhism, there remains an abiding, though hidden, sympathy throughout these pages between Zen Buddhism’s arch 
doctrine of “no-self” (Anatta) and Heidegger’s staunchly anti-Cartesian rejection of a “subject” or self: this sympathy is 
what drew me to Heidegger in the first place – though my engagement with Zen Buddhism is spiritually oriented and not 
philosophically oriented, hence I will not be pursuing the philosophic parity between these apparently aligned themes, 
hence its “hidden” status. 
20 At heart the practice of Soto Zen – founded by Dogen (1200-1253) in Japan – is a fierce anti-intellectual emphasis on 
pure meditation. 
21 I was a postulant, then a novice monk, between 1988-94, in the “Order of Buddhist Contemplatives” – 
www.throssel.org.uk. For those wanting a textual reference to the practices of this order, see Roshi Jiyu-Kennett’s Zen is 
Eternal Life (third edition: 1987). 
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themes are death, anxiety, boredom, technology, history, and the event. I will split these six themes 
into two parts. The first part includes the chapters on death, anxiety, and boredom, all of which 
have a certain melancholy to them, which, far from being co-incidental, allows me to make a 
connection between chronological time ordinarily conceived and the Romantic22 mood of 
melancholy this chronic conception of time betrays. The second part includes the chapters on 
technology, history and the event, which, in distinction to the melancholy of Part One, are suffused 
with a brighter sense, one of opportunity, or Kairos23 in Greek. I will now give a brief overview of 
each chapter. 
 
Thesis Overview 
My primary focus for this thesis is on an executive education provision offered from a 
university-based business school, to a specific, or series of specific, multinational corporations. A 
wider definition of executive education would include all tertiary, graduate, post-graduate, life-
long, and non-certified open-enrolment programmes with a “business” oriented theme, or with 
decidedly market-oriented values. But given the pervasiveness of corporate values across most 
education provisions at the time of writing,24 such a wide scope for executive education is 
unworkable for my thesis. Which leaves me in a position of defending the corporate, that 
pantomime villain we all love to hate, the generator of immense wealth and power across all 
societies, as both the cause and effect of executive education. 
When is it justifiable to critique the “corporatisation” of a form of education that is 
dedicated to servicing corporates? Or put another way, what threshold is reached when an 
avowedly instrumentalised understanding of education, as executive education is, becomes 
untenable? Or again, on what grounds can a challenge be mounted against a non-state funded 
education provision customised for, and paid by, multinational corporations? The strongest answer 
to these questions25, despite its circularity, comes from the position of the corporate itself, that 
                                                          
22 Throughout this thesis I will be referring to Romanticism with a capitalised “R”. As a precedent to this usage, I follow 
Stephen Prickett’s example, in his European Romanticism: A Reader (Pricket, et al, 2014), who, given the enormity of his 
task, rightly acknowledges a “family resemblance” (ibid: p.15) between widely differing Romantic works of this period, 
across Europe. He also defines Romanticism as a language” (ibid: p.14), allowing him to capitalise the term. 
23 I will likewise be using a capitalised “K” in referring to Kairos throughout this thesis, following the precedent set by the 
Oxford Classical Dictionary (OCD, Third Edition, Hornblower, 1996) personification of the term. I will also italicise the 
term Kairos, given that the OCD offers it in untranslated form. 
24 A non-exhaustive list of critics and supporters of a neoliberal educational agenda are well represented in the edited 
collections Neoliberalism and Education Reform, by Wayne Ross and Rich Gibson (2007); The Assault on Universities, by 
Michael Bailey and Des Freedman (2011); Politics for a New Generation, by Nick Pearce and Julia Margo (2007); 
Neoliberalization: States, Networks, Peoples, by Kim England and Kevin Ward (2007); Contesting Neoliberalism: Urban 
Frontiers, by Helga Leitner, Jamie Peck and Eric Sheppard (2007); Working the Spaces of Neoliberalism, by Nina Laurie 
and Liz Bondi (2005). 
25 Routinely evidenced in nearly all requests into Cranfield for customised executive education. 
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body served by executive education, and goes like this: When that educative provision does not 
meet the needs of the corporate. And how so this? Because the knowledge and information 
included in that provision is not relevant to the specific corporate, or their market; because the 
academic research as the basis of this provision of knowledge and information is “too free,” that 
is, insufficiently pre-determinable by the buyer; and because the knowledge and information of 
the provision cannot be readily instrumentalised, or executed on, by the body of executives under 
orders by the corporate, to any standardly measureable effect. My dissatisfaction with this 
corporate solipsism is targeted at the standard and academically sanctioned disciplinary-based 
approaches to executive education provision – for instance, psychology, sociology, economics, and 
ethics – offered not just by business schools26, all of which make claims to redress the issue of 
relevance, and attempt to justify or critique the circularity of the provision. My choice of 
philosophical ontology is a deliberate methodological outlier to this disciplinary hegemony, offered 
as an experiment. Weakly stated my argument will be instantly dismissible for its outlying status; 
strongly stated, it poses a political threat to the hegemony, by lifting the veil of executive 
education. My argument is structured as follows. 
Chapter One begins my existentially-tinged argument with an examination as to why 
Heidegger chose the oppressive theme of death as a promising start to his overt reflections on 
time, in Division Two of Being and Time at least. Heidegger’s distinction between “death” and 
“demise” offers me the first chance to use his philosophy of time to prize apart the relata of my 
cognate, by orphaning execution as a pure ability, distinct from execution as a response to a specific 
order. Of all the possible cognate-shuffling permutations, such as order-less order, or execution-
less order, or order-less execution, I’ve based the Death Chapter on execution-less execution so as 
to begin to lift the veil on the above circularity, to reveal what a melancholy meditation on our 
mortality can do for the “executioner” of execution. The reader is introduced to Sanjay, an ironic 
figure, promised earlier, a self-mocking, melancholic, and impossible example of an influential 
senior corporate executive, a primal “ur-executive,” onto which I can drape the cloth of my 
argument. 
In Chapter Two we reconnect with Sanjay, this time attired as a budding Chief Human 
Resources Officer, undergoing a bout of anxiety. Heidegger is well known for his writing on the 
mood of anxiety, and this chapter traces this concept’s connection to time and temporality through 
                                                          
26 This disciplinary hegemony is upheld by a wide source of executive education provisions; from global consultancy 
companies, from the corporation’s own corporate “universities” and equivalent internal training bodies, from training 
and development companies, not to mention e-learning providers, and the business media. In a way, these “cultural 
circuits of capitalism,” as Nigel Thrift calls them, in his book Knowing Capitalism (Thrift, 2005: p.6), look to academic 
research by university based business schools to ratify the findings from each discipline, as well as sanctioning the 
disciplinary divisions themselves. 
Introduction 
 
- 29 - 
 
a melancholy-inducing confrontation with nothingness, as well as via Heidegger’s straightforward 
sounding, though shibboleth-like notion of “care”. What time makes available for me depends on 
what I care for, and so care and time, for Heidegger, are intimately connected. A familiarity with 
this particular rendition of “care” helps us to re-order time, to isolate time from its merely 
sequential character, thereby giving us another opportunity to halt our “chronically” chronological 
sense of time and look to alternative, and opportune, moments of vision through the melancholy 
mood of anxiety. 
Chapter Three continues the melancholy manner of investigating the chronically 
sequential time of the cognate, this time via the long-while (German: Langeweile) that is boredom. 
It is unusual to come across an extended treatment of the vaguely comic mood of boredom in the 
context of education, and I offer Heidegger’s not especially education-oriented views as a 
framework to reveal boredom’s timely character. Our familiarity with being bored, even if it is a 
mood we’d do anything not to be in, reveals our uncanny familiarity with time, even if it is 
something we’re trying to kill. As such, Heidegger’s point is that time has an educative potential, 
one that reveals to us, annoyingly, time stripped bare. Having Sanjay exposed to this raw time 
provides another opportunity to reconsider our executions from boredom, if not our boring 
executions, and the boredom in which we hold the orders under which we operate. 
With a change of tempo, I open Part Two of the thesis, introducing the sublimity of a 
Kairotic sense of time, in distinction to the merely sequential, and frankly melancholic, conception 
of chronological time. Kairotic time is equivalent to what Heidegger calls the “moment of vision,” 
or Augenblick, and points towards something he calls “originary temporality,” on which our sense 
of clock time is based. Starting with Chapter Four I show that his attempt to un-couple, to un-hitch 
sequential time, is not a form of temporal nihilism. I unearth this arch-concept of time and put it 
to work reframing Heidegger’s own famous essay concerning the enframing tendencies of 
technology, using his strange sounding concept of the “fourfold” of earth, sky, divinities and 
mortals. Heidegger’s fourfold is a decidedly temporal device, one that can rescue the executive 
from enslavement by the time of the corporation. Rather fantastically, I have Sanjay attempt just 
such a rescue, and leave the reader asking themselves whether “temporal truancy” in a corporate 
setting is actually possible. 
Chapter Five addresses Heidegger’s head-on temporal theme of history. By now I have 
introduced the reader to a parallel narrative that has begun to emerge through the chapters of 
Part One, that of German Romanticism. I start out by describing Romanticism as simply the 
intellectual headwaters of Heidegger’s thought, but soon move on to ascribe aspects of Kairotic 
time as justifiable, even necessary, under the Romanticist heading. I begin to introduce the positive 
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transposition between Heidegger’s concept of “formal indication” and “Romantic irony,” where 
irony not only allows me to explain the contrariness of much of Heidegger’s thinking – time, history 
and temporality included – using Romanticism, but where Romanticism itself becomes a defence 
of Kairotic time. Sanjay is himself transposed into a decidedly Romantic register in this chapter, 
piling the pressure on the reader to relinquish the sanctity of the sequence of the cognate. 
Chapter Six takes Heidegger’s difficult concept of Ereignis, translated as event of 
appropriation, as a proxy for the executive’s newly ordered educative event, the mode of 
experience in which Kairotic time can come to appearance for the executive. Picking up the 
Romanticist narrative, and the concept of Romantic irony, I present how I believe Heidegger 
himself may have positioned the chronic time of the sequence against the opportunity of Kairotic 
time, in the form of an oscillation between the two temporal types; as playing one type off against 
the other. Sanjay is once again pressganged to act as mascot for what I call “ironic productivity” in 
the face of the order-execution cognate, this time facing his mortality via his doctors’ orders. 
The concluding chapter summarises how I believe ironic productivity has emerged from 
my exploration of Heideggerian existential temporality, and why this pseudo-productivity is 
nonetheless a useful manifesto for resistance to the order-execution cognate, and the one-
dimensional time of corporations and their educative practices. It is possible to find a way of living 
that embodies an understanding of being, as time. 
I am under no illusion as to how heterodox this study may seem – put against 
contemporary executive education practice – with its Bohemian carnival of players, concepts and 
methods the reader is about to meet, which begs two questions; Who is my intended the audience 
for this thesis as a whole, and; What proposition am I putting forward for consideration by this 
audience? Firstly, this is not a thesis wholly suitable for hard-core Heideggerians, who can rightly 
criticise my having cherry-picked elements from his thinking at the expense of a lack of fidelity to 
his broader thought across his collected works (Gesamtausgabe), and who may well be 
uncomfortable with my having glossed over considerable subtleties therein: nor is this a text wholly 
suitable for senior executives, on grounds of its verbosity: which then beckons an unusual strain of 
“intermediate reader,” someone prepared to temporarily suspend the sharply delineated 
disciplinary regimes of scholarship and/or profit-making respectively. Which leads me to propose, 
secondarily, that the method under greatest scrutiny in this thesis is that of philosophy itself – its 
troubling tendency to make itself irrelevant to everyday concerns via its often hermetic jargon, at 
the same time as its capacity to reveal the world anew - and it is this that I commend to this hardy 
reader. To be indulgent of philosophical whimsy, yet merciless to our own capitalist and neoliberal 
whimsy, is the first step out of the prison of our own Zeitgeist, via thinking the unthinkable.
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1 
__________________________________ 
 
 
Death and the Execution-less Execution 
 
 
Mortals die their death in life 
(Martin Heidegger, Elucidations in Hölderlin’s Poetry, p.190) 
 
 
1.1 Introduction 
There is no easy way to put this: when our flow of blood stops, we die. Even using the 
language of business, this is still our final deadline; one we cannot miss, fail to execute, or see 
pursued to the end. Or rather, a little less brutally put, if our blood flow stops, then we die; where 
this adjustment for the sake of propriety, here, serves to mitigate our anxiety at the prospect of 
our worldly demise: not many in business, it seems, like to dwell on the business of death – the 
fact of my being “not dead yet” seeming to act for me as a powerful enough decoy against the 
distant and unpleasant prospect of my demise. The innocent seeming “when/if” distinction here 
has a temporal dimension to it: temporal both in the sense of flagging our worldly end as distinct 
from, say, our spiritual end – where worldly denotes secular, coming from saeculum for century or 
common age – as against a religious time of those who claim to live closer to an eternity; as well 
as in the sense of indicating our time not yet come, our own future, all the possibilities still left to 
us. The “when” heralds an absolutely certain future state, which happens to be still outstanding; 
with the “if” hinting at a wheeling, a hedging, or securing against a merely potential loss (hence its 
relative palatability), with a balance of life still owing until the debt is finally liquidated. Despite 
such finality, couched in robustly financial sounding terms, death has been the source of fascination 
and creativity for artists and spiritual leaders since time immemorial – literally, since time out of 
mind, since the beginning of humankind’s reckoning with time. In conjunction with religious and 
eschatological concerns of our fate, and from the aspect of an aesthetic sense, the face-off against 
finitude is the supreme motivating factor behind our species’ greatest artistic achievements.  
What then of those more profane, non-sacred, apparently non-artistic, business and 
commercial-related aspects of our collective historical endeavours facing off against finitude and 
1. Death and the Execution-less Execution 
 
- 34 - 
 
confronting death? Consider the figure of a corporate executive on their way to work, in a crowd 
flowing over London Bridge1. What of his or her motivations, achievements and executions against 
this final deadline? What impact does the prospect of death have on them? Have the vectors of 
their achievements been similarly powered by the anxiety-inducing motivational force of the 
“when” – the fact – of our death, as it has been for spiritual and artistic leaders, rather than the 
“if” of trading on its future and not yet realised potential? Or are we justified in our expectation of 
a significant asymmetry in the artistic or spiritually sanctioned achievements between the sacred 
and the profane, between the prophets and the men (usually) of profits? 
In this chapter, as part of an uncovering of the kinds of work that a philosophical reflection 
on the order-execution cognate can do, I will attempt to establish that executive education (in 
contradistinction to any other form of education for those in other of life’s stages) is an especially 
productive site for understanding Heidegger’s non-commonsensical notion of death, outlined in 
§46-54 of Division II of Being and Time (Heidegger, 1962: p.279-311). I will establish this fortunate 
concurrence in four stages: firstly, by briefly introducing the furore surrounding Heidegger’s 
confusing §46-54, with its poorly matched interpretative factions emerging within the secondary 
literature as a result; secondly, and via justifying my siding with the more experimental of these 
factions, by confirming a link between the forward “projecting” temporal aspects of existence 
(standing-out) and the forward projecting temporal aspects of execution (sequencing-out); thirdly, 
by equating Heidegger’s (re-) conception of death with “execution-less execution”; and lastly, in 
returning to the order-execution cognate, laying down a case for executive education becoming 
the site for loosening the grip between the cognate’s relata, thereby releasing execution per se for 
other, more timely, “profits”. The reason death is so important to Heidegger, in Being and Time at 
least, is that death discloses our futurity, “which is itself the first horizon we encounter of originary 
temporality, that fundamental structure of intelligibility that makes possible any understanding of 
being at all” (Thomson, 2013: p.261). Since we are on the hunt for Heideggerian time, which goes 
by the name of originary temporality, or “primordial authentic temporality” (Heidegger, 1962: 
p.399), our clearest glimpse of it, and often our first serious contemplation of it, comes from our 
looking ahead to our own death, and so, strangely, it makes sense to start with death. 
 
                                                          
1 Cue the apt lines from T.S. Eliot’s 1922 poem The Waste Land “Under the brown fog of a winter dawn,/A crowd flowed 
over London Bridge, so many,/I had not thought death had undone so many” (Eliot, 1974: p.54). As will be seen later in 
this chapter, this Dantean evocation of the “undoing” via death, and the possible reappropriation of these crowds to a 
new and reawakened purpose, will make (some) sense when death will be introduced as an execution-less execution. 
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1.2 Demise and Death in Being and Time2 
Even operating under the favourable conditions of a sharply delimited doctoral thesis, the 
incongruity of the above agenda – its antecedents and omitted explanatory preconditions – is a 
telling burden for me. That said, the path I feel delivers the most justice to the majority of 
constituents in my overall argument – e.g. the reviled figure of the corporate executive with their 
excessive pay, the figure (not so saintly himself) of Heidegger, the pessimistic perspective on 
excesses of instrumentalized, professionalized, vocationalized and technologized so-called 
executive education – is a direct confrontation with that ultimate leveller and end-stop of all 
enterprises, corporate or otherwise, human demise and death. Sadly Heidegger’s exposition of 
death, in Being and Time, by the account of most commentators, is incredibly confused, but goes 
something like this.  
Motivated to reawaken in us the question of the sense of being, the entire project of Being 
and Time pivots on this imperative of Heidegger’s, not least when it comes to appreciating the 
conditions required to live in a manner that embodies an understanding of being: this particular 
embodiment Heidegger calls Dasein3, which as a verb in German means “to be there”. The exotic 
sounding term is sometimes portrayed as synonymous with the entity of an individual person, and 
sometimes as that which is distinctive of humanity in general. But for our purposes I will follow 
John Haugeland’s usage, proximal as it is to Heidegger’s abiding motivation, of defining Dasein as 
a “way of living that embodies an understanding of being” (Haugeland, 2013: p.81-82), which at 
least allows a modicum of sense to be read into Heidegger’s own definition of death, given as 
follows: 
 
death, as the end of Dasein, is Dasein’s ownmost possibility – non-relational, certain and as 
such indefinite, not to be outstripped. Death is, as Dasein’s end, in the Being of this entity 
towards its end (Heidegger, 1962: p.303, emphasis in original).  
 
Peering through this tortuous phrasing is what seems to be a promise of an absurd seeming 
reprieve from death, of a “living of death in the being of Dasein towards its end”: a nonetheless 
miraculous reprieve that must surely require a new definition of death; which is exactly what 
Heidegger attempts to provide, and which is exactly the cause of such consternation in the 
secondary literature, and bewilderment amongst non-Heideggerians. As Iain Thomson (ibid) 
                                                          
2 This title is a transposed lift of Ian Thomson’s chapter title in Mark Wrathall’s Cambridge Companion to Being and Time 
(Wrathall, 2013: p.260). I am indebted to Thomson, and his particular chapter, for helping me make sense of the many 
interpretations of Heidegger’s §46-54 death chapter I have come across in researching my analysis. 
3 Of the three principle elements of Being and Time – being, time and Dasein – the one not mentioned in the book’s title 
takes up the majority of its text (Haugeland, 2013: p.76). Consequently, Dasein has received many interpretations: but, 
for this thesis, I will use John Haugeland’s controversial definition.  
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recounts, at the instance of a fellow (and incredulous4) Heidegger scholar confronting such a 
redefinition: “(as Hoffman once objected to me): ‘One can stretch the meanings of words, but only 
so far: Up cannot mean down; black cannot mean white, and death cannot mean something that 
you can live through!’” (Thomson, 2013: p.263, emphasis in original). I ask the reader to suspend 
judgement on the viability of this troublesome reassignment of “death” until such time as I have 
introduced the vital distinction Heidegger does concede, between “demise” and “death”: a 
distinction which frees, and focuses, Heidegger’s own site of philosophical work to concentrate on 
what it means to champion Dasein – namely “a way of living that embodies an understanding of 
being” (Haugeland, 2013: p.81-82) – and a distinction that also allows me to begin to champion 
execution as an embodied understanding of being, likewise. 
Along with his career-long motivation to reawaken the question of the sense of being, 
Heidegger needs to provide a complete account of the being of Dasein, which must therefore 
include an account of its end, as a condition of its “completeness”. However, if Dasein has future 
possibilities open to it as long as it exists, then how can it ever be grasped as a whole, since that 
would be tantamount to precluding Dasein’s freedom by prematurely delimiting its future 
possibilities? This is the stated purpose of his §46-54 on death, to provide that whole account of 
how Dasein can embody its understanding of being in the face of its not-being, or its end of all 
possibilities. However, by attempting such a complete account, and in keeping with the 
overarching, though revised, phenomenological method against which his philosophy is aligned, it 
becomes impossible for a Dasein to encounter its own death comprehendingly, as it were, which 
is demanded of the phenomenological method in philosophy per se. As Stephen Mulhall notes, 
“For when Dasein reaches its end, when it is no longer essentially related to what is not yet, and 
hence no longer essentially incomplete, it is also no longer there. Death is not something that any 
Dasein has or could directly experience” (Mulhall, 2007: p.299). Foreseeing this impossibility and 
absurdity, Heidegger substitutes our common sense notion of death for an intermediate 
phenomena he calls demise, thus: 
The ending of that which lives we [call] ‘perishing’. Dasein too ‘has’ its death of the kind 
appropriate to anything that lives… In so far as this is the case, Dasein too can end without 
authentically dying, though on the other hand, qua Dasein, it does not simply perish. We 
designate this intermediate phenomenon as its ‘demise’ (Heidegger, 1962: p.291). 
Even Hubert Dreyfus, as close a reader of Heidegger as any commentator, and at a loss to find an 
explicit gloss from the author as to the distinction between perishing and demise (Dreyfus, 1991: 
p.309), concludes on Heidegger’s behalf that only the elevated status of a Dasein could possibly 
                                                          
4 Not to mention non-Christian, judging from the object of his incredulity. 
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experience their own end as demise, whereas organisms, for instance, merely perish (ibid) in a 
purely biological sense. Where Ian Thomson marks out the distinctions between perishing, 
demising and dying under the rubric “Pears perish, but Daseins demise and die” (Thomson, 2013: 
p.265, emphasis in original), the average reader is understandably left confused as to the exact 
meaning of Heidegger’s term “death”. To clarify let us return to that portion of the Heidegger’s 
definition of death which raised suspicions earlier, the part which reads “Death is, as Dasein’s end, 
in the Being of this entity towards its end” (Heidegger, 1962: p.303, emphasis in original). It turns 
out to be possible to give an account of the whole of Dasein, including its death, if the death 
referred to is a condition in which Dasein can find itself in life, through which it can pass, and after 
which it can reflect on its own passing. Says Heidegger of this non-commonsensical death, “Death 
is a way to be, which Dasein takes over as soon as it is” (Heidegger, 1962: p.289). What exactly 
does Heidegger mean by death? 
 By far the best extant summary of the secondary literature’s wide variety of explanations 
of Heidegger’s notion of death is the one given by Hubert Dreyfus (Dreyfus, 2005: p.xxxi), in his 
foreword to Carol White’s posthumously published book Time and Death (White & Ralkowski, 
2005). After having read the majority of the commentators trading their interpretations, to have 
come across this elegant summary was a relief. My purpose in sharing this summary, in overview 
only, is to show how narrow and unlikely a path the reader must follow in order to reveal, what I 
believe to be, the most promising interpretation of Heidegger’s notion of death, and not 
surprisingly in my case, one that helps deepen the notion of execution, thereby contributing 
towards my redeeming of “executive education”. 
 Dreyfus orders his summary of interpretations by rank of their increasing plausibility, an 
index that is itself the product of his own Heidegger scholarship. The exegetical journey starts with 
the least plausible assumptions; that by death Heidegger means either an event at the end of a 
human life, or that “dying is a way of life that takes account of the certainty of that final event” 
(ibid). These are the cherished and longstanding interpretations of Heideggerian death attributable 
to Jean-Paul Sartre (Sartre, 1957) and Charles Guignon (Guignon, 1983) respectively5. Leaving these 
interpretations behind, as we have seen above, precludes all of the commonsensical readings of 
Heidegger on death. Next to be left behind are interpretations of death that see it as the closing 
down of possibilities, rather than having anything to do with demise (Taylor Carman, 1998); or as 
a hunkered-down readiness for the inevitable attack of anxiety that comes in prospecting death 
(William Blattner, 1994). Pressing on, no sooner arrived at than passed, so to speak, is one heroic 
                                                          
5 Since my purpose here is only to review an overview of a set of sub-optimal interpretations that will have little bearing 
on my argument, in order to reach the most productive set, I will not unpack the respective theories of each of the 
commentators Dreyfus mentions in his survey. 
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and one romantic interpretation, the heroic of which acknowledges that our individual identities 
can be lost (Dreyfus’ own interpretation, from Dreyfus, 1991); the romantic of which acknowledges 
that we disclose the world around us ourselves, and that only once this is realised can we die a 
“good death” (Julian Young, 2001). All of which brings us speedily to the two interpretations on 
which my thesis is based, where it is worth quoting Dreyfus in full. Of the two most plausible 
interpretations, he introduces them thus: 
 
Death is equated with world-collapse, and dying is understood as readiness for world-
collapse. 
a) Death is equated with the sort of world-collapse that can befall individual 
human beings, and dying is staking all on one’s current world, while sensing its 
vulnerability and being ready and able to give it up if it can’t be made to work 
[John Haugeland, 2013]. 
b) Death is equated with the sort of world-collapse that can befall a cultural epoch, 
and dying is striving to preserve the culture’s understanding of being while being 
ready to sacrifice it when confronted with anomalous practices that portend the 
arrival of a new cultural world [Carole White, in White & Ralkowski, 2005] 
(Dreyfus, 2005: p.xxxi, in White & Ralkowski, 2005). 
 
Though Haugeland’s interpretation6 is predominantly specific to a Dasein-oriented Being and Time, 
where White’s ranges more fruitfully across the less Dasein-oriented entirety of Heidegger’s works 
in the wake of Being and Time, their co-incidence is striking: striking enough to make me believe, 
firstly, that useful philosophical work could be conducted on reconceiving the figure of the 
executive (in instance a. above) as someone prepared for such “world-collapse”; and secondly (in 
instance b.), on reconceiving the homogenous “body executive” – the executive function conceived 
primarily in the context of the corporation – as a body prepared for such an epoch change; and 
where the site for these ambitious preparations is the executive educative process. 
 As to why it falls to a consideration of death to precipitate such an agenda for executive 
education, my suggestion is that it has to do with our making a stand in the face of death (either 
in the a. or b. sense of death above – it doesn’t matter which); specifically, our standing out into 
an intelligible world, as Dasein does in its way of living that embodies an understanding of being. 
Dasein embodies this standing out by choosing future oriented projects and executing on them, or 
carrying them out, bringing the “future” of those projects into fulfilment. As we learned earlier, it 
pro-jects – in the sense of favouring the throwing forward of – its dealings into future possibilities 
open to it as long as it exists, which is why Heidegger had to account for “Dasein’s Possibility Of 
                                                          
6 I hold Haugeland’s definition of Dasein as “a way of living that embodies an understanding of being” as part of the 
working through of his interpretation of death as world-collapse for an individual Dasein. 
Part One: Melancholically Chronic 
 
- 39 - 
 
Being-A-Whole, And Being-Towards-Death”, as the title (sic) of §46 has it (Heidegger, 1962: p.279). 
At which point, let us move to the second stage in my fourfold outline of how a philosophical 
examination of the order-execution cognate is an especially productive site for understanding 
Heidegger’s now (hastily) qualified notion of death. 
 
1.3 Standing-Out and Sequencing-Out 
It is a truism to say of a project that it pro-jects into a future. And while the term “project” 
is native to my argument’s constituents – within the mostly profit making contexts of multinational 
corporations, whose vast constellation of projects undertaken within and on behalf of the 
corporation’s shareholders, and whose overarching projects define the corporation’s purpose of 
maximising shareholder return – we all of us have forward looking projects: your project right now 
is reading and making a judgement about this thesis, as well as possibly earning a living, being a 
parent or lover, “a pet owner or any other identity-defining self-understanding”, as Ian Thomson 
calls such projects (Thomson, 2013: p.269). Remaining with Thomson, it is his critique of Haugeland 
and White’s coincidental and co-sustaining take on Heidegger’s death concept (see footnote 33, 
p.287, ibid) that has made me realise that the very notion of executive as ex-sequi, as sequencing-
out, is extremely close to what Dasein is doing in standing-out (Latin. ek-sistere) in its temporally 
structured way of living that embodies an understanding of being. That in sequencing-out of our 
future facing life’s projects we are at the same time standing-out, or properly speaking existing, 
where “’[e]xistence’ means a potentiality-for-being” (Heidegger, 1962: p.276), which is Dasein’s 
authentic and future-oriented mode of being; namely where “[t]he primary phenomenon of 
primordial and authentic temporality is the future” (Heidegger, 1962: p.378, my emphasis). Making 
this connection clearer (no small task) will require us to return to the demise/death distinction, the 
a) and b) interpretations of Haugeland and White, as well as examining Thomson’s critique more 
carefully. It will eventually provide us with a link to engage with what Heidegger calls the ecstasies 
(Latin. ek-stasis) of temporality, and puts us on a course for realigning our analysis of the order-
execution cognate with Heideggerian temporality. 
 Where to begin? It would be worth building up a case of how “world-collapse” could 
possibly come about, since I have rather skipped over the competing interpretations of Heidegger’s 
death concept. In which case I will look at “world-collapse” from the perspective of the figure of a 
fictional corporate executive (much in the manner of a typical, though para-fictional, “case study,” 
as used commonly in executive education by business schools) thereby providing a provisional 
basis from which to explore what Heidegger’s non-commonsensical notion of death could possibly 
mean, at the same time as introducing the reader to a typical consumer of the executive education 
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process. Whilst the incorporation of the device of a fictional corporate executive is intended for 
pedagogic purposes – to encourage, nay force, the reader to become embroiled in the complex set 
of ideas this thesis grapples with – this device is nonetheless a compromise: it attempts to balance 
a radically simplified and overdrawn take on Heidegger’s thinking with a nod towards the 
executions of profit-making undertaken by executives. Assuming the reader to be of the unusual 
“intermediate” variety7, I ask that you carry these provisos and these disciplinary temperings into 
the following pages, at least until you’ve faced-off your own disciplinary daemons. 
In order to set the scene and settle the reader in, consider the figure of Sanjay8, a 52-year 
old corporate executive, born in the slums of Gurgaon in northern India, near New Delhi. He has 
done well for himself. Let us have him quartered in Europe as the respected Senior Vice President 
for the Indian-based business process outsourcing operation of X-Corp, itself a New York Stock 
Exchange listed Software Company, specialising in outsourcing and offshoring of services. Imagine 
that Sanjay has a 30 year old son, living and working as a call centre manager in Gurgaon, just as 
he himself9 did many years ago. Let us also have him acting as the high ranking corporate patron 
of an executive education programme, designed to educate and develop his globally dispersed 
team – of direct reports within X-Corp – to lead the future business: all in all a fairly typical, if high 
level, picture of the basis of customised executive education, an assurance especially directed to 
those readers unfamiliar with this type of corporate focused bildung, or executive formation. Given 
Sanjay’s upbringing in the slums, he is no stranger to death (so my story goes), having spent most 
of his childhood living in anticipation of his grandparents dying (his parents already dead when he 
was a baby), in which early times he had scant hold on a means of survival. Sanjay is less afraid of 
dwelling on the topic of death. 
With this picture set, relative to Dreyfus’s earlier dismissal of Sartre’s and Guignon’s 
simplistic though common conception of death as an event, and a way of life with that event in 
mind, Sanjay clearly rejects this interpretation. Neither is death for Sanjay a closing down of 
opportunities (Carman), since Sanjay has seized all the opportunities placed in front of him to get 
himself where he now stands: nor does the prospect of death motivate him in readiness for an 
                                                          
7 See the last paragraph of the Introduction for why I invoke this particular strain of reader. 
8 Though mine is not an empirical study, this character has emerged from my research into differing workplace 
temporalities around the industrialised world, with half an eye to the inequalities and subsequent politics of so called 
24/7 working practices, particularly in globally dispersed call centres. See Winifred Rebecca Poster’s chapter (‘Saying 
‘Good Morning’ in the Night: The Reversal of Work Time in Global ICT Service Work’) in Beth Rubin’s book Workplace 
Temporalities (Rubin, 2007: p.55). With the character of Sanjay I need also to acknowledge that I’m playing with fire, so 
to speak, in that Sanjay will probably be interpreted as an instance of a “subject” in direct contradiction to Heidegger’s 
disavowal of subjectivity per se: it is not my intention to portray Sanjay as a “knower” standing against “the known,” (the 
death concept, for instance) which was a general view of “truth” that Heidegger was at pains to reject – see Richard 
Polt’s The Emergency of Being (2013: p. 90). Rather, my intention is to allow the reader to take a view point that will 
foster sufficient recognition to render the more arcane aspects of Heidegger’s thinking accessible. 
9 See previous footnote regarding the caution with which “self,” e.g. “himself”, should be interpreted. 
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anxiety attack prefiguring death (Blattner), since this seems to Sanjay rather cowardly and faintly 
absurd. Since also having embodied a range of identities that have animated his various causes, 
those which have helped him to climb out of the Gurgaon slums and into material and monetary 
wealth, death as the heroic relinquishing of an identity (Dreyfus’s own interpretation) means 
nothing to him, since he would then have been dead many times over, making a mockery of any 
genuine pathos he has had the right to feel, given the hardships he and his wider family has 
suffered. However, given his religious upbringing, dying a “good death” (Young) is important, 
though his spiritual world view starts, rather than ends, at the suggestion of our disclosing the 
world around us, and grows into a Buddhist cosmogony that is exceptionally richer than 
Heidegger’s: this particular death concept is likewise dismissed. So, before further appropriating 
Sanjay’s Dasein – his (fictional) way of living that embodies an understanding of being, an 
embodiment which is markedly at odds with our modern notion of a “self”10 – to our preferred 
interpretation of Heideggerian death, let me take stock of whether what is happening in the 
foregoing play of Sanjay is, methodologically, permissible.11 
What phenomenological sense can rightly be claimed of our encounter with Sanjay, given 
that Being and Time, at least, is famous for its non-Husserlian and non-Cartesian remake of the 
phenomenological method12 brought to bear on Dasein.  This method Heidegger defines as 
hermeneutic (Heidegger, 1962: p.62) and styled on letting “that which shows itself be seen from 
itself in the very way in which it shows itself from itself” (ibid: p.58), which is a case of describing 
phenomena in their own terms, “as a way the authentic sense of being is made known to Dasein”, 
as Daniel Dahlstrom describes it (Dahlstrom, 2013: p.158), or to use Michael Zimmerman’s 
rendering, as an ontology of “that kind of interpretation which allows an entity to show itself in the 
way appropriate to that entity itself” (Zimmerman, 1990: p.138). It would seem that so long as our 
analysis focuses on existence as the determining character of Dasein, and as the source of the 
phenomena to be studied (ibid: p.33, 61), all will be well. But all is not exactly as it seems with 
explicitly revealable “existence,” especially when by “the phenomenon” Heidegger also includes 
those classes of phenomena which are hidden. Revealing what is not seen – and therefore contra 
                                                          
10 See footnote 7 of this chapter: the reader should be aware I am taking liberties with my reading of Heidegger, 
principally for pedagogic reasons, reasons that allow me to put forward an interpretation, on behalf of the reader, of an 
executiveness that shows its way of being in a manner appropriate to “executiveness,” in the fashion that Heidegger’s 
hermeneutic phenomenology method supports. I am not suggesting that Sanjay’s Dasein is his “true self,” whatever that 
could mean. 
11 As a taste of where my dalliance with fiction is going in this thesis, and as a reminder of the power of the narrator in 
fiction, consider Erich Auerbach’s description of the freedom of Proust as narrator in his À la Recherché du temps perdu: 
“[t]he narrator is free to roam the world, uncoupled from the pitching deck of time as it unspools, and deeply immersed 
in the internal course of his emotions and in the melody of their expression” (Auerbach, 1925: quoted in Porter, 2014: 
p.161). 
12 It is commonly acknowledged that Heidegger’s relationship with, and exposition of, phenomenology changed over the 
course of his work. At this stage of my argument, I will concentrate on his phenomenology of the 1920’s. 
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Kantian styled phenomena which need to be directly apprehended – will have a bearing on the 
import we can give to demise and death, when we look squarely at what exactly it is we are fearful 
of regarding death as. Is it the pain of death, the loss of loved ones, our no longer enjoying life, to 
name but a few? Is there something else that we are anxious about regarding our death? As we 
will see, the hidden phenomena under examination later will be framed by a mood of an “anxiety 
about demise and death” that we (generally) do not acknowledge, much like how the phenomena 
of the being of beings remains hidden to most of us. Says Heidegger on the object of study of 
phenomenology, “[m]anifestly, it is something that proximally and for the most part does not show 
itself at all: it is something that lies hidden, in contrast to that which proximally and for the most 
part does show itself” (ibid: p.59, emphasis in original). This talk of the “hidden” is problematic for 
Sanjay, who not only does not exist (outside of his fictional status in this thesis) and so cannot 
rightly be said to have either explicitly apprehendable phenomena or hidden phenomena, but for 
whom I posit that which is hidden in my construction of him. Throughout this thesis my intention 
is to align, as a parallel discourse to the body and intent of my argument, a more methodologically 
oriented track that puts under scrutiny the place of the illusory or non-existent, i.e. the hidden, 
with respect to the order-execution cognate, in the light of Heidegger’s own dalliance with fictional 
characters13 and particularly with his play on time in his concept of Augenblick, the moment of 
vision: but more on this later. Let us now take a closer look at what it means to press forward into 
future projects, using Sanjay, as I am keen to reveal what Heidegger deems to be the source of our 
anxiety about death. 
To stand-out into ones’ projects, however they manifest, means that we have identified a 
future purpose towards which we have decided to strive: that we have ascribed value to the 
projects we have chosen, believing their execution to be worthy of our attention, and which 
provide some meaning, however provisional, to our lives. In a very real sense our projects become 
our existential possibilities, in that it is they into which we pour our identities, via roles and 
commitments that make us who we are. These projects shape and bound how we live our lives 
because they matter for us; because we care14 for them; because they are the future towards which 
we ourselves pro-ject. We can rightly say that our projects “stand” for something into which we 
project ourselves via execution, or via our carrying them out: and so it makes some sense, when 
speaking of Dasein existing, that Dasein stands-out. Ian Thomson renders “existing,” via the Latin 
as ek-sistere which means “standing-out,” into “temporally structured intelligibility” (Thomson, 
                                                          
13 I am thinking of the three imaginary conversations had, with characters Heidegger conjured, that make up volume 77 
of Heidegger’s complete works, translated as Country Path Conversations (Heidegger, 2010). 
14 Heidegger’s revealing concept of care (Sorge) is lurking in the wings of this discourse at this stage. The concept of 
“care” will play a prominent role in the next and subsequent chapters. 
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2013: p.264) whenever glossing any occurrence of Heidegger’s formidable phrase “Dasein’s 
primordial kind of Being” (Heidegger, 1962: p.291). What Thomson is referring to is Heidegger’s 
acknowledgement of the close etymological connection between ek-sistere, and ek-stasis, 
between existence and ecstasy. Whilst the latter term has not been fully introduced to the reader 
yet, ecstasis will have an important bearing on our discussion of temporality later when we realise 
that by the term “ecstases” Heidegger is referring to time and to temporality, and ipso facto to the 
nature of being that Heidegger is hunting down. It is worth bearing in mind that “[t]he primary 
phenomenon of primordial and authentic temporality is the future” (Heidegger, 1962: p.378, my 
emphasis), hence my interest in establishing what it means to exist via one’s pro-jecting into future 
facing executions. 
Consider Sanjay: it makes sense to say that throughout his early life Sanjay projected 
himself into a future, into a markedly better future than the slum circumstances he was born into. 
It is not a trivial point to make such a claim about projection, even though our common sense tells 
that we all proceed (or flop, depending on how resolute we’re feeling) into a future, since in 
Sanjay’s case his projects did not just present themselves unbidden; he had to engineer and 
manoeuvre himself into opportunities that were not naturally forthcoming, given the poverty of 
most of his early life. Building up a picture of the projects Sanjay had set himself to execute, let us 
imagine Sanjay growing up in the slums of Gurgaon; aspiring to get the money for his Grandma’s 
cataract operation; seeing his brothers and sisters enslaved by his Grandfather’s pottery kiln, 
themselves shunning education; joining the fight against the developers who were gradually 
stealing slum land; finally making it into the education system, and eventually securing a place at a 
renowned Indian university, going on to gain his MBA from an equally prestigious Indian institute 
of management.  
Setting aside for the moment issues concerning the fidelity this story has to what may 
actually pertain, it would seem as though this rags-to-riches “story” identifies a right and proper 
set of projects to execute: that these were somehow the inevitable and justified projects for Sanjay 
to have chosen to press forward into, and that, via his choices, he has completely banished once 
and for all any anxieties he may have about the apparently justified “ultimate purpose,” or 
teleology, of his struggled-filled existence via these executions. And yet those projects are 
(doubly15) contingent, in that a whole host of other project possibilities were possible16. In steering 
the argument back onto a heading towards what would constitute “world-collapse,” and remaining 
with this notion of contingency for a moment, consider the hypothetical question “what should 
                                                          
15 Not forgetting that I am the author of all of Sanjay’s travails. 
16 See Taylor Carman’s contribution to Dreyfus’s survey of the secondary literature in my earlier overview of the senses 
of Heideggerian death. 
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Sanjay have done with his life?”; or transpose this question to your own life. It helps in this regard 
to introduce a term Heidegger uses, “uncanniness” (unheimlichkeit) or “not-being-at-home,” to 
describe how there can be no seamless connection between Dasein’s existing and the projects we 
(or Sanjay) choose to make sense of our existing. As unsettling as this initially sounds, for me this 
turns out to be one of the gems of Heidegger’s discussion on death, since by introducing 
“uncanniness” we are left pondering what exactly our “home” is; where the dislocating question 
“what should I do with my life?” all of a sudden reveals an abyss above which our projects 
precariously “stand,” or shudder, or teeter; such a grave consideration reveals the 
“groundlessness” of our executions and our existence. Positively stated, by even tentatively 
entertaining the thought that what we “stand for” – in the completest sense of the term – can 
collapse, such a collapse, as Thomson says, is “the fundamental existential homelessness that 
follows from the fact that there is no life project any of us can ever finally be at home in, because 
there is ultimately nothing about the ontological structure of the self that could tell us what 
specifically we should do with our lives” (Thomson, 2013: p.270). Using Sanjay as an example, 
things could have been otherwise for him. At this stage I would like the reader to begin to imagine 
Sanjay’s tenacity to project himself into executing future projects, as this brief caricature has 
shown, as a capacity in its own right; not even as a capacity as such, but more as a mode of his 
being, in keeping with John Haugeland’s definition of Dasein; as if he could project himself without 
there being discrete projects into which he can pro-ject himself towards. I will return to this thought 
experiment in the next section. 
I need first to make the connection between our tentative encounter with a scare-quoted17 
“world-collapse” and how sequencing-out is a modal variation of standing-out; and how all of this 
is relevant to our overall discussion of demise and death. The foregoing has established as a 
preliminary definition of Heidegger’s notion of death, “world-collapse”; a global collapse of my 
world’s18 mattering to me, distinct from merely an event at the end of my life. We have seen how 
our existing is equated with our “making a stand,” and we have also encountered Heidegger’s 
insistence that it is on the basis of the future temporality (not “past” or “present” temporalities) 
                                                          
17 I will persist with my oven-glove scare quotes around “world-collapse” until such point in my argument where I can 
stand the heat and defend the term. 
18 As one of the staples of Heidegger’s philosophical vocabulary, as Daniel Dahlstrom warrants (Dahlstrom, 2013: p.237) 
it, the term “world” in Heidegger has a precision of meaning that is not captured by our common sense of the term as 
the totality of facts (Witgenstein, 1951), or our global environment. As Dahlstrom notes of the term as used in Being and 
Time, “Heidegger distinguishes four meanings of ‘world’: (1) the totality of entities on-hand within the world, (2) the 
manner of being of entities on-hand within the world (or a certain region of such entities, e.g. the world of mathematics), 
(3) the place in which, being-here (da-seiend), we factually live and dwell (e.g. the public world, a household), and (4) the 
manner of being proper to being-in-the-world” (Dahlstrom, 2013: p.237, emphasis in original). Uses (1) and (3) are closest 
to our everyday, ontic, uses of the term, whereas uses (2) and (4) carry an ontological sense. In my usage of the term to 
which this footnote refers, I am using senses (1) through (3), in the dissolution, via “world-collapse”, of everything that 
affords meaning to my life. It will take the balance of this thesis to show what Heidegger means by (4). 
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that our most authentic standing-out as projecting should be considered. My modest claim at this 
stage is that the activities of “projecting” and “sequencing” are synonymous: that by laying out, by 
planning and executing a sequence of actions towards a future state, one is effectively making a 
stand via this execution; one is acting out one’s existence, demonstrating a living embodiment of 
one’s understanding of being: in short, that in sequencing-out (in executing) one is being Dasein 
explicitly. 
 
1.4 Execution-less Execution 
All I am left with, once the arbitrariness of my projects are revealed, once I am prepared 
to acknowledge that it is at least possible to be unable to project myself into projects that would 
normally give my existence meaning; all I am left with, then, is mere projecting. That this is a tricky 
paring-down even to imagine, least of all live through, assigns weight to the term “world-collapse”; 
it is a complete breakdown: it is, short of our blood flow stopping, fundamental, and goes some 
way to explain why Heidegger (though not unprecedentedly19) did not think our current biological 
conception of death up to this most severe of all rebirths. As difficult as it is to conceive of existing 
when all you have stood for no longer has meaning; as difficult as it would be to conceive of your 
yearly, monthly, or minute-by-minute rhythm of sequenced executions purportedly leading you 
towards the ends that give your life meaning, as somehow no longer providing any meaning 
whatsoever; given the horror of this, it is at least possible to conceive of – albeit amidst your anxiety 
of this state of affairs ever becoming an actuality. I ask the reader to dwell with this anxiety a little 
longer than is comfortable, if your interest is to get to the bottom of what Heidegger means by 
death and why he is even talking about it, since this effort will, inter alia, help surface the distinction 
between his confusing terms of “demise” and “death” and serve to loosen one’s assumptions about 
the sanctity of our death taboos. Revisiting the said quote above (Heidegger, 1962: p.291), where 
our incredulity about living through death all started, the horrific sweeping away of all meaning, as 
if you were witnessing your home and your town being swept away by a tsunami, is exactly what 
Heidegger means by death. Remaining with the tsunami20 metaphor, “demise” would be your 
being swept away and losing your life by drowning in the catastrophe we would normally call death; 
                                                          
19 The state of enlightenment in Zen Buddhism, otherwise known by the terms kensho, satori, or realisation, is a 
longstanding example of such a living death. This is one of the points in the narrative that beckons an engagement with 
the formal discourse on the influence of Eastern modes of thought on Heidegger’s own. See, for instance, Reinhard May’s 
Heidegger’s Hidden Sources: East Asian Influences on His Work (May, 1996), and John Caputo’s The Mystical Element in 
Heidegger’s Thought (Caputo, 1986). 
20 See The Tsunami and the Cherry Blossom, a “Sundance” 2012 film by Lucy Walker, for a graphic and moving account 
of quite what “total world-collapse” might begin to mean (and look like). It is worth noting, however, that even the 
depictions in this movie do not latch on completely to what Heidegger is aiming at in his reconception of death: not all 
instances of survivors living in a state of Heideggerian “death,” properly speaking, were depicted as, or could be called, 
authentic. 
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existential death would be losing the grip of a loved one in the deluge, witnessing their demise, 
and surviving with nothing that you “stand for” left intact. Here then also, amidst the metaphorical 
mangle of debris caused by this sweeping away of meaning-affirming existence, lies the source of 
confusion that Heidegger has (unwittingly) unleashed, between death as demise and death as 
existential death, in §46-54 of Being and Time. For the survivors of the Japan tsunami of 11 March 
2011, it may well have been preferable to have been killed – to have demised – than to have had 
to live through seeing the meaning of their lives swept away in front of them. And yet, seemingly 
perversely, being landed back into a world stripped of your familiar meaning-making projects, with 
only your ex nihilo ability to continue to execute intact, Heidegger identifies positively this kind of 
death as: 
death, as the end of Dasein, is Dasein’s ownmost possibility – non-relational, certain and as 
such indefinite, not to be outstripped. Death is, as Dasein’s end, in the Being of this entity 
towards its end (Heidegger, 1962: p.303, emphasis in original).  
 
That this kind of reconceived and existential death announced in this quote is not only survivable, 
but also already part of what it means to live in a way that takes complete account of what it means 
to exist knowingly, gives meaning to his phrase “being-towards-death” (Heidegger, 1962: p.279). 
The question still remains, is it possible to exist after this form of death on the sparse diet, as it 
were, of empty executing, of being willing to execute, but with nothing to execute? Not only is 
Heidegger’s answer to this a resounding “yes”; this affirmation becomes both the sole purpose for 
living authentically, as well as the rationale for the often misunderstood second Division of Being 
and Time, allowing a subtle re-appreciation not only of the first Division, but of the unfinished, 
though fragmentarily published, third Division21. As Carol White says of her long time engagement 
with §46-54, “[t]he new meaning taking shape in the chapter on death began to reach out into the 
surrounding chapters, especially the ones on Dasein’s experience of time. The ontological level of 
the whole discussion in the second half of Being and Time shifted from the personal and subjective 
to the cultural and historical” (White & Ralkowski, 2005: p.l). (I have found Carol White’s 
observations singularly constructive, consoling, and brave, with respect to appreciating 
Heidegger’s notion of death, as I’m sure she did prior to her own death after a longstanding illness.) 
Her point about broadening the focus from the seemingly subjective Dasein, outwards to cultural 
and historical horizons, will have considerable implications in justifying this thesis’s overarching 
intention of proposing a suspension (if that makes any sense at this stage) of a purely sequential, 
or more properly, chronological sense of time in understanding the order-execution cognate. To 
                                                          
21 Narrative in the remaining chapters will draw from these (Division III) works, which, in English translation, will include 
The Fundamental Concepts of Metaphysics (Heidegger, 1995) and The Basic Problems of Phenomenology (Heidegger, 
1982). 
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set the stage for this so-called suspension of a chronological sense of time using the foregoing, I 
can now show that the congruence between standing-out and sequencing-out allows me to claim 
that not only is “projecting” the basis on which my existence can continue to make sense in the 
face of, and subsequent to, Heideggerian death, but that death, properly speaking, is “project-less 
projecting” (Thomson, 2013: p.278, emphasis removed) in the face of world collapse: mutatis 
mutandis, that Heideggerian death can therefore equally be termed “execution-less execution”.  
While there is the fortunate concurrency22 between the terms “execution” and “death,” 
and now that I have committed myself to an interpretation of what Heidegger calls “death” – 
namely, the project-less projecting we experience in the wake of “world-collapse” – it still does not 
quite make sense to say that suspending or arresting execution is itself a form of (Heideggerian) 
death; that execution-less execution is a form of death. An executive’s failure to carry out an order, 
while quite possibly incurring opprobrium, is not itself deathly. Simply claiming execution-less 
execution to be a form of death is a confusing locution, one which smacks of cod-Heideggerian 
blather from, what’s more, an ultra-orthodox neophyte. That said however, head bowed, I would 
still like to examine further the implications of this bastard and provisional phrase, if only to 
convince the reader that it is possible to conduct philosophical work on something so inane 
seeming and inviolable as my order-execution cognate. There are three approaches to examining 
this swapped out phrase execution-less execution that I would like to engage with to commence 
this job of work; these are normative, teleological and anxiety-based approaches.  
With the last of these first, I will defer an extensive discussion of the anxiety-based 
approach to my next chapter, as there will be more to explore – with the help of Sanjay – about 
whether anxiety can or should be induced in the form of an executive education that prefigures 
execution-less execution. For the moment it is worth giving a preliminary introduction to 
Heidegger’s concept of anxiety (Angst) first, in a discussion around his analysis of death, since angst 
(hidden or otherwise) regarding our death has an impact on our preparedness for world-collapse, 
or as he calls it our “being-towards-death” (Heidegger, 1962: p.277). In that book, one of 
Heidegger’s few concessions to engaging the reader is the trope of a fake (usually leading) 
question, one of which he deploys with regard to angst, thus: “[h]ow is it that in anxiety Dasein 
gets brought before itself through its own Being, so that we can define phenomenologically the 
character of the entity disclosed in anxiety, and define it as such in its Being…?” (Heidegger, 1962: 
p.228): how indeed? Fortunately, having wrestled with his death concept thus far, we can relatively 
                                                          
22 Fortunate because apophantic, in the sense that Heidegger uses it (Heidegger, 1962: p.56) to mean letting something 
be seen as objectively true, distinct from deriving that truth via subjective judgements. For instance, it makes more sense 
to transpose the terms “execution” and “death” than it does “execution” and “life”: the former has an apophantical 
signification which the latter does not (though this did not stop Heidegger proceeding to mean by death a form of life). 
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easily, and in leisured fashion, gloss his fake question thus: “in glimpsing the nothingness of our 
familiar world via world-collapse, what is it that compels us to continue to embody our being, our 
Dasein, in project-less projecting, or in execution-less executions?” The not surprising answer to 
this is; our angst: which is reason enough to cue up a fuller examination of angst later. But he does 
not mean by this our fear of our eventual demise, going so far as to call such fear “cowardliness in 
the face of anxiety” (Heidegger, 1962: p.311). What I take it he means here is that our fear in the 
face of our impending demise is but a shield to block the even more horrific prospect of our actually 
surviving “world-collapse”: such standardly conceived fear is only a decoy to this horror. As Ian 
Thomson has it,  
 
Heidegger’s startling claim – that our fear of our eventual demise is really just a way of fleeing 
our anxiety about the core self laid bare by the global collapse of worldly projects in what he 
calls “death” – is so strange that, as far as I know, no interpreter has explicitly thematized and 
addressed it. Instead, it is most often miscognized: death is misunderstood as demise 
(Thomson, 2013: p.279). 
 
This is a rousing call, and one I would like to answer. As such, this observation of Thomson’s is the 
reason I have remained close to his interpretation of death in particular, in this thesis chapter. As I 
mentioned at the start of the “Standing-Out and Sequencing-Out” section, Thomson has taken the 
risky step of jumping over, in the fashion of Hubert Dreyfus (Dreyfus, 2005: in White & Ralkowski, 
2005: p.xxxi), an array of interpretations of Heidegger’s death concept that fell short of engaging 
fully with the candidature of “world-collapse” as the potential meaning of death: risky since non-
commensensical, or non-phenomenological, in the eyes of the “also-rans” – e.g. how can you 
survive death and who could make such a claim23? Though it is Thomson’s critique of the 
champions of that interpretative struggle, John Haugeland and Carol White – the duo backed by 
Dreyfus (ibid) – that establishes the role played by angst as the pivot around which demise and 
death gain their new, post-commonsensical, senses. Of these two interpreters he says, “rightly 
insisting on the difference between death and demise should not lead us to err in the opposite 
direction, as Haugeland and White clearly do, prying death and demise so far apart that they 
entirely overlook the crucial interconnections linking the two phenomena together” (Thomson, 
2013: p.275: see also see footnote 33, p.287). By completely un-associating demise from the 
existentially conceived death of “world-collapse”, as Haugeland does (Haugeland, 2000: p.66), it 
becomes difficult to reconcile Heidegger’s recurrent (in Being and Time) and angst-related themes 
                                                          
23 Cue a Christian argument that places Christ in just such a position, thereby rescuing Heidegger’s discussion of death 
away from desacralized accusations of nihilism: see George Pattison in his book Heidegger on Death: A Critical 
Theological Essay (Pattison, 2013). I have a problem with taking this type of death (and resurrection) at face value, and 
so will not be pursuing Pattison’s argument. 
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of fleeing, Das Man, and authenticity24 with the central role that death plays in his argument, 
especially when existential death is “the project-less projecting we experience in the wake of the 
global collapse of the inauthentic one-self [Das Man] each of us continually accrues [flees]” 
(Thomson, 2013: p.278, my emphasis). The fear we have of demise is perfectly justified; only we 
should see, says Heidegger, that particular fear as “noise” attenuating a barely perceptible, 
because preternatural, angst that accompanies existential death. 
 
1.5 The Moment of World Collapse 
It is tempting to imagine dastardly cartoon villains, or arch “baddies” in Bond movies, or hapless 
placard-wearing doom mongers, when considering something so absurdly totalising as “world-
collapse,” especially in the context of our genteel philosophical lives – the lives of you as reader 
and me as writer of a philosophically oriented thesis. The fact that Heidegger is (deadly) serious 
might come as something of a shock25. In setting out for us, in a chain of intricately interconnected 
arguments across the breadth of his philosophical writing, using freshly minted technical 
vocabularies, how we can come to terms with our own death and live more authentic lives, 
Heidegger certainly gives us pause to think more deeply about what the finitude of our existence 
reveals concerning the remaining possibilities of our existence. This deeper thinking about finitude 
makes most sense, not surprisingly I’d say, in relation to time. My engagement starts, in Being and 
Time, with the term Augenblick, translated as “the moment of vision,” which has two meanings in 
that text: the authentic present (Heidegger, 1962: p.387) and the unity of authentic time generally 
(Heidegger, 1962: p.376). At this early stage I’ve not had the chance to marshal my argument 
sufficiently to justify the value that Augenblick will bring to my time-focused analysis: suffice to say 
that “authentic time,” addressed by the term, affords, unsurprisingly, an appreciation and analysis 
of non-authentic time in its (negative) definition. As the Introduction stated, these two types of 
time I have assigned to the two parts of this thesis: chronic time, or less pejoratively, chronological 
or sequential time, to the three chapters of Part One; and Kairotic time, or the time of the “moment 
of vision,” to the three chapters of Part Two26. My point, at this early stage, in jumping ahead to 
                                                          
24 Concepts that I have not glossed, assuming some familiarity on the part of the reader with these in Division I of Being 
and Time. 
25 Though, as Andrew Haas suggests in his book The Irony of Heidegger (Hass, 2007), “what if all this were not so serious? 
And what if the feign to philosophical seriousness was merely a ploy?” (ibid: p.3). I’m sufficiently intrigued by the power 
of irony that I’ll use ironic readings of the more arcane and impenetrable portions of Heidegger’s texts to bring to 
attention what I take to be left-over, or remaindered (as the title of my Conclusion has it) interpretations from both 
uncritically orthodox and critically prejudiced receptions of his work.  
26 The “chronic” and “Kairotic” distinctions also form part of Frank Kermode’s argument about time, in his book The Sense 
of an Ending (2000), where, in the context of literary fiction, these same terms serve to contrast the reason of “chronos” 
from the imagination of “Kairos” (ibid: p.63), in order to highlight the mere successiveness in the interval between “tock-
tick” (ibid: p.46) in works of literary fiction. Says Kermode, “the interval must be purged of simple chronicity, of the 
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the Part Two themed “moment of vision” (Augenblick) is to establish what Heidegger is trying to 
show us in the death/demise distinction: that it is possible to conceive of time as non-sequential, 
as not just the passaging of “nows,” one after another, chronologically speaking, until the sequence 
of “nows” ends with our demise; but that, with existential death, what is revealed is an opening 
onto a different, a non-chronological notion of time, “a kairological time – in which a new order 
becomes possible, in which new possibilities for life, knowledge and the whole of human conduct 
open up” (Ó Murchadha, 2013: p.1). 
My demise comes at the end of my life, where my life is characterised chronologically, as 
a sequence of days, months, years, as well as a sequence of experiences, of relationships, of high 
points and low points, brutally put. My existential death comes when everything that gives my life 
meaning is swept away – which the tsunami metaphor illustrates equally brutally – and where I 
have to begin again in the wake of this catastrophic loss. Only in this second instance, in existential 
death, do I get the chance to see, and to subsequently act in the shadow of, my own totality, my 
own finitude, and experience what Felix Ó Murchadha, in his book The Time of Revolution: Kairos 
and Chronos in Heidegger, terms “Kairological time” (ibid). This experience is of “world-collapse” 
in all its horror, a world-collapse ripped of its scare quotes; a world-collapse all the more horrific 
because we survive it. At this stage of my argument, what I believe Heidegger is showing us in the 
death/demise distinction, inter alia, is an opportunity to acknowledge not just our finitude, which 
can come to us most days, in nothing like an extreme case of world-collapse; rather, the 
opportunity to acknowledge time differently, to experience a rupture in our standardly conceived, 
chronological and sequential conception of time. In short, that we can make some sense of what 
“authentic time” might be by dwelling on what existential death means. As we’ve seen, Heidegger 
calls this mode of preparedness “being-towards-death”. 
  Assuming that I can equate existential death with execution-less execution, and 
that I can dress this up to make sense: what use would that have for our executive Sanjay, exactly? 
Sanjay’s coming to terms with his being-towards-death – him confronting his anxiety about 
surviving a collapse of his world of meaning making, while still finding a way of living that embodies 
an understanding of being (the meaning of Dasein) – is not a big deal for him. He only has to look 
at where he’s come from to see the contingency of his existence thus far. As a sickly Dalit-caste 
child in the slum he has been close to demise several times: he’s also directly experienced his family 
losing everything they’ve owned, when the greedy property developers demolished their shack, 
kiln and entire livelihood. He and his family came through this episode, despite witnessing the 
                                                          
emptiness of tock-tick, humanly uninteresting successiveness” (ibid: p.46): echoes of Walter Benjamin’s “empty time” in 
Illuminations (Benjamin, 1999: p.263). 
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ongoing destruction all around them, where they never felt safe thereafter. And so what Heidegger 
is articulating in §46-54 of Being and Time about death is not much of a rupture for Sanjay; it’s all 
rather normal, if a tad convoluted. The point at which it begins to resonate with Sanjay comes with 
Heidegger’s talk of “authentic present,” a moment which accurately describes how the young 
Sanjay, and his extended family, confronted the moments of their existential deaths. At no point 
during the immediate aftermath of their shack’s destruction did despair or any notion of 
victimhood disrupt the resolve he felt towards his future existence. In his subsequent late 
adolescence, during his uptake of charity from an educational aid organisation, and his steady climb 
back into higher education as a consequence, Sanjay can ascribe the basis of this resolve, its source 
of energy, to his so-called moment of vision through his “existential death”. This is a helpful 
articulation for Sanjay. Now, “magically,” as a successful senior executive in X-Corp, he is 
disappointed not to have the stories he tells to his staff about his past precipitate a deeper 
understanding of how time is conceived, and how it could be re-conceived, inside that corporation. 
Time is running out for him to convey his resolve to his peers. As for execution-less execution, 
whilst it seems to describe a readiness for goal-less action, Sanjay is perfectly aware of the pressing 
orders that need executing against X-Corp’s strategic imperatives of increasing shareholder return, 
and can make no sense of at the moment of an order-less execution. 
 Leaving Sanjay’s narrative at this point, and as an update on the confession I made at the 
start of this chapter – the one that acknowledged the incongruity of the agenda that I have set 
myself the task of justifying, and how telling a burden this is for me – I would ask the reader to view 
my efforts in the light of providing alternative (and burdensome, because philosophical) ways of 
examining this phenomena called “executive education”. The alternatives considered here are 
Heidegger’s overlapping onto-ontological analyses of being that (unfortunately, unsurprisingly) 
betoken their own derision in the instrumentalized and vocationalized circles that purport to 
educate the patrons27 of our globally neoliberalized society, alternatives which nonetheless face-
off the standardly deployed counter-arguments couched in the ethical, psychological and scientific 
discourses, none of which are especially suited to uncovering a way of living that embodies an 
understanding of being (Dasein) of our executions. The rest of my burden refers to conducting this 
reappraisal while looking out from within the glass-walled towers of said circles, as one of the 
plotters28 and not as one of my disaffected compatriots in the public spaces down below. 
                                                          
27 I do not mean to preclude all of us as partaking of the fruits of such a society: we are all accomplices and patronisers 
of the neoliberal end game. I am not referring to some conspiratorially minded elite, either, as the rulers of such a society, 
as tempting and as convenient as this would be. The onto-ontological lessons of Heidegger and his interpreters apply 
equally to the Davos-attending chief executive and any mean-spirited banker, or member of the so-called one percent, 
as they do to any believer in existential death. 
28 See the Introduction chapter as a reminder of my own role in the provision of executive education. 
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With not much for you to go on at the moment, it still makes some initial sense to say, 
then, of our standardly chronological conception of time that it is askance of whatever Heidegger 
means by “authentic time,” the time of Augenblick or the moment of vision, or Kairological time. 
It also makes initial sense to say that our normative conceptions of “order” in the order-execution 
cognate, normally conceived, is a lexical representation of a modern-day skilful expedient that 
routinely sees orders executed, sequenced-out, in a timely (sequential, and therefore 
chronological) fashion. The ends towards which, and in the service of which, executions are 
sequenced-out are orders predicated on the viability of such sequencing. As the previous chapter’s 
list of modes of execution revealed, all examples of execution are based on a judgement of the 
likelihood of that order’s sequencing-out being sequenced-out, irrespective of value judgements 
surrounding the intent of the order or the competence of the mode of execution. Thus, a symphony 
being playable, a policy being implementable, a piece of software code being runnable; all of these 
executions are viable sequences. What, then, of this viability when it does not pertain to an actual 
execution, as in the case brought about by Heidegger’s concept of existential death; what would 
an execution-less execution reveal of the sequencing and of the original order? What would remain; 
and to whom should a schooling in this superseded execution fall? What sort of executive 
education curriculum would this constitute, if in fact it is even amenable to being the subject of an 
education? 
Given the proximity of anxiety to one’s fear of death, and how, as Heidegger said in this 
chapter’s opening epigram “mortals die their death in life,” in the next chapter I will explore 
whether anxiety can or should be induced in the form of an executive education that prefigures 
execution-less execution; quite what profits this will secure; and against what resistances the vim 
of a Kairotic (non-chronological) take on time will be set.
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__________________________________ 
 
 
Anxiety is Nothing 
 
 
 
 
[A]nxiousness as a state-of-mind is a way of Being-in-the-world; that in the face of which we 
have anxiety is thrown Being-in-the-world; that which we have anxiety about is our potentiality-
for-being-in-the-world. Thus the entire phenomenon of anxiety shows Dasein as factically 
existing Being-in-the-world. The fundamental ontological characteristics of this entity are 
existentiality, facticity, and Being-fallen. 
(Martin Heidegger, Being and Time, p.235) 
 
 
2.1 Introduction 
One of the motivating factors of this thesis is my concern about how the monological, 
hegemonic and ultimately iniquitous nature of contemporary western capitalism provides the main 
ordering principle1 with which the figure of the corporate executive should make sense of their on-
going professional development. Executive education, as part of this development process, is 
geared towards optimising an executive’s capacity to execute against the corporate imperative, in 
turn, making the corporate more competitive in the market; executive education is therefore 
complicit in the iniquities of capitalism. I believe the state of “anxiety” to be one that adequately 
represents a fundamental orientation for this executive towards his or her hyper-capitalist 
existence. With only the race-to-the-top as that against which to judge one’s success as a senior 
corporate executive, the losers are not only those executives that do not want to aspire to higher 
status or riches – suffering as a result the contempt of the paradigm cases of successful executives 
who (should) do – but all ordinary people whose indices of virtue are not a measure of the capacity 
to out-earn the greedy supermanager2 or the asset and property owning billionaires. Suffering in a 
                                                          
1 Other routinely accepted standards, or orders, with which to gauge the merit and worth of one’s on-going professional 
development, independent of profession, are enjoyment, happiness and non-monetary reward from one’s work. 
2 In Thomas Piketty’s surprise bestseller, Capital in the Twenty-First Century (Piketty, 2014) the senior executive is 
equated with what Piketty calls the “supermanager,” thus: “The final and perhaps most important point in need of 
clarification is that the increase in very high salaries primarily reflects the advent of ‘supermanagers,’ that is, top 
executives of large firms who have managed to obtain extremely high, historically unprecedented compensation 
packages for their labor” (Piketty, 2014: p.302). As Danny Dorling says of these super-rich, in his Inequality and the 1% 
(2014), “[i]t is up to the rest of us to control these people – for their own good as well as ours. We can document their 
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state of anxiety is therefore a common experience, if not the default, for the executive; for the rest 
of us it may well constitute a midpoint between the feelings of oppression and resignation in our 
consumerist existences.  
But this does not mean anxiety is always a negative state, or that it is a psychological state 
at all. Instead, following on from Ian Thomson, who remarks about “Heidegger’s startling claim – 
that our fear of our eventual demise is really just a way of fleeing our anxiety about the core self 
laid bare by the global collapse of worldly projects in what he calls ‘death’” (Thomson, 2013: p.279) 
in the previous chapter, I will introduce here a Heideggerian variety of anxiety; an anxiety which 
reveals the horror of world-collapse, an anxiety that has a decidedly existential outlook, but one 
that opens onto a more promising landscape than it would be routinely credited as giving, and one 
which will help me reconceive how the executive and executive educator should view “time” with 
respect to the order-execution cognate. 
The purpose of the present chapter is to use Heidegger’s negative-seeming melancholic 
spirit of anxiety to reveal potentially exhilarating prospects for fundamental change, for both the 
individual executive and the corporations he or she works in, and most certainly for executive 
educators. This about-face for such a dreary seeming mood rests on a distinction between two 
types of time, the chronic and the Kairotic; or rather, the extent to which our way of “finding” a 
living that embodies an understanding of being (which is our working definition of Dasein) 
appreciates and lives out both of these types of time in the process of “finding”. 
I intend to oversee this unexpected transformation in three stages: firstly with an 
introduction to Heidegger’s unusual conception of anxiety as a rare occurrence of what he calls a 
“ground mood,” a manifestation of anxiety in marked contrast to the symptoms of the more clinical 
varieties of anxiety that we are familiar with and which are  treatable psychopharmacologicaly and 
therapeutically; secondly, by introducing his notion of “nothingness” as that which is revealed in 
such a ground mood; thirdly, to introduce to the thesis Heidegger’s concept of “care” (Sorge), and 
with it the all-important correlate to that of being, namely time. In this fashion, together, we will 
steadily work our way through Heidegger’s baroque-sounding opening epigram, his own definition 
of “anxiety” from Being and Time. Turning to that epigram, my first introductory section will map 
from the “being-in-the-world” and run up to the second semi-colon: the second section on 
“nothingness” expanding on what our “potentiality-for-being-in-the-world” means; and the third 
section expanding on the last two sentences of the definition, unpacking what “factically" means 
                                                          
greed, the size of their yachts, the frequency with which they fly…” (ibid: p.173). How will executive education itself 
accommodate this scrutiny? 
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and revealing that “existentiality,” “facticity,” and “being-fallen” are correlates of the tensed3 
temporal modes of future, past and present respectively. 
Positively stated, in the language of Being and Time, in “being-towards-death” (Heidegger, 
1962: p.279), and in being “ready for anxiety” (ibid: p.343), one is correspondingly open to 
anticipating one’s rebirth in the founding of a new form of life. As Joseph Schear affirms, “[this] 
prospect, while no doubt terrifying, could also be felt as exhilarating – at least for a being bent on 
a sustainably intelligible form of life, and so uniquely capable of fundamental change” (Schear, 
2013: p.377), and it is in this vein that I wish to persist in using the more existential terminology of 
Being and Time’s Division II to both inform the reader, via contrastive effects, of normative 
executive education, and to suggest a reformative agenda for the education of executives in the 
autumn of their careers, consequentially. Negatively stated, however, the sense of malaise from 
all this talk of death – the previous chapter’s plangent sounding “loss of meaning” and “world-
collapse,” added to which is this chapter’s avowal of Heideggerian anxiety, not to mention the 
forthcoming chapter on boredom – has cast a chronically melancholic4 pall over the proceedings, 
sufficient to render any serious examination of the life-meaning of corporate executives wholly 
ancillary, at most, to resuscitating glad tidings more generally for most of us. This is telling. By way 
of a sense of the majority of scholarly commentaries on Heidegger’s death concept analysed for 
this thesis5, a lack of sympathy for existentially nervous non-philosophers (let’s call them 
executives) is a predominant theme, usually couched in the scholarly elitism of self-referential 
Heidegger-speak (for instance, seldom in these commentaries was the commentator’s discussion 
of Heidegger’s death concept played out in sufficient illustration or example, as I intend to do in 
this thesis, with my fictional executive, Sanjay). However, given an unease with the state of 
melancholy for most of us, I would like to suggest a recuperative and re-enchanting service to the 
                                                          
3 I will not have the opportunity in this thesis to pursue debates centred on “tensed time” initiated by J.M.E McTaggart 
in his influential “The Unreality of Time” (1908); one built on extensively by Flood and Lockwood (1986), Mellor (1998), 
Oaklander (2014), Poidevin (2007), Tooley (1997); nor, for that matter, will I engage with the work of Henri Bergson 
(1910, 1912). 
4 My choice of the term “melancholy” here is intended to reflect a grave, though popular, topic for writers and 
philosophers through the ages, one which I am uncertain Heidegger appreciated. I’m thinking of Robert Burton’s best 
seller The Anatomy of Melancholy (Burton, 1621). Melancholy must also be mentioned as the cause of Michel de 
Montaigne’s writing of his Essays (Montaigne, 1580): “It was a melancholy humour… brought on by the chagrin caused 
by the solitary retreat I plunged myself into a few years ago, which first put into my head this raving concern with writing” 
(Montaigne, 1580: Collected Essays, II.8). Consider also Sigmund Freud’s psychoanalytic essay “Mourning and 
Melancholia” (2005), where he associates melancholy with the sense of loss, as experienced in mourning; and especially 
where this conjunction chimes with my Conclusion’s mourning for a disregarded “excess”. The border between chagrin 
(depression) and Heideggerian anxiety will be one this chapter will need to patrol, if the arguments here are not to be 
treated as mere dandyism. 
5 Scholarly commentaries on Heidegger’s death concept from de Beistegui (2003), Blattner (2006), Dahlstrom (2013), 
Davis (2010), Dreyfus (1991), Dreyfus & Hall (1992), Dreyfus & Wrathall (2005), Gelven (1989), Gorner (2007), Guignon 
(1983, 1993), Haugeland (2013), Inwood (1999), King (2001), Kisiel (1993), Large (2008), May (1996), McManus (2015), 
Mulhall (1996), Ó Murchadha (2013), Pattison (2000), Polt (2005, 1999), J.Richardson (2012), W.J. Richardson (1963), 
White (2005), Wood (2002), Wrathall (2000, 2011, 2013a, 2013b), and Young (1997). 
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disaffected consumer, be that fellow scholar or executive, one that will be hinted at throughout 
this chapter and one which will draw on the distinction between chronic and Kairotic time, to which 
I will return later. 
What is the reader to make of this negative character of both death and anxiety drawn 
from Heidegger’s writings, other than attempting to extract propositional content from this 
melancholic reverie in the form of blunt didacticism?, where by “propositional content” I mean an 
idea or set of ideas expressible in declarative sentences6. For instance, such propositional content, 
such didacticisms could have taken the form of useful facts about coping in the face of death, such 
as living a healthier and longer life, or dealing with the death of a loved one, or managing the fear 
of one’s own death, or learning about how other cultures and epochs have regarded death: sure 
enough. But instead I am suggesting that an examination of Heidegger’s concept of death, and 
especially what it means to be “ready for anxiety,” helps to form one’s attitude to death, rather 
than inform one of the processes of death (assuming that such knowledge would be useful); and 
that this formative process with respect to death is the purpose of sustaining my melancholic focus 
on Dasein’s individual and our society’s collective finitude, especially with respect to the singular 
and collective class of Dasein as the highly influential sequencer-out and subject of the order-
execution cognate. In this chapter, and using Heidegger’s concept of anxiety, I would like to draw 
a distinction between examining what Heidegger’s text says about death and instead look to what 
it does; and this for two reasons. Firstly, to blunt the beak of the fiercely extractive disposition 
within normative executive education discourses that would asset-strip Heidegger’s text (or this 
thesis) for usable material; a disposition whose predatory force I am keen at least to reveal as 
normative, if not attempt to arrest. And secondly, to show that the eminently ignorable philosophic 
processes on display for the “meaning mongering” (Landy, 2012: p.8) executive, or executive 
educator even, serve several purposes, only one of which is to act as a quarry for meaning. To 
illustrate the thrall by which we are compelled, in our disenchanted7 modern world – and in the 
light of Heidegger’s melancholic and existential vein that I am concentrating on here – to seek 
endorsement from some source of authority for the manifold candidates to life’s meaning, I would 
like to borrow from the discipline of literature studies the notion of “enchantment,” especially, 
                                                          
6 I am indebted to Joshua Landy, and his book How to do Things with Fictions (Landy, 2012: p.3), for an introduction to 
the use of fiction as a formative aid in the process of training, distinct from its unquestioned use as a mere quarry for 
meaning. 
7 As Max Weber wrote in 1917, “The fate of our times is characterised by rationalization and intellectualization and, 
above all, by the ‘disenchantment of the world’” (Weber, cited in Gerth and Wright Mills, 1946, my emphasis). As Joshua 
Landy and Michael Saler introduce their book The Re-Enchantment of the World (Landy & Saler, 2009), Weber was in 
good company with his pronouncement of disenchantment, preceded as he was by the German Romantics of Schiller 
and Goethe, as well as by Schopenhauer and Nietzsche.  
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given my interest in motivations surrounding the order-execution cognate, where efforts at re-
enchanting our world can bring purpose, meaning and order to our lives. 
The comparative literature scholar Joshua Landy, in reference to his Austin-like attempt to 
show how to do things with fictions (in his book of that title; Landy, 2012), dismisses the three main 
branches of espoused theoretic purpose of fiction – purposes that are exemplary, affective and 
cognitive respectively – in preference for a fourth, formative, which serves for more than the 
unquestioning transmission of propositional content. Of fictions he says that: 
 
Rather than providing knowledge per se – whether propositional knowledge, sensory 
knowledge, knowledge by acquaintance, or knowledge by revelation – what they give us is 
know-how; rather than transmitting beliefs, what they equip us with are skills; rather than 
teaching, what they do is train. They are not informative, that is, but formative. They present 
themselves as spiritual exercises (whether sacred or profane), spaces for prolonged and 
active encounters that serve, over time, to hone our abilities and thus, in the end, to help us 
become who we are (Landy, 2012: p.10, emphasis in original). 
 
 
I would like to acknowledge and suggest that Heidegger’s writing on death, and especially the 
demonstrative role he sees anxiety playing in Dasein’s being-towards-death in his works such as 
Being and Time (Heidegger 1962) and in What is Metaphysics (Heidegger, 1978a), can and should 
be treated in Landy’s formative sense if one is to a) confront the fiercely extractive attitude towards 
texts as sources of instrumental knowledge only, and b) divert attention towards acquiring new 
skills, some of which are applicable to superseding, as was introduced in the previous chapter, the 
order-execution cognate in the light of questioning our hyper-capitalist existence. As to why I am 
distracting you with theories from comparative literature at this stage of my argument; it is so that 
I can show how an engagement with the above texts can precipitate a practical execution of how 
Heideggerian anxiety can be beneficial for our executive, particularly with respect to assessing their 
own relationship to the order-execution cognate – that provisional candidate acting as the stated 
purpose of all executive education activity, the goal towards which executive education is oriented. 
  
2.2 What is Heideggerian Anxiety? 
We first come across the term anxiety in Being and Time in §39 (Heidegger, 1962: p.227), 
just as Heidegger introduces the need for Dasein to introduce itself to itself for the purposes of 
grasping what its being really is: although he has been experimenting with the concept of 
Bekümmerung (worry) since around 1920, where he says “worry is the care of existence” in his 
1922 lecture course on Aristotle (Heidegger, 2001: p.112), which is why I am keen to link anxiety 
and care together later in this chapter. We most of us care about our existence, and face this care 
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especially in how fragile our existence really is. This acknowledgement of fragility in care arises, via 
Heidegger’s early-career interest in the phenomenology of religion, in the form of the German term 
“angst” (anxiety or anxiousness), a term borrowed from Søren Kierkegaard’s text The Concept of 
Anxiety (1844) on the use of repeated renewal and spiritual unrest, and a term in common use in 
English in post-Freudian psychological literature. The reason for his interest comes from the urgent, 
but often hidden, need he sees humans having in finding ourselves in the world. As we saw from 
the previous chapter, our acknowledging the state of being-in-the-world is fundamental to 
Heidegger’s project, and anything that assists in this acknowledgment is given prominence in Being 
and Time. The mechanism by which Heidegger throws the focus, as it were, on our ability to 
confront our own being is via the unexpected identification of “moods” as the site of this 
confrontation; and not the superficial sorts of moods we would naturally consider when we first 
hear the term “mood”. His interest instead is in the status of some moods as fundamental or 
“ground” moods (Grundstimmung): angst, or anxiety, is just such a ground mood, as is boredom, a 
concept concerning which he has much more to say in The Fundamental Concepts of Metaphysics 
(Heidegger 1995) published two years after Being and Time, and with which I will engage in the 
next chapter. 
The way in which “Dasein brings itself before itself” (Heidegger, 1962: p.226) in the ground 
mood of anxiety is the way in which anxiety allows all our practical involvements in the world to 
fall away. In the previous chapter I introduced his notion of “uncanniness” (unheimlichkeit) or not 
“being-at-home,” and it is Heidegger’s ground mood concept of anxiety that precisely interferes 
with our ability to lose ourselves in the activities of everyday life, and to mess with our feeling at 
home in the routines we normally and comfortably fall into: in fact, Heidegger calls this everyday 
comfortable mood one of “evasion” or “falling” (Heidegger, 1962: p.178). Thus, through the 
mechanism of the ground mood of anxiety, Heidegger has successfully revealed the presupposed8 
structure of our being-in-the-world, which was his urgent purpose: “that in the face of which one 
has anxiety… is Being-in-the-world as such” (Heidegger, 1962: p.230, emphasis in original). In 
                                                          
8 If in fact it is presupposed. As a refutation of the “being-in-the-world” concept see the debate between John McDowell 
and Hubert Dreyfus (Mind, Reason, and Being-in-the-World, Joseph K Schear, 2013). McDowell opens his response to 
Dreyfus’s Heidegger-inspired defence of ‘absorbed coping’ in being-in-the-world by saying that we, rather, stand in the 
“space of reasons”. Of this space McDowell says “The epistemological significance of the experience of rational subjects 
is that when our experiencing is perceiving, as it can be, features of the environment are perceptually present to us in a 
way that provides us with opportunities for knowledge, of a kind that is special to rational knowers: knowledge that is, 
to echo Wilfred Sellars, a standing in the space of reasons” (Schear, 2013: p.42). McDowell refutes Dreyfus when the 
latter accuses him of perpetuating a “myth of the pervasiveness of the mental,” as the debate has it, and of maintaining 
a distance to the world via a conception of disengaged mindedness. Says McDowell of this accusation that Dreyfus’ 
insistence that being-in-the-world denotes the proper site of experience, “his interpretation of my picture of acting is 
shaped by his importing the assumption that mindedness necessarily brings detachment with it” (ibid: p.45), calling this 
the “myth of the mind as detached”. If nothing else, this particular clash of respective myths brings one to ask what extra 
condition is being defended in one’s insisting that “being-in-the-world,” in its seeming proximity to the world of 
experience, is the more true condition of our existence. 
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bringing being-in-the-world into conspicuous view it is hoped the reader can now begin to make a 
connection between his concept of death – “Death is, as Dasein’s end, in the Being of this entity 
towards its end” (Heidegger 1962: p.303, emphasis in original) – together with his interpreters’ 
glossing of that concept as world-collapse, from Haugeland and White, via Dreyfus (Dreyfus 2005: 
p.xxxi), and the place anxiety has in revealing to us that which can collapse in that this particular 
ground mood9 is an embodiment of Dasein’s “being-towards-its-end”. Even if this is clear, how are 
these relations relevant to the senior corporate executive? Firstly, that death is openness to a 
vulnerability that leaves only one’s ability to execute when there is nothing meaningful remaining 
to execute, or execution-less execution; that Heideggerian death leaves one open to continue with 
ones executive skills intact, even though the clearly identifiable ends towards which one exploits 
these skills no longer exist. Secondly, that world collapse is the conscious state where the “world” 
of one being-in-the-world can be exchanged for another “world” of being-in-the-world, but where 
the new world is not clearly perceived. Thirdly, that Heideggerian anxiety brings before the 
executive’s attention that which they are routinely and unreflexively engaged in; those engrossing 
activities which previously gave their executive lives meaning and reveal what it is one has anxiety 
about, namely “being-in-the-world” as such; and which could therefore serve some purpose in 
revealing a new “world” or new order. Along with Felix Ó Murchadha, I’m claiming that Heidegger’s 
concept of Augenblick¸ as the moment of vision, provides the Kairotic time sufficient to disclose 
being:  
 
[i]ts being is, however, disclosed to Dasein only in moments of vision (Augenblicke), which 
occur for Dasein in its affective state (Befindlichkeit) [or ‘mood’]. The affective state of Dasein 
is manifest concretely in specific moods. Such moods for Heidegger are either affects of its 
engrossment with entities, as for example is the case with fear, or disclose for Dasein its 
ontological state, as in the case with Angst (Ó Murchadha, 2013: p.62). 
 
In terms of something approaching my overall argument thus far, it seems conceivable that an 
executive experiencing a form of Heideggerian anxiety could be the catalyst for opening the way 
for the collapsing (however this is conceived) of one “world” order in exchange for another, leaving 
intact the executive’s capacity to execute in this, as yet unconceived, alternative world. For 
instance, perhaps this world-collapse, this existential death, is a blow dealt to the current eopch’s 
monological, hegemonic and iniquitous order of western capitalism; maybe, via a reconceived 
education process for these executives, maybe not; but an alternative ordering principle 
nonetheless, one which can be disclosed by “anxiety-ready” senior executives, whose execution 
                                                          
9 In the next chapter I will reveal a subtle modal variation with which Heidegger’s other ground mood, boredom, reveals 
more of nothingness, itself the subject of the next section in this chapter. 
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within this new order is assured by these “anxiety-ready” executives’ abilities surviving existential 
death intact, as we saw in the previous chapter. Though this does all seem rather far-fetched and 
under-baked. All the same, my wish is to convince the reader that there is hope still to be had in 
the figure of the executive; that a timely change in appreciation of such an everyday mood as 
anxiety has the power to break the hold which the unreflectively conceived order-execution 
cognate has over the executive; and that executive educators face squarely their responsibilities of 
sanctioning the rise of Piketty’s “supermanagers” (Piketty, 2014: p.302). 
The previously stated aim of this chapter is to use Heidegger’s anxiety concept to challenge 
the dominance of the order-execution cognate in the education of late-career executives. The 
dominance of this cognate rests on an assumption that the executive’s and their corporation’s 
betterment consists in one or several of the following conditions pertaining: either better orders 
being issued, or better execution of those orders being carried out, or a stronger assessment of the 
relevance of the orders issued relative to the corporation’s mission and circumstance, or stronger 
accountability for the means available with which those orders are executed – where “better” and 
“stronger” are used relative to any current state within the corporation, and where “order” refers 
to a command issued by the senior corporate executive on behalf of his or her corporation and/or 
shareholders. I am claiming that all education-oriented (or instruction, training, or development 
oriented) endeavours under the title of executive education are measurable against this cognate, 
against the fact of orders being issued and executed, in whatever fashion. The question is, which 
orders, and which orders based on what conditioning or overarching order? Assuming the reader 
subscribes to the view that the averagely conceived senior corporate executive is not only existing 
under the ubiquitous state of globalised capitalism, as we all are, but is in fact uniquely contributing 
to the successes and excesses of that capitalist state in the guise of their existing as an executor of 
orders inside their corporation, itself an active component of iniquitous capitalist wealth 
generation, then it is a contracted expectation10 that they issue orders and execute orders to the 
best of their ability, and to the financial betterment of their shareholders11.  It is against the 
overarching order of capitalism that the senior executive issues his or her orders, where here I am 
conflating the two (at least two) senses of order I referenced in the Introduction. This, in turn, 
reinforces the grounds for a relationship, albeit non-dependent, between the executive and a form 
of executive education based on the order-execution cognate, in the sense of the cognate acting 
as a proxy for the most primordial motivation for continuing to accumulate wealth in the fashion 
that Thomas Piketty identifies in his blockbuster book about the delinquencies of capitalism: 
                                                          
10 Albeit only a psychological contract, rather than a stipulated clause written into their formal employment contract. 
11 At least for publicly listed profit making enterprises; though the not-for-profit sector has also to successfully generate 
sufficient profit, from whichever sources, to cover their costs and invest back into the business. 
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though it is conceivable, if unlikely, that an executive may never have, nor ever will, engage in 
formal executive education of the type announced in the Introduction. What else can we say of the 
corporate attributes of this executive figure? 
The late career executive has either passed or is situated at his or her mid-life point. 
Following Christopher Hamilton, in paraphrasing George Eliot in Middlemarch, perhaps “there is a 
kind of astonished recognition at this [mid] stage of life that we have been… ‘well-wadded in 
stupidity’ and could not see this” (Hamilton, 2009: p.29), not least bare the fact that there is no 
escape from this very condition, that it will persist, and that we only  have ourselves to blame for 
not sloughing off this wadding of stupidity sooner. Whilst hardly the last word on the causes and 
symptoms of mid-life crisis, Hamilton’s observations at least situate our executive in a likely state 
as he or she takes part in an educative process for their espoused benefit12 – an educative process 
espoused and offered by the relevant management (usually the department of “Human 
Resources”) inside their corporation. Maybe our executive is simply exhausted by their seemingly 
endless “falling” to work within the large corporation in which they’ve struggled these past years, 
and are dumbfounded as to why each upward rung of the career ladder brings them no nearer a 
sense of satisfaction with their wider lives, despite increases in remuneration. Maybe they’ve had 
cause to reflect on their mortality; maybe they can see no end to their struggle to find meaning to 
their (corporate) existence, as well see all too clearly their own end, their own (corporate, as in 
“bodily”) demise. Perhaps mention of ‘evasion’ has been a moment of vision when they’ve caught 
themselves giving the nod to that hidden, other, non-corporate figure13 of themselves. Perhaps the 
break offered by a short programme of executive development secures precious time to linger with 
such ruminations: perhaps it doesn’t; perhaps the prospect of such navel-gazing seems too 
outlandish for this executive’s august standing in their organisation. Even if all of these possibilities 
for our executive were to come to pass, would they likely occasion a concerted reflection of this 
Dasein’s being towards its end – an object of anxiety? 
                                                          
12 Says Piketty about the statistical correlation between high levels of remuneration and productivity in the US, “[t]o my 
mind, the most convincing explanation for the explosion of the very top US incomes is the following. As noted, the vast 
majority of top earners are senior managers of large firms. It is rather naïve to seek an objective basis for their high 
salaries in individual ‘productivity’. When a job is replicable, as in the case of an assembly-line worker or fast-food server, 
we can give an approximate estimate of the ‘marginal product’ that would be realized by adding one additional worker 
or waiter… But when an individual’s job functions are unique, or nearly so, then the margin of error is much greater. 
Indeed, once we introduce the hypothesis of imperfect information into standard economic models…, the very notion of 
‘individual marginal productivity’ becomes hard to define. In fact, it becomes something close to a pure ideological 
construct on the basis of which a justification for higher status can be elaborated” (Piketty, 2014: p.330-331). This, along 
with similar conclusions of Piketty’s, does not bode well for correlating the positive effects on productivity as a result of 
executive education. 
13 As T.S. Eliot’s Waste Land has it, “who is the third who always walks besides you/…Gliding wrapt in a brown mantle, 
hooded” (Eliot, 1974: p.67), perfectly portrayed in Charlie Kaufman’s phantasmic movie Synechdoche, New York (2008). 
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My interest, in playing out as it were in an St Ignatius Loyola14 oriented exercise of the type 
Joshua Landy suggests above (Landy, 2012: p.10), what an active engagement in a Dasein’s  
“wakefulness for itself” (Heidegger, 2001: p.113) might look like, stems from a combination of 
factors. Most notably from the congruence afforded to such an exercise by Heidegger’s own two-
week probation in the novitiate of a Jesuit monastery in Tisis in the province of Vorarlberg, Austria 
(Ott, 1993: p.56, and Safranski, 1998: p.14). Neither Hugo Ott nor Rudiger Safranski, as Heidegger 
biographers, provide evidence that Heidegger underwent the rigorous version of Loyola’s Spiritual 
Exercises as part of his postulancy15; but he did continue on with his studies of Catholic theology, 
and it is implausible that Loyola’s exercises were not known to him, nor that their spiritual, 
theological and existential effect remained unappreciated. My point about the genesis of 
Heidegger’s specifically existential oriented thinking – his deep regard for an Augustinian self-
certainty (City of God, 11.26) that, in his view, is more profound than that of Descartes (Kisiel, 1993: 
p.106), and his claim, in October 1920, that he was “still really a theologian” (letter to Löwith, 
quoted in Kisiel, 1993: p.150) – is that it has a religious substance. This fact alone is unremarkable, 
save for it vouchsafing my interest in the spiritual aspects of anxiety; an interest that will be met 
with much derision in the circles of executive education, and one that will be the subject of 
unqualified contempt from the ranks of business school academics charged with intellectually 
underwriting16 the contemporary capitalist and neoliberal17 order and blindly18 educating 
executives into that order. But that is not a reason not to proceed with my investigation, albeit 
cautiously, which is why I would like to return to the work of Charles Taylor and punctuate this 
investigation of Heideggerian anxiety with a look at how a possible equivalent to our “ground 
mood” might manifest in our secular age: fortunately, Taylor has hit upon a promising nexus of 
candidates in his work on melancholy and the opportunities for remedial re-enchantment 
therefrom in the face of the “malaises of modernity”.  
                                                          
14 The (1491-1556) founder of The Society of Jesus, otherwise known as the Jesuits. Loyola is also famous for his Spiritual 
Exercises, a set of Christian meditations that are divided into themes and set to be carried out over 30-days. The Spiritual 
Exercises still remain an important part of the early spiritual development of novices in training in all Jesuit seminaries 
around the world. 
15 I stray into this conjecture only because I too have been a postulant and a novice monk in a contemplative monastic 
order and know well the all-consuming religious enthusiasms experienced. 
16 According to David Harvey, “the advocates of the neoliberal way now occupy positions of considerable influence in 
education (the universities and ‘think tanks’), in the media, in corporate boardrooms and financial institutions…” (Harvey, 
2005: p.3). 
17 David Harvey introduces it thus: “Neoliberalism is in the first instance a theory of political economic practices that 
proposes that human well-being can best be advanced by liberating individual entrepreneurial freedoms and skills within 
an institutional framework characterized by strong private property rights, free markets, and free trade” (Harvey, 2005: 
p.2). 
18 Writing about the unfulfilled promise of management as a profession, Rakesh Khurana, himself in the profession of a 
business school academic,  notes of this self-inflicted blindness of business schools that “[t]he market logic that has taken 
over business schools… has prevented us from even seeing that there might be an alternative to either markets or 
regulation as a way of preserving the integrity of our capitalist system…we have no meaningful language for civic 
discourse about the ultimate purpose of our secular institutions” (Khurana, 2007: p.379). 
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In the chapter of that title, in his work The Secular Age (Taylor, 2007: pp.299-321), and 
speaking of what he calls our “buffered identity” – the modern self that has closed the boundary 
between interior thought and exterior nature, and in a contrary manner to the pre-modern self for 
whom the boundary was wholly porous – he attributes to this lack of porosity a corresponding 
disenchantment and a causal factor of our modern malaise: 
 
The buffered identity is deeply anchored in our social order, our embedding in secular time, 
the disengaged disciplines we have taken on. This anchoring ensures our invulnerability. But 
it can also be lived as a limit, even a prison, making us blind or insensitive to whatever lies 
beyond this ordered human world and its instrumental-rational project. The sense can easily 
arise that we are missing something, cut off from something, that we are living behind a 
screen (Taylor, 2007: p.301-2, my emphasis). 
 
According to Taylor, we have made ourselves invulnerable to a cosmos of spirits and forces, to the 
“higher times” given by Augustine (Confessions XI) that were not an Aristotelian numerical 
succession of chronological instants of “now,” but rather the Kairotic gathering together of past 
into present to project a future19, and which found expression in the liturgical calendar as well as 
in Carnival (Taylor, 2007: p.56): this invulnerability is currently manifest in our mechanistic and 
staunchly chronological view of the time of the universe, and in our embrace of homogenous, 
empty and purely secular time (ibid: p.300) that is not especially the privy of business schools. The 
vision of a screen being withdrawn, to reveal who knows what, is at once compelling and absurd: 
formerly, via our compulsion and quest to fill gaps in our knowledge; latterly, via the mantle of our 
hubris in having ratiocinated all there is to know; both of which stances betray a suspicion of there 
being any need to acknowledge the metaphor of “porosity” at all. But I don’t believe this, and am 
comfortable, as Taylor is (as is John Haugeland, 2013: p.239), with assuming that our remaining in 
a state of vulnerability is a good thing. And as a test of this appetite for vulnerability, I would like 
to introduce a contender for that which can be revealed from behind the screen: “nothing,” or 
“nothingness,” a topic that Taylor does not directly address (in The Secular Age) but which 
Heidegger does. 
 
2.3 Nothingness 
Heidegger gives direct address to nothingness in the context of anxiety in his 1929 
inaugural lecture to his fellow researchers, teachers and students at Freiburg University, 
                                                          
19 The allusion here, in Taylor’s work, to Heidegger’s project in Being and Time is no coincidence. Speaking of Augustine’s 
view of “lived time” Taylor says “The past, which ‘objectively’ exists no more, is here in my present; it shapes this moment 
in which I turn to a future, which ‘objectively’ is not yet, but which is here qua project. In a sense, Augustine may be 
thought to have foreshadowed the three ekstaseis of Heidegger” (Taylor, 2007: p.56). 
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subsequently translated and published under the title “What is Metaphysics?” (Krell, 1978: p.93-
110). We can almost picture the scene: a new and famous faculty member joining the university 
community, with an expectant audience keen to hear, comprehend and assess what he has to say 
about his recently published magnum opus. How intrigued the audience must have been. Coming 
two years after the publication of Being and Time, we see in this lecture the inclusion of boredom 
as an accompanying and equivalent “ground mood” to anxiety mentioned in this text, translated 
as “the founding mode of attunement20 [Befindlichkeit der Stimmung]” (ibid: p.100), which, as in 
my section above, refers to Dasein coming before itself. Only, in this lecture, Heidegger prefigures 
his introduction of the purpose of ground moods as Dasein’s self-revelation, as it were, with 
reference to that against which Dasein and all of humanity’s scientific endeavours are pitted, 
namely nothing: it is as if he is backing his intrigued audience into an epistemological corner, most 
of whom he recognises as having no appetite to consider “nothing” no matter how ontologically 
oriented it may be. His empathetic strains can be heard in the following: 
 
The nothing – what else can it be for science but an outrage and phantasm? If science is right, 
then only one thing is sure: science wishes to know nothing of the nothing. Ultimately this is 
the scientifically rigorous conception of the nothing. We know it, the nothing, in that we wish 
to know nothing about it (Heidegger 1929, in Krell, 1978: p.98). 
 
This is an empathy that serves my readers of this thesis too, and the associated executive education 
audiences sceptical of any supposedly business- or management-oriented discourse that is not 
directly oriented to profit maximisation. To bring to a point the enormity of the scepticism 
Heidegger faces from this particular address, in light of the wan counter of empathic reasoning in 
the above quote, I too should consider the enormity (the burden I referred to in the previous 
chapter) of outrage from my assembled audience.  
On behalf of all business executives in the world, and echoing the longstanding academic 
split between poiesis and praxis, the question still stands: What possible relevance do reflections 
on anxiety and nothingness have for increasing shareholder value, say? Or, theoretically put: What 
conceivable purpose do questions of ontology have with a body (etymologically, a corpse, a corps, 
hence corporate) charged solely with an ontic commitment of profit maximisation? And where do 
those with apparently ancillary educational responsibilities stand with regard to this 
ontological/ontic stand-off, given the crisis of capitalism with which we are currently all gripped? 
Surely, the only anxieties we should be considering are the worries of making insufficient profit for 
                                                          
20 Attunement first appears in Being and Time (p.172) when Heidegger introduces what Macquarrie & Robinson, the 
translators, misleadingly term “state-of-mind”. Heidegger equates our Befindlichkeit with every-day “mood” 
(Gestimmtsein or Gestimmtheit) or “attunement” (Stimmung). As we have seen earlier, Felix Ó Murchadha translates 
Befindlichkeit as “affective state” (see footnote 51, p.206 in Ó Murchadha, 2013). 
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our host organisation, of feeling anxious about our jobs; or feeling anxious about climate-change-
induced global apocalypse, hijacked planes, chemical attacks, SARS, swine flu or Ebola, drug-
resistant tuberculosis, and the abiding stresses of a worldwide economic slowdown and of a global 
economy undergoing seemingly constant upheaval21. The modern, in Taylor’s parlance, are not 
short of anxieties. Melancholy was not the preserve of the pre-moderns. After the Freudian term 
Angst entered our vocabulary, we have become more loquacious with respect to describing anxiety. 
For instance, the American Psychiatric Association’s Diagnostic and Statistical Manual (currently in 
its fifth edition) lists and defines hundreds of anxiety disorders, a number significantly up from the 
first edition of that work in 1950. Not unlike Robert Burton’s wonderful The Anatomy of Melancholy 
of 1621, we have graced our vocabulary with multiple terms for anxiety, gladly referring to melaina 
chole (Greek for “black bile”), as Scott Stossel tell us, “as ‘melancholy,’ ‘angst,’ ‘hypochondria,’ 
‘hysteria,’ ‘vapors,’ ‘spleen, ‘neurasthenia,’ ‘neurosis,’ ‘psychoneurosis,’ ‘depression,’ ‘phobia,’ 
‘anxiety,’ and ‘anxiety disorder’ – and that’s leaving aside such colloquial terms as ‘panic,’ ‘worry,’ 
‘dread,’ ‘fright, ‘apprehension,’ ‘nerves,’ ‘nervousness,’ ‘edginess,’ ‘wariness,’ ‘trepidation,’ ‘jitters,’ 
‘willies,’ ‘obsession,’ ‘stress,’ and plain old fear” (Stossel, 2013: pp.34-35). I take Heidegger’s 
attempt at empathy very seriously, in the face of a general bewilderment at the notion of 
nothingness, especially given our exhausted familiarity with all of the above forms of clinical 
anxiety, together with our private and ongoing sufferance and possible medication for such22. 
However, Heidegger nevertheless does continue to back his audience off their comfortable 
chairs in “What is Metaphysics?” by continuing to claim that it is via our founding mode, or 
fundamental, attunements, our ground moods, that nothing is revealed to us: 
 
Does such an attunement, in which man is brought before the nothing itself, occur in human 
existence? This can and does occur, although rarely enough and only for a moment, in the 
fundamental mood of anxiety (ibid: p.100). 
 
Although he is at pains here, as he is in Being and Time in §39, to distance anxiety from fear 
(Heidegger, 1962: p.227), he is also sufficiently empathic to acknowledge that we generally do our 
utmost to avoid anxiety: not because of fear of encountering nothingness head on, but because we 
                                                          
21 This breathless list of anxieties, and the subsequent marathon of scare-quoted surrogates for the term anxiety, is taken 
from Scott Stossel’s book My Age of Anxiety: Fear, Hope, Dread and the Search for Peace of Mind (Stossel, 2013: p.18), 
in my attempt to understand how Heideggerian anxiety differs from modern-day clinical anxiety. In the UK, from a report 
in 2009 by the “Mental Health Foundation,” (quoted in Stossel, 2013: p.18) fifteen percent of the population stated that 
they are currently suffering from an anxiety disorder, a proportion whose rates are increasing. Aside from so-called 
“talking therapies” the principle treatments for anxiety disorders are pharmacological medication, using such brand 
name drugs as Thorazine. Imipramine. Desipramine. Chlorpheniramine. Nardil. BuSpar. Prozac. Zoloft. Paxil. Wellbutrin. 
Effexor. Celexa. Lexapro. Cymbalta. Luvox. Trazodone. Levoxyl. Propanadol. Tranxene. Serax. Centrax. St John’s wort. 
Zolpidem. Valium. Librium. Ativan. Xanax. Klonopin (Stossel, 2013: p.7). 
22 A helpful accompaniment to Stossel’s book, and one that puts Heidegger’s interest in the state of anxiety into 
perspective, is the historical study of anxiety by Allen Horwitz, Anxiety: A Short History (2013). 
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seldom realise anxiety properly conceived, which explains why he claims anxiety of this nature to 
be rare. Rather mystically put, he says of this oblivion from anxiety that “[b]eing held out into the 
nothing – as Dasein is – on the ground of concealed anxiety is its surpassing of beings as a whole. It 
is transcendence” (Heidegger, 1929, in Krell, 1978: p.106), which I take to mean the Kairotic 
moment of vision when we realise that our existence takes place in the context of no-thing, which 
can only focus attention back on our own being, suspended, as it were, in this field of nothingness. 
As elliptical as this quote sounds, its concision well matches its transcendent subject. That we are 
well wadded in our everyday “feeling at home” (heimlich), falling into our tranquilised occupations 
and oblivious to any transcendence, adds piquance, pathos and reverence23 to any utterance 
denoting the possibility of living in a state to the contrary – in my view, anyway – in the way that 
artists, sculptors and architects through the ages have similarly worked to evince a sense of the 
transcendent in art to those who stumble in off the street and stand before their work in churches 
and galleries, gawping. Heady stuff for our executive too, though he or she is not especially under-
privileged to gasp and grasp the opportunity for awe here. Our archetypal senior executive, in 
falling-to-work and feeling at home in “executing” and “projecting” for their multinational 
corporation, in the glass tower just across the street, as it were, is no more qualified for evasion 
from anxiety and nothingness, by dint of their executions, than the zero-hour-contract worker on a 
building site three doors down, by dint of theirs. Whilst I am keen to draw a distinction between 
the respective statuses of comparative wealth, benefits, security, healthcare, educational 
background and future education, training and development prospects between the senior 
corporate executive and the zero-hour-contract worker24, I draw no distinction between their 
respective competencies to uncover opportunities to experience Heideggerian anxiety, regarding 
those as equal. This particular equality – that all human agents, normally considered, ceteris 
paribus, are capable of openness and vulnerability – is central to my argument25 where, in this 
instance, that towards which we are all equal is this sense of nothingness. The next sections will 
                                                          
23 If nothing else, the sentiments expressed here at least nudge the argument back in the direction of the sacred/secular 
distinction, even if it is to flatly denounce the existence of any transcendent whatsoever as Taylor’s modern “buffered 
identity” is more likely to do. At most, the sentiments provide impetus for us to conceive of Taylor’s metaphorical screen 
and then throw it back, in an attitude of resolved-ness and vulnerability. 
24 It was from reading Polly Toynbee’s book Hard Work (2003) and Toynbee and David Walker’s Unjust Rewards (2008) 
– as well as from an extended embrace with the writing of Noam Chomsky (1998, 2003a, 2003b), Ernesto Laclau (1985, 
1996, 2004, 2005), Chantal Mouffe (1985, 1993, 2005) and Michael Hardt and Antonio Negri (2000, 2005) and recently, 
Thomas Piketty (2014) – that I became aware of the contrast between the respective orders, or ranks, of those managed 
and those who manage that was at the core of the executive educative provision I was involved in supporting. This 
sparked my interest in exploring whether the order/execution distinction need always be so partisan and unequal. Was 
I colluding in and perpetuating (e.g. executing) the particularly oppressive ordering of capitalism and neoliberalism, so 
anathema to the above authors, via the implicit ranking (ordering) of the enfranchised versus the disenfranchised, as 
part of my support of a process of undemocratic education? It seems as though I am: this thesis has been an opportunity 
to explore some alternatives. 
25 As it is to most religions espousing some form of salvation, redemption or enlightenment. 
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pursue these inequalities and equalities further, establishing a proxy with which to supersede the 
commanding motivation in the order-execution cognate. 
Heidegger claims that from a position of Dasein encountering nothingness in its 
transcendence, and thereby looking back from that nothingness to our form of being (Dasein again, 
but this time in its being-in-the-world) in our everyday falling back to everyday activities, is to have 
identified the subject of metaphysics proper, and to have placed nothingness and being on an equal 
and dependent footing. According to Heidegger, “[o]nly in the nothing of Dasein do beings as a 
whole, in accord with their most proper possibility – that is, in a finite way – come to themselves” 
(ibid: p.108), going so far as to claim that our scientific endeavours are themselves dependent on a 
nothingness that gives being meaning (ibid: p.109). Space does not permit an extended engagement 
with philosophical criticisms of metaphysics per se, such as those of Ayer, Quine or Strawson, 
though Heidegger’s stance will be criticised in subsequent chapters of this thesis, since it would 
seem that Heidegger is establishing properties that nothingness exemplifies, e.g. “being,” at the 
same time as endorsing the scientific method which relies on observable properties. What is 
observable of nothingness? He would claim that it is only on the basis of nothingness that things 
mattering to us show up as mattering at all. What matters to us, what we care about, are the 
projects that we execute. This is a cue to introduce Heidegger’s notion of “care,” one that appears 
in and around his work Being and Time, but which appears less frequently in his later thinking, up 
until his engagement with the concept of “appropriating event,” which will have an important part 
to play in my argument and be the topic of my penultimate thesis chapter. 
 
 
2.4 Care 
Being matters to Dasein, especially with a Dasein wracked by anxiety. Absorbed in the 
world of its concerns, that things “are” and that Dasein itself “is”; these are the concerns of all of 
us. These concerns, broadly conceived, have what Mark Wrathall and Max Murphey have 
categorised as both “affective” and “projective” dimensions to them (Wrathall and Murphey, 2013: 
pp.18-19). Our affective concerns are indicated by the English expressions involving the locutions 
of “care about” or “couldn’t care less about”. What is cared about are generally those things that 
matter to me, that affect me, that touch me and for the sake of which I take an active interest; and 
obversely in instances where I do not care. Our projective concerns emerge from expressions 
involving the locution “taking care of,” where my taking care of something means I have made 
myself responsible to act with respect to that which I care about: I am projecting my concern 
towards something, committing myself towards some project about which I care. Already, in the 
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projective dimension, there is more than a hint of temporality: what I care about is something 
towards which I project my actions and concerns, as in the case of executing, as there is, though 
less obviously, in the backward looking affective dimension, in that I am touched by something that 
I care about because I always have been, that my being affected by something is condition of the 
state of who I have become. Likewise, my falling to current projects, my caring about what I am 
doing right now, concerns the immediate present: the “omnitemporal” – as Eric Auerbach, in his 
book Mimesis (2003: p.161), calls it – present concern that has come to me from a past, and which 
I direct at a future state. These temporal indicators are the crucial component of Heidegger’s 
overall argument in Being and Time, evidenced by the last link in a chain of reasoning that quickly 
summarises Dasein’s falling into the everydayness, and the potentiality Dasein has of viewing 
afresh that same everydayness via care, thus: Dasein is the meaning of our everyday existence; 
care is the meaning of Dasein; and time is the meaning of care (a chain of reasoning adapted from 
de Beistegui, 2005: pp.74-75).  
Albeit a summary adapted from the secondary literature, the above concertinaing of these 
crucial concepts together is nonetheless a quick move; though one not unlike Heidegger’s own, in 
claiming time to be not only the basis of care but as serving a unifying structure to the care concept 
too. But as Stephen Kaufer acknowledges of Heidegger’s frisky move, “[t]he transcendental 
argument that temporality makes care possible is so quick that it is easy to miss altogether. 
Heidegger claims that temporality somehow unifies the various aspects of care, but is hard to see 
what justifies this claim” (Kaufer, 2013: p.338, emphasis in original), and so our confusion is 
somewhat justified. In one last exegetical reference, before attempting to map the above onto a 
practical example for our executive, coming from the hugely important §65 of Being and Time, we 
have Heidegger saying of the unifying properties of temporality for care that:  
 
Temporality makes possible the unity of existence, facticity, and falling, and in this way 
constitutes primordially the totality of the structure of care. The items of care have not been 
pieced together cumulatively and more than temporality itself has been put together ‘in the 
course of time’… out of the future, the having been, and the Present. Temporality ‘is’ not an 
entity at all. It is not, but it temporalizes itself (Heidegger, 1962: p.376). 
 
As a minimum piece of annotatory assistance for such a loaded passage, I should say that 
“existence,” “facticity,” and “falling” are Heidegger’s terms for the following: existence is that 
towards which Dasein comports itself, namely its being; facticity refers to our absorbed dealings in 
the world with those things nearest to us, distinct from (traditionally conceived) matter in the form 
of factum brutum; and falling, as we have already come across it, is Dasein’s plunge into its 
everyday involvement with the world. Such are these term’s respective meanings: however, these 
2. Anxiety is Nothing 
 
- 69 - 
 
three terms also correlate with the three tenses of time, which is indeed far from clear in Being 
and Time, the exposition of which would take a considerable amount of time to unpack. This was 
the quick move that Stephen Kaufer was referring to.  
I owe my rescue from confusion in this regard to Hubert Dreyfus, especially his 2007 
podcasted lecture series on Being and Time (and its associated printed material), where he 
helpfully collates all of Heidegger’s instances of three-part structures – such as thrownness, falling 
and projecting, or disposedness, discourse and understanding, or, in the above case, facticity, 
being-fallen and existentiality – and places them under the three tenses of past, present and future, 
as well as indexing the heading of each threefold by purpose (Dreyfus, Nov 12 2007: “Philosophy 
185” podcast “handout”). Perceptive and pro-Being and Time readers may have sensed the kernel 
of Heidegger’s argument here, which is why §65 of Being and Time is so important to 
understanding the overall argument, and such an oft quoted section by commentators. Perceptive 
readers will also have noted a connection with this chapter’s opening epigram, Heidegger’s 
definition of anxiety. All of which allows me to parse the above quote in the following clunky 
fashion. The basis of Dasein’s future facing executions, its always already having been, and its 
present involvement with the world is, basically, time; the nothingness revealed through anxiety 
shows Dasein that it has buried itself in its present everyday activities, its being-in-the-world; 
looking back at itself from nothingness Dasein is thereby shown that it has future potentiality 
beyond evasive falling; it is, therefore, time that we should look to to make sense of our being-in-
the-world, and making the most of it. Hardly a Pulitzer prizewinning piece of prose, and just as ugly 
as the original, if a little more homey, my Heidegger-lite parsing does at least allude to the 
connection between being and time, which is helpful I’d say; but to what end? Why bother? And 
this has been my gripe with the work of the majority of Being and Time commentators26 I have 
come across in this research. As well as unpick, elucidate and cross reference Heidegger’s technical 
prose, as useful as such scholarly work is, surely we have been thrown an opportunity (a 
potentiality-for-being-in-the-world, properly speaking) to do something with this thinking? The 
majority of instances where the text has been, so to speak, cashed out by commentators in 
specifically practical examples involve, not unsurprisingly, examples of academics standing at 
blackboards making sense of their referential totalities: William Blattner’s tale of Smith & Jones in 
his book Heidegger’s Temporal Idealism is perhaps the best and most engaging example of this 
(Blattner, 1999), up to a point of its limited applicability. 
 This is what I want to do in the next section; to build onto the above exegesis a practically 
oriented correlation, in my case concerning a revised potentiality-for-being-in-the-world for the 
                                                          
26 See footnote 4 above. 
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late career corporate executive, one that affords a confrontation with the excesses of a 
monological, hegemonic and iniquitous system of contemporary western capitalism, on the coat 
tails of which hangs executive education. For this I will return to the ongoing story of Sanjay, who 
now faces the opportunity to act as patron to all the training, development and executive 
education activities of X-Corp. Sanjay is now at a crossroad in his position with X-Corp, having to 
reconcile a previous existence with a future potentiality. Falling short of complete illustration of 
world-collapse, this passage is intended instead to picture the commencement of a state of anxiety 
for Sanjay that will, later in the thesis, culminate in an example of total collapse of Sanjay’s world. 
 
o-----o 
 
 The CEO of X-Corp, on behalf of the board, has asked Sanjay to assume the role of Chief 
Human Resources Officer (CHRO). The CEO feels that Sanjay's call-centre management experience 
and personal values would make him the ideal CHRO candidate, to provide the much needed 
inspiration and vision that X-Corp needs if it is to continue to exploit its market dominance and 
attract and retain the industry’s best talent. The CEO is aware of Sanjay’s personal history, and has 
campaigned hard on Sanjay’s behalf to convince the company board and shareholders that Sanjay 
is a “safe pair of hands” for the CHRO role: his reputation for waywardness ensured their initial 
hostility. Sanjay must make a decision quickly, as to whether to accept the board’s significant offer 
and to uphold the trust the CEO is putting in him. Superficially, the offer constitutes not only a 
substantial promotion and an enormous boost to his already respected reputation, but an 
unparalleled opportunity for Sanjay to elevate his philosophical values to the level of corporate 
strategy, that may then go on to affect the entire current and future workforce of X-Corp 
(developing and caring for his staff, staff generally, was the most rewarding part of his job), not to 
mention X-Corp’s competitors, and who knows, possibly even the entire offshoring sector – such 
is his excitement about what this opportunity confers. In pausing for thought, though, this decision 
reveals a less than certain future for Sanjay, if he were to be tempted by the pay and share options 
which were enormous, and with the ludicrously excessive benefits that went with the role. Sanjay 
knows he could handle the additional responsibilities and pressures that went with a C-level (e.g. 
CEO, COO, CFO) role, not least of which would involve uprooting his young family from Europe to 
North America, and being at opposite ends of the clock from his family in Gurgaon. Long ago he 
accepted his expatriate status. And ever since his time as a call centre supervisor, where he 
affectionately called himself a “cyber-coolie”, managing time – and managing himself and his team 
around global time zones – has been second nature to him. Looking ahead down the track of his 
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current role, to where he’d seen himself, what matters to him about the CHRO post is the unsettling 
detour that the change in responsibilities would entail. There was a serene yet poetic justice in the 
path Sanjay had set himself on. Sanjay couldn’t give this up. His past was both an attestation to 
and a cause of the struggle he was still fighting. The serenity he gained from his view of his past life 
came from the apparent inevitability and seemingly predetermined-ness of it all, and from “not 
being able to get behind it”. 
 A week had passed: a strange week, almost dream-like, in the way that routine events, his 
whole engagement with work, somehow fell away. The gossip around the office was that Sanjay 
had suffered bereavement in the family, so distant did he seem. As he sat in his lushly appointed 
kitchen late on Saturday, on the point of phoning the CEO, Sanjay felt he was riding a wave of 
resolution. He had decided to take the job: his wife was ecstatic at the prospect of moving, though 
the kids didn’t seem to react to the news. This was the right time, the opportune moment, to carry 
out what he believed in27. 
o-----o 
  
 The decision confronting Sanjay, in Heidegger-speak, represents a potentiality-for-being-
in-the-world in marked distinction from his existing as falling into his everyday-ness, brought about, 
as the Heideggerian speak would have it, by an induced state of anxiety. Where most decisions 
involve the opening and then closing of potentialities, in the review of available options and the 
eventual closing of the majority of those options via the execution of the chosen option – and in 
the manner of Taylor Carman’s definition of Heidegger’s sense of death, which Dreyfus dismisses28 
– the decision facing Sanjay is better explained using exactly this Heideggerian manner of speech; 
as one where that on the basis of which29 the decision is to be made has itself disintegrated. In 
                                                          
27 This section of text is based on an amalgam of readings with a work orientation (Lars Svendsen, 2008: and Robert 
Hassan & Ronald Purser, 2007), with sociological orientation of accounts of workplace temporalities (Beth Rubin, 2007: 
and Carl Cederström & Peter Fleming, 2012), from more novelistic accounts (Siddhartha Deb, 2011: Mark Currie, 2010), 
from a career-long engagement with business-related journalism (The Economist, The Financial Times and other 
newspapers), as well as from conversations with executive education participants and clients in a professional capacity. 
It is therefore presented as a piece of fiction. 
28 See section 1.2 in the previous chapter. 
29 The translation of Woraufhin sparked a debate between Hubert Dreyfus and William Blattner on the pages of Blattner’s 
Heidegger’s Temporal Idealism (Blattner, 1999) and which spilled out into the airwaves of Dreyfus’s podcasted lecture 
series (Dreyfus, Nov 12 2007: “Philosophy 185” and “Philosophy 187”), though I am unable to find the quotes. Dreyfus 
in his Being in the World: Commentary on Heidegger’s Being and Time Division I (Dreyfus, 1991), as well as in his lecturing 
on Being and Time (Dreyfus, Nov 12 2007: ‘Philosophy 185’), repeatedly frames his understanding of the being of Dasein 
via Macquarrie and Robinson’s translation of the German term Woraufhin as “that on the basis of which”. Blattner 
prefers the translation “in terms of which”, all of which hair splitting distinguishes Blattner’s as the more idealistic term 
from Dreyfus’s less idealistic translation preference. Dreyfus claims that Heidegger’s inclusion of Woraufhin early on in 
Being and Time (Heidegger, 1962: p.25-26) signals his meaning of being as “that against which” or “in comparison with” 
beings are already understood. See the concluding chapter for more on the idealism/realism debate in Heidegger. 
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other words, the familiarity and comfort with which Sanjay was in his world all of a sudden showed 
itself to him as contingent, as lacking in meaning: that he was no longer at-home, in the 
unheimlichkeit sense. I am identifying that the italicised phrase, that on the basis of which, in 
relation to the foregoing example of Sanjay’s, constitutes a descriptor of Sanjay’s Dasein, his being 
and that for which Sanjay exists. In a glimpse of nothingness, from a rare opportunity of a state of 
Heideggerian anxiety, and in his reflections on the new job offer, Sanjay has been jolted out of his 
comfortable present-ness and been presented with his own potentiality-for-being-in-the-world. 
This Kairotic moment, this extended moment of anxiety, in which the contingency of Sanjay’s 
existence is brought before him, and where his ownership of his own future faces him, is not an 
intrinsically good thing. That the picture I paint of these moments could depict equally well the 
resolve of a suicide bomber, a desperate gambler, or a political revolutionary, I don’t doubt. Though 
to think of these dangers from out of our everyday chronology, our quotidian sequences of nows, 
says Felix Ó Murchadha, “with an awareness that human action within a Kairos may lead to 
catastrophe, is to carry out the task and the responsibility of thinking” (Ó Murchadha, 2013: p.198, 
my emphasis). Sanjay is doing just that, carrying out the dangerous task and responsibility of 
thinking for himself, on behalf of his family and for his company. 
 In terms of the previously outlined and temporally oriented “care” structure of this form 
of thinking, the three temporalities for Sanjay are also clearly apparent: the future is represented 
in the new job offer and what Sanjay can become; the present as a clearer realization of what it is 
Sanjay stands for; and the past as his emergence from and identification with a (possibly 
inconceivably) strongly held set of beliefs. Of the relative priority of these tenses, and in alignment 
with Heidegger’s giving priority to the future30, Sanjay’s future potentiality allows him to make 
sense of his past and his present conditions. In Heideggerian terms, echoing the definition of care31 
as well as jumping ahead to Heidegger’s notion of “anticipatory resoluteness,” Sanjay is able, via 
anxiety, to anticipate his own potential in respect to the job offer by coming back to where he has 
come from. In that sense, only with respect to Sanjay’s future can he have lived authentically. For 
what it is worth, that tortuous phrasing of mine, recognised as another piece of clumsy parsing, is 
a mapping of Sanjay’s story onto this portion of Heidegger’s definition of anticipatory resoluteness: 
 
Anticipation of one’s uttermost and ownmost possibility is coming back understandingly to 
one’s ownmost ‘been’. Only so far as it is futural can Dasein be authentically as having been. 
The character of ‘having been’ arises, in a certain way, from the future (Heidegger, 1962: 
p.373, emphasis in original). 
                                                          
30 As Heidegger states, “the primary phenomenon of primordial and authentic temporality is the future” (Heidegger, 1962: 
p.378, emphasis in original). 
31 Care is defined by Heidegger as “the Being of Dasein means ahead-of-itself-Being-already-in-(the-world) as Being-
alongside (entities encountered within-the-world)” (Heidegger, 1962: p.237). 
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The fundamental mood of anxiety has precipitated, for Sanjay, an encounter with what he cares 
the most about; with a welcome anticipation of his own possibilities, given his strong connection 
to his past cares; with a dissolution of his life’s meaning, comparable to his previous existential 
“deaths” during his slum years; and with a new appreciation of the connection between 
chronological and Kairological time. The task now is to consolidate these revelations, but this time 
using a different fundamental mood, that of boredom. 
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3 
__________________________________ 
 
 
No Time for Boredom 
 
 
 
 
Boredom is the entrancement of the temporal horizon, an entrancement which lets the moment of 
vision belonging to temporality vanish. In thus letting it vanish, boredom impels entranced Dasein 
into the moment of vision as the properly authentic possibility of its existence, and existence only 
possible in the midst of beings as a whole, and within the horizon of entrancement, their telling 
refusal of themselves as a whole. 
 
(Martin Heidegger, 1995, Fundamental Concepts of Metaphysics, p. 153, emphasis in original) 
 
 
 
3.1 Introduction 
What a boring epigram. I hit upon this particular boring quote from Heidegger’s 
Fundamental Concepts of Metaphysics to serve a couple of reflexive purposes: firstly, to furnish 
this last of three chronic and melancholic chapters in this thesis – after, that is, death and anxiety, 
with this chapter on the topic of boredom – with Heidegger’s definition of his own peculiar concept 
of boredom; as we will see, boredom can bring us before time, like a plaintiff before a judge. 
Secondly, cheekily and simultaneously in this instance, to quickly provoke the reader into a reaction 
about boredom, thus: Why am I claiming the quote is boring; what grounds do I have; and do I find 
it boring or is it just boring, in the manner that my teenage daughter finds many things just boring1? 
Does the reader, in fact, find it boring, and if so why: if not, why not, given its seeming obtuseness 
to our standard conception of boredom? Surely, what is boring is what I find boring, and not what 
someone tells me is, objectively speaking, boring? Not to mention; why are we even considering 
boredom here? What a boring set of questions2. 
                                                          
1 For the record I do not find the quote boring, or the topic, hence its inclusion: and in lieu of chastising Heidegger’s 
return to a mystical and obfuscatory language to describe boredom as itself boring – in just such that manner of the 
heavy opening epigraph – instead I appreciate anew his turn to poetry as the means by which to articulate the oft-times 
inarticulable, in a non-boring way. The playfulness between treating the topic of boredom interestingly, and being true 
to its apparently (spiritually?) redemptive potential by treating it boringly, will be a feature of this chapter. 
2 Some of these boring questions emerge and subside from within Lars Svendsen’s book A Philosophy of Boredom (2005). 
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My purpose in examining Heidegger’s concept of boredom is to bring to fruition my 
preceding chapters’ analyses of Heideggerian death and anxiety. The reader may have been 
wondering, or indeed reeling, at why this particular angle on Heidegger’s work was chosen. It will 
fall to a revised understanding of boredom, in the context of executive education, to reveal the 
fruits of an extended engagement with these more embarrassing3, because existential4, aspects of 
(at least) the fundamental ontology project Heidegger brought to prominence in Being and Time 
and continued into the early 1930’s: a project that the majority of commentators mine for the hard 
graft that its straightforwardly ontological language performs, bracketing the existential flim-flam 
as an embarrassing and unworthy excess. As John Haugeland attests of this peculiar aversion to 
existentialism, it is possible to “show quite directly how the existentialist themes are not only 
relevant but actually crucial to the ontology,” and is astonished how “most readings of Heidegger 
manage to ignore this glaring interpretive issue” (Haugeland, 2013: p.44).  
In the spirit of curiosity, and rising to John Haugeland’s challenge, I feel well placed to 
recruit to the task of investigation what most constituents in my professional world would regard 
as embarrassing cogitations to the work I find myself in. With a personal history in religious 
contemplation, but now finding myself surrounded by a globally dispersed cadre of senior 
executives from what might as well be an homogenised, mythical, single profit-hungry corporation, 
all tasked with improving their corporations’ profit-making statuses, I’m curious to investigate 
Heidegger’s relatively modest claim that a healthy occurrence of the mood of boredom can open 
us out onto a profound sense of our own being. I’m intrigued to ask; What effect would such an 
exposure of this fundamental mood have on our capitalist world: what would be revealed? In the 
mood as we normally experience it, not much I suspect, so smothered are our inclinations to 
question a so dull and insignificant seeming mood. What would it even mean, in an educational 
context, to elevate the status of questioning our everyday notions of boredom, in whatever guise 
such questioning took, as the responsibility of educators to promote (a form of elevation I myself 
am doing here)? Delving deeper into this strange call on executive educators’ time, what will the 
defence of the proposition that thinking more seriously about boredom is the responsibility of the 
educators of those executives tell us about mainstream executive education practices themselves? 
Presumably, that there exists a measure of value of an executive educator’s effort, namely the 
practical applicability of craft-like knowledge – or to use its appropriate technical characterisation, 
                                                          
3 Hubert Dreyfus uses the term when he confesses to “ignoring Division II [of Being and Time] as something of an 
existentialist embarrassment” (Dreyfus, 2000: p.313, my emphasis). 
4 I agree with all Heidegger commentators who make the point that Heidegger was not an existentialist. Says Heidegger 
himself in a lecture course delivered 1930-31 about his then recently published Being and Time, “[i]t was never my idea 
to preach an ‘existentialist philosophy.’ Rather, I have been concerned with renewing the question of ontology – the 
most central question of western philosophy – the question of being” (Heidegger, 1988: p.13). 
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techne – which in the case of corporate executives is the take-up and application of profit-
maximising techne. The counter claim would go something like this: boredom is, ipso facto, the 
absence of any action, the epitome of a lack of practical knowledge, the antithesis of profit-
maximising techne, and therefore the work of the executive educator to completely dispel or 
ignore. I disagree. I wish to apply some of the dangerous thinking that came at the end of the 
previous chapter, and claim that the “task of thinking” handed to us through boredom reveals the 
politically incendiary quandary of non-productivity: dwelling with boredom, in more ways than one, 
reveals the un-productive, the un-knowing and unashamedly non-techne aspects of all of our lives, 
to which ingenious use can be put by examining it in the context of education for the late career 
executive. Phrased in the already overdetermined language of “utility,” what utility could the 
commissioning patrons of such education – whose invitations to tender to education providers 
such as business schools betray their own corporation’s anxieties of productivity-failure in the 
neoliberal endgame – possibly gain through a task of thinking aimed at investigating degenerate 
non-productivity? It is likely that if you as reader are having trouble conceiving of what executive 
education actually is, this far in to a thesis on executive education, then it’s because you’re 
approaching the exercise in terms of techne, or more probably its lack, as in a lack of this particular 
“mode of knowledge” (Ó Murchadha, 2013: p.55), a mode that stands in relation to capitalist 
production. Hence the degeneracy I speak of; not only the shocking relegation of relevant seeming 
techne out of the picture, as our examination of boredom foretells, but the unquestioned 
assumption you might have had of executive education being solely about the knowledge of 
production. Is the order of the order-execution cognate dealt a blow with the bracketing-off of 
production? What is left of execution once production-less ordering is bracketed-off from 
execution? 
Before we begin to further address these questions, and before we embark further on this 
journey into boredom, I would like to bolster John Haugeland’s attestation and flag how my 
approach departs from a standard quarrying (Haugeland’s “most readings”) of Heidegger’s 
thinking. To build on the point not just of how load-bearing the death, anxiety and boredom 
content is to my project, but of how alternative and decidedly ‘political’ its use as a philosophical 
building material, so to speak, appears even to those rare Heidegger-friendly philosophers working 
within the field of management as an academic discipline – those adventurous enough to construct 
even a modestly Heideggerian ontological foundation for a discipline that is notoriously lacking in 
any philosophical footings at all – I would like to take a brief detour via the ethics oriented work of 
Dominik Heil. In his work Ontological Fundamentals for Ethical Management (2011), building on 
Heidegger’s concepts of Bestand (“standing reserve”) and Gestell (“enframing,” but cleverly 
3. No Time for Boredom 
 
- 77 - 
 
translated by Heil as “em-bankment”, as the “banking” of the standing reserve), as they are used 
in The Question Concerning Technology  and related essays (Heidegger, 1977: p.19), Dominik Heil 
begins to lay the groundwork for a convincing and cathartic conception of the modern-day 
corporation as a fiercely extractive piece of technology in its own right, one which orders all assets 
at a corporation’s disposal (including quite a few that aren’t) as a standing reserve or resource to 
be exploited for profit-making purposes – presumably for the greater good of capitalism, though 
Heil doesn’t concentrate on this connection. Most certainly the corporation is the kind of place I’m 
interested in; the place in and for which executive education is carried out, even though 
foregrounding the predictably exploitative nature of corporations – Heil calls it “corporate em-
bankment” (Heil, 2011: p.103, my emphasis) – does not advance the argument much beyond a 
crude name-calling of the banker-bashing variety. What is original and exciting in his work is how 
he allies Heidegger’s concept of the “work,” as in a “work of art,” taken from Heidegger’s lecture 
published as The Origin of the Work of Art (Heidegger, 1978), to explain the way in which the world 
of a corporation can be understood (Heil, 2011: p.84) as a “world,” distinct from the tradition of 
viewing corporations as entities, or as a collection of entities, e.g. people, offices, ledgers, 
photocopiers. By saying that “corporations are works that create a world” (ibid: p.87) Heil is 
establishing a fundamental ontology that allows those that follow his Heidegger-inspired thinking 
to make claims that executives in those corporations, in those corporate worlds or “works,” can 
reveal those worlds in original and compelling ways; ways similar to how a skilled carpenter reveals 
the wood in a beautiful piece of furniture, or Michelangelo revealed figures from shapeless blocks 
of marble. The (non-Heideggerian) philosophic tradition – especially one based on the pre-
eminence that Plato attached to the idea of things, that one understands how things (really) are 
only when those things have been abstracted away from all particular details and instances – would 
have us become clear about the corporation by correctly thinking about the corporation rationally 
and atomistically. Then, following Descartes, the tradition would have us sit back and think about 
the purpose of the object that the corporation is, thinking about the role of the subject of the 
executive; as subjects standing over against objects, in a completely disengaged manner. The 
novelty of applying Heidegger’s thinking to studies of the corporation, of Dominik Heil bringing 
Heidegger to the attention of the field of management and corporation studies, comes when the 
traditional approach to understanding the corporation as a Platonic form, or the executive as a 
detached subject, or our correct rationality as the ultimate philosophical goal, is swapped out for 
considering how our ability to become involved in the work of the corporation is what matters 
most, as mattering most: that our doing is more important than our thinking: that how the 
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executive acts and engages with their world is the proper desiderata of a philosophy of executive 
education – that this techne is paramount. But that is not the whole picture. 
The purpose of my detour to the work of Dominik Heil is to show how his study, likewise, 
has next to no engagement with the melancholic and “existential agony” aspects of Heidegger’s 
thinking, despite the proximity of Heil’s general area of interest to mine; demonstrating, as I think 
this does, John Haugeland’s earlier point about how easy it is to overlook5 the existentialist aspects 
of what must be considered to be a body of work, not just that of the existentially tinged second 
division of Heidegger’s unfinished, three divisioned Being and Time. While we don’t get to hear 
about it, Dominik Heil is perhaps justified in his selective application of Heidegger’s thinking to 
understand the nature of corporations and management simply because those existential aspects 
do not seem relevant to the domain of business, in his view. But then his claim to have brought 
those involved with corporations, i.e. executive educators in my case, into a “co-respondence with 
the very nature of entities and Being itself” (Heil, 2011: p.179) is fatally flawed when missing from 
this analysis is one of the prime, and I would argue, abundant and most accessible means of 
obtaining such a “co-respondence,” namely our ontological moods6: an example of this is an 
executive’s melancholy at his failure to escape the meaningless and crushingly boring duties inside 
the corporation he finds himself in, one of many negatively phrased moods depicting subsistence 
employment inside the workplace captured in Carl Cederström and Peter Fleming’s provocatively 
titled book Dead Man Working (2012). As that book acknowledges, though without mentioning 
Heidegger once, we care deeply about our moods, the effect they have on us and how they colour 
our worlds, the worlds that Heil and I operate in. Such moods have such an enormous disclosive 
capability, of disclosing that to which we are disposed, that it would be un-Heideggerian to ignore 
them. 
                                                          
5 Hubert Dreyfus, in the acknowledgements section of his Being in the World: Commentary on Heidegger’s Being and 
Time, Division I (Dreyfus, 1991: p.xiii) comes clean that he and John Haugeland have totally different views on the 
existentialist themes of Division II of Being and Time. As he says ten years later “Haugeland is no Heideggerian. He has 
gotten Heidegger’s priorities reversed. Dasein does not disclose itself in order to disclose the being of entities; Dasein 
discloses the being of entities in order to disclose itself. This disagreement determines our divergent take on everything 
else” (Dreyfus, 2000: p.314, emphasis in original). In his Commentary (1991) Dreyfus situates his reason for relegating 
his analysis of the whole of Division II to an appendix around how that portion of Being and Time was itself only an 
addendum, one that Heidegger hastily added for the sole purpose to secure tenure. Subsequent to that publication 
however, as Mark Wrathall and Jeff Malpas remind us, Dreyfus has since acknowledged that “by treating Division I 
independently of Division II he has failed to comprehend the importance to the Heideggerian project of a higher form of 
intelligibility than everyday intelligibility” (Wrathall & Malpas, 2000, vol.1: p.6). In a note to to me as writer as much as 
to the reader, I need to attend to whether my addressing boredom is geared towards properly disclosing entities (and 
the world) via executive education, or whether it is geared towards the disclosing of Dasein in its executiveness. 
6 The reader should not consider moods as the preserve of the domain of psychology. Having a mood (Gestimmtsein) 
does not happen without our heads, but that doesn’t mean they happen in our heads. The analogy Mark Wrathall likes 
to use (Wrathall, 2010) is that of a radio. A radio gets tuned in to different radio stations: that doesn’t mean the different 
stations are all inside the radio. It just means that without the radio getting tuned to them we’re not in a position to pick 
them up. 
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Moving on then, it is important that I show my own Heideggerian colours in my adoption 
of, in this instance, the mood of boredom as showing how we are disposed in the “affective state” 
(Befindlichkeit) as Felix Ó Murchadha calls it. I stop at this generic term since it is here at which my 
principle commentators – John Haugeland and Hubert Dreyfus – have a fundamental disagreement 
about what moods actually reveal. It is worth spending time on this now, so as to make clear where 
I stand on my support for engaging with existentialist themes in the context of executive education. 
In response to John Haugeland, his one time student, colleague, close friend7, and intellectual 
adversary in this case, Dreyfus says about moods: 
 
Surely ontological moods, which Haugeland acknowledges are Heidegger’s paradigm cases of 
disposedness, do not reveal what is and is not possible for entities; ontological moods like 
joy, boredom, despair, or anxiety reveal the global attunement of colouring of our whole 
world and so reveal ‘how things are going with us’. By making us sensitive to what matters; 
they make us sensitive to our way of being (Dreyfus, 2000: p.314, emphasis in original). 
 
As much as this is an ideological choice here – between deciding whether that for the sake of which 
ontological moods should be considered is their power to reveal Dasein first and foremost, or 
whether they should be considered for their foremost means of revealing Dasein’s power to 
disclose the being of entities – what is at stake is whether the reader is willing to remain with the 
conclusion, one that Dreyfus asserts, that the ultimate aim of any study of our disposedness is to 
show Dasein as a discloser, plain and simple. For this thesis I will choose not to rest at that point of 
Dreyfus’, since I had already reached that conclusion prior to my discovering him or Heidegger. The 
option of twisting this around, at the expense of being un-Heideggerian according to Dreyfus, and 
of moving beyond a merely Dasein-oriented focus that Dreyfus seems to be stuck with, is the 
direction I will take – something I will explore later in this chapter. 
This chapter is where I come clean on why I find the more existential aspects of his thinking 
particularly instructive for the area of work I now find myself in (executive education) in the sense 
of helping me to find the grounds from which to supersede the hegemony of the order-execution 
cognate – that stated purpose of all executive education activity which states that the goal towards 
which all executive education is oriented is to address the manifold aspects of execution, in 
whichever manner and circumstance the sequencing-out takes place, over against a prevailing 
order, of whatever magnitude or level of governing dynamic that order stands. The cognate is 
certainly a handy descriptive device. It is not often one has the chance of conceiving and working 
with such a conveniently singular purpose when it comes to defining that for the sake of which the 
                                                          
7 They both appeared in Tao Ruspoli’s 2010 cinematic Festschrift to Hubert Dreyfus (as well as Wrathall and Malpas’s 
two volume written Festschrift to Dreyfus), Being in the World, along with the usual US-based (only) suspects of 
Heideggerian scholarship. 
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educative act, in this instance executive education, is conducted: the thrill of whose uniqueness 
alone, however, should be enough to signal the flaws in such reductive and essentialist thinking. 
Can I really make ship-shape the whole of executive education and align it to a single purpose, 
namely the order-execution cognate? A spontaneous answer, given my professional experiences, 
is “no”; though the slightly more considered answer of “I’m not sure” is reason enough to defer an 
outright rejection of this handy device until the overall argument of this thesis has emerged from 
its construction, after it has slid down the slipway, as it were, but before it is fitted out to convey 
passengers, if in fact (to labour the metaphor even further) the vessel is seaworthy at all. 
It will be remembered that anxiety, in the Heideggerian sense, was revealed as a “ground 
mood” (Grundstimmung) or a “fundamental attunement”. It turns out – although you wouldn’t 
guess it from the opening epigram – that the mood of boredom has a special claim in “attuning” 
us to the time in our lives, hence its relevance in a thesis that is time-oriented with regard to the 
temporal aspects of, respectively, execution, education and their compound, executive education. 
Boredom tunes us into what, for Heidegger, deserves our closest attention, which in the case of 
boredom is our encounter with time. This process of tuning, not unlike that of bringing a piano 
back into tune, or a wayward plane back onto its homing beacon8, or a symphony back to its home 
key, is Heidegger’s way of claiming there to be a proper focus for our philosophical attention. 
Variously, throughout Heidegger’s philosophical career, these “proper focuses” have been, roughly 
speaking, the distinctly related themes of the onto-theological conception of Dasein; Dasein’s 
being; the historically distinct epochs of being; the role of language in revealing being; and time. It 
is the latter and, I would argue, this overarching focus that is under explicit examination here, not 
least because this persistent focus was still uppermost in Heidegger’s post-Being and Time lecture 
course given at the University of Freiburg in the academic year 1929/30, subsequently published 
in book form in English translation as The Fundamental Concepts of Metaphysics (Heidegger, 1995): 
this focus on time continued across the whole of his published works, culminating in the 1972 
publication in English of his lecture Time and Being. With respect to time, the reason why Heidegger 
singles out anxiety and boredom as fundamental, distinct from other moods, is because they serve 
to tune us into becoming awake to the temporal ground of Dasein’s being, namely the threefold 
horizon of time’s present, past and future, or “care” as we saw it nominalised in the previous 
chapter. Only in being ‘gripped’ by philosophical questioning (Heidegger, 1995: p.57) can we hope, 
according to Heidegger, to gain insight into what our fundamental attunements give us to know, 
                                                          
8 This is the comparator reference of Hubert Dreyfus, one he uses in his podcasted lecture series of Division II of Being 
and Time (Dreyfus, 2007). 
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or reveal, or give us over to knowing. This chapter will explore this claim further. Says Heidegger 
regarding the connection between the preceding points: 
 
We determined philosophizing as comprehensive questioning arising out of Dasein’s being 
gripped in its essence. Such being gripped however is possible only from out of and within a 
fundamental attunement of Dasein. This fundamental attunement itself cannot be some 
arbitrary one, but must permeate our Dasein in the ground of its essence. Such a fundamental 
attunement cannot be ascertained as something present at hand that we can appeal to, or as 
something firm upon which we might stand, but must be awakened – awakened in the sense 
that we must let it become awake. This fundamental attunement properly attunes us only if 
we do not oppose it, but rather give it space and freedom (Heidegger, 1995: p. 132). 
 
That which we are giving space and freedom to is boredom (and anxiety; though Heidegger does 
not foreground this particular mood is this text); and the reason for doing this – for providing space 
for boredom, however that could possibly be foregrounded – is so that we can become gripped by 
a comprehensive questioning. It’s as if Heidegger is saying here that we cannot be trusted to 
philosophize ordinarily unless we are gripped in this fashion – in the fashion of fundamental 
attunements: that we have to not only confront anxiety and boredom, which shouldn’t be difficult 
given their quotidian occurrence, but to be somehow awakened to that towards which we must 
become attuned, via anxiety and boredom. At the head of a long list of (equally) critical 
philosophical questions regarding this shaky claim is one that concerns Heidegger’s partiality for 
apparently psychological states mediating the process of philosophical questioning. I will come 
back to this objection later. However, parking for a moment the obvious shortcomings of this 
claim’s exclusivity, not to mention its strangeness, and for the sake of positioning some more 
introductory comments before our engagement with Heidegger’s argument about boredom 
proper, it is worth me recapping my argument in this thesis thus far, so as to remind ourselves how 
all this ties in with executive education and the delinquency of iniquitous capitalism. 
 By way of summary, based on the provisional apparatus of my order-execution cognate, I 
am putting forward a Heideggerian justification for not considering time merely in terms of 
chronologically conceived temporal sequences, “homogenous” and “empty”9 as our common 
                                                          
9 Walter Benjamin, in his book Illuminations (Benjamin, 1999: p.263), talking of our modern and profane sense of time, 
calls it “Homogenous, empty time”. With respect to the emergence of the secular age, says Charles Taylor of Benjamin’s 
phrase, “’[h]omogeneity’ captures the aspect I am describing here, that all events now fall into the same kind of time; 
but the ‘emptiness’ of time takes us into another issue: the way in which both space and time come to be seen as 
‘containers’ which things and events contingently fill, rather than as constituted by what fills them. This latter step is part 
of the metaphysical imagination of modern physics, as we can see with Newton. But it is the step to homogeneity which 
is crucial for secularization, as I am conceiving it. The step to emptiness is part of the objectification of time which has 
been so important a part of the outlook of the modern subject of instrumental reason. Time has been in a sense 
‘spatialized’. Heidegger has mounted a strong attack on this whole conception in his understanding of temporality; see 
especially Sein und Zeit…Division II. But distinguishing secularity from the objectification of time allows us to situate 
Heidegger on the modern side of the divide. Heideggerian temporality is also a mode of secular time” (Taylor, 2007: 
p.798). 
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understanding of time has it; but as also taking the form of Kairotic moments, or “knots” to use 
Charles Taylor’s language (Taylor, 2007: p.54), moments whose nature calls for temporary 
temporal suspension and even reversal of the standard temporal succession. Whilst our 
chronological conception of time predominates our reckoning with time generally, with time’s 
Kairotic aspects either relegated to the status of anomalous and therefore discountable 
psychological states, or to primitive or pre-modern accounts of the time of the sacred as Charles 
Taylor avers, both chronic and Kairotic types of time are worthy of consideration, if we are to find 
a way of living that embodies an understanding of being (to keep reminding ourselves what Dasein 
is). Where, as Heidegger states on the opening page of Being and Time, “[o]ur provisional aim is 
the Interpretation of time as the possible horizon for any understanding whatsoever of being” 
(Heidegger, 1962: p.1), it makes sense, in the light of a desire to understand being qua Heidegger, 
to be similarly interested in getting to grips with time in all its varieties. My purpose in this thesis 
is to account for alternative conceptions of time in Heideggerian terms, in the context of executive 
education. As a consequence I will be able to use “time” to act, so to speak, as a burglar’s jemmy 
to prise apart the relata of the order-execution cognate, thereby nullifying the purported essence 
of executive education through a dissolution of the sequence, or ex-sequi, of executiveness. 
Heidegger’s concept of boredom, and fundamental attunements generally, can enact the violence 
of the jemmied splintering, as it were, on our executive’s stolid acceptance of, and collusion in, the 
seemingly unassailable forces of contemporary capitalism (this is an effort in stark contrast to the 
palliate to capitalism offered by “business ethics,” the current incumbent in executive education 
tasked with questioning/sanctioning capitalistic motivations). Only then, once the Dasein of our 
senior executive has been gripped by its own essence, can we (philosophers of education) consider 
effecting a reappraisal of this familiar and iniquitous world of capitalistic excesses in the form of an 
educative experience for the late career executive that mocks death, politicises non-production, 
and frees the executive to reconsider their encorporated time and finitude, effecting who knows 
what as a result: dangerous indeed. 
Almost Wagnerian in its ambition, though based on such insignificant beginnings in the 
guise of plain old boredom, I will attempt this process of disassemblage in the following manner. 
Firstly, using the text The Fundamental Concepts of Metaphysics, I will outline what Heidegger 
means by establishing, as he does, three levels of boredom, and quite why he accords boredom 
the status of a fundamental or ground mood. Secondly, using these three levels and this 
fundament, I will make a connection between boredom and the modern melancholy10 suffered by 
                                                          
10 Heidegger actually uses the German term Schwermut, translated as “melancholy,” in connection with boredom when 
he describes boredom as “slowly propelling us to the threshold of melancholy”, and where an apparently melancholy 
seeming landscape “is not itself melancholy, but merely attunes us in such a way” (Heidegger, 1995: p.79, 85). 
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our senior corporate executive and position this melancholy as the workbench for tinkering with 
what our fundamental attunements give us to know. Lastly, I will explore how this theory works in 
practice. 
 
3.2 Three Levels of Boredom 
As we saw in the previous chapter, we first came across “attunement” in Being and Time 
(Heidegger, 1962: p.172) in relationship with our everyday moods, “how one is, and how one is 
faring” (Heidegger, 1962: p.173), in which Dasein is brought before its being as “there” in the “Da” 
of Dasein – in a fashion of Dasein being “delivered over” to its being11; in a way in a form of active 
portering. We then came across attunement again in What is Metaphysics? (Heidegger, 1943), in 
relationship with man this time being brought before nothingness through anxiety. Ultimately, 
Heidegger’s interest in attunement is allied to his wish to see the work of metaphysics address the 
sense of Being, and not only beings as present-at-hand entitites. As Daniel Dahlstrom notes, “In 
asking its leading question ‘what are beings?’ metaphysics recognizes only beings, not the sense of 
being, not historical being (the presence as such of beings to Dasein), which is at odds with what 
Heidegger considers the proper task of metaphysics, since it should be asking the basic question: 
‘what is being?’” (Dahlstrom, 2013: p.129). This was the muster call I wanted to rally to when I first 
engaged with Heidegger’s work. When I first set out on the task of this study, I was keen, like any 
newbie, to assimilate exciting new concepts (such as Heidegger’s reawakening of our sense of 
being) into my everyday practices: this straightforward seeming act of portering for me, as I initially 
saw it, involved breaking with a thousand year history of pragmatic and techne oriented merchant 
education12 and swapping that out with classes on metaphysics for merchants. How foolish I was: 
until, that is, I realised that a subtle but persistent alignment of opportunities lay before me, under 
the auspices of which I could conduct my portering duties after all. These opportunities manifest 
themselves in the figure of the older but well-connected and influential merchant, in executive 
guise these days, suffering with what I’m calling, for euphony’s sake, the mood of modern 
                                                          
11 Just to pick up on the anti-psychology point made earlier, Dasein brought before Dasein is not evidence of a 
psychological basis of his analysis. Says Heidegger of this, “The statement: Dasein exists for the sake of itself, does not 
contain the positing of an egoistic or ontic end for some blind narcissism on the part of the factical human being in each 
case” (Heidegger, 1998: p.122, emphasis in original). Instead, “[w]e must therefore take careful note that the conception 
of man as consciousness, as subject, as person, as a rational being, and our concept of each of these: of consciousness, 
subject, I, and person, must be put in question” (Heidegger, 1995: p.133, emphasis in original). 
12 Where education for the orders of merchant workers (L: laboratores) – as with the orders of clergy (oratores) and 
warriors (bellatores) – has a long history: see David Priestland’s Merchant, Soldier, Sage: A New History of Power (2012), 
and Jacques Le Goff’s Time, Work, & Culture in the Middle Ages (1980: p.53). 
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melancholy, accompanied by that in the face of which the malaise is positioned13, the current 
capitalist order: hence my melancholic and capitalist-facing executive. 
The act of bringing this instance of Dasein before its own being, in order to ask Heidegger’s 
cardinal question “what is being?,” can now, after a little more introducing, be delegated to our 
humble servant “boredom” (not forgetting its twin “anxiety”), notwithstanding the fancy tag of 
“fundamental attunement” that acts simply, as it were, as an arrow on the hotel ceiling pointing to 
Mecca, to that which we need to attend in this analysis, to Dasein as an active discloser disclosing 
the world. And while it is too early in the argument to attribute the object in the face of which 
Dasein, in this instance, is bored or bored by, we have the beginnings of a motley though 
philosophically productive alignment. 
A casualty of the translation into English of the German word for boredom, Langeweile, is 
the English term’s having a direct sense of time, which is present in the German “long-while,” in 
which time is not only explicitly addressed but suffered by it being “drawn out” in boredom: and 
so usefully “[b]oredom and the question of boredom thus lead us to the problem of time” 
(Heidegger, 1995: p.80) directly, and thereby an engagement with boredom “ultimately grasps at 
the roots of Dasein, i.e. prevails in the ownmost ground of Dasein” (ibid: p.96)14. That time is “drawn 
out” in boredom is Heidegger’s observation of the first of three forms, or levels, of boredom he 
identifies, where we do our best to “pass the time” or to “kill time”. Illustrating this first and most 
familiar form of boredom, Heidegger uses the example of waiting at a station for a train (Heidegger, 
1995: p.93). In this example the train won’t be arriving for four hours, and so he has us (figuratively) 
rummaging through our rucksack looking for something to read, spending some time studying the 
timetables, as well as walking out of the station surveying the locale, counting the trees along the 
road. Though, in our concerted effort to pass the time, after glancing at the clock again, we’ve only 
managed to draw out a mere five minutes. This oppressive dragging of time as a sequence is what 
we’re trying to divert ourselves from: we are being held in “limbo,” as Heidegger calls it (ibid: p.99), 
in our frantic efforts to keep ourselves occupied and to fight off boredom. The oppression we feel, 
he sees as our fear of being “left empty” (ibid: p.101), which means that the situation we find 
ourselves in at the instance of our boredom offers us nothing: that in being left empty we are 
abandoned to ourselves. Says Heidegger of this relationship between being held in the transition 
state of limbo, and our fear of facing ourselves, “[h]ow much time is capable of here! It has power 
                                                          
13 I’m holding back from making a causal connection between melancholy and the capitalist order: I’m merely facing 
them off against each other at this stage. 
14 I have assumed that the reader is familiar enough with Heidegger’s works to make the connection between boredom’s 
grasp at the roots of Dasein and unity of the past, present and future time as the basis for Dasein’s being. For what it’s 
worth, this far in to the thesis, Heidegger establishes this connection in §65 of Being and Time by saying that “Temporality 
makes possible the unity of existence, facticity, and falling, and in this way constitutes primordially the totality of the 
structure of care” (Heidegger, 1962: p.376). 
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over railway stations and can bring it about that stations bore us. On the other hand it becomes 
apparent that time of itself, the mere course of time, does not bore us. Rather becoming bored is 
this essential being held in limbo in coming to be left empty (ibid: p.105, emphasis in original). What 
we’re left facing is time itself, in all its drawn out chronological and successive order. 
Given our apparent familiarity with boredom, the description of this first form seems 
acceptable enough. What Heidegger is acknowledging here is that we can become bored “by” 
something: by having to wait for a train, in this instance, where the “by” in Heidegger’s language 
involves a form of being that is present-at-hand. The “leaving empty” of the first form of boredom 
is not an absence or lack of something, “but is a particular kind of being present at hand in 
accordance with which things refuse us something – not in general or universally or 
indeterminately, but refuse something that we spontaneously expect within this particular 
situation under these specific circumstances” (ibid: p.106, emphasis in original). The salient point 
introduced here is the refusal, whose role in the opening epigram serves as the link to that which 
fundamental attunements give us over to attend. We shouldn’t forget that it is because of 
fundamental attunements that we’re talking about boredom at all. As we will see, since boredom 
gives us an opportunity to come face-to-face with nothingness, the same nothingness that was 
introduced in the previous chapter, it is not surprising that we refuse this opportunity. “Boredom 
in the ordinary sense is disturbing, unpleasant, and unbearable” (ibid: p.158), and so an element 
of refusal is not unsurprising when confronted by the abyss of nothing that we do our utmost to 
block out from our lives. The prospect of confronting the contingency and meaninglessness of our 
lives in the face of nothingness is the motivating force of our fleeing and refusing to face that which 
boredom shows us: and yet it is this very refusal that Heidegger wants us to focus on, which is why 
he introduces a second and more profound form of boredom that “grasps more at the roots of our 
Dasein” (ibid: p.107). 
Putting up for a moment with a whiff of high-mindedness that comes from having someone 
tell us what is good for us, though being sufficiently intrigued to see just what sort of palliate is 
offered to mitigate the effects of what must surely be a straightforward mood, we find Heidegger 
busily preparing for us a descriptive framework for a deeper form of boredom that is not 
dependent on the specifics of a particular situation that bores us. The example he uses to illustrate 
this second form of boredom is a dinner party, the delightful circumstances of which we find quite 
to our liking: the company is pleasant, the food is nice, the music and conversation are to our taste, 
where overall we find the event perfectly “witty and charming” (ibid: p.109). And yet, as he 
continues with the illustration, when we get home after the party, “[w]e cast a quick glance at the 
work we interrupted that evening, make a rough assessment of things and look ahead to the next 
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day – and then it comes: I was bored after all this evening, on the occasion of this invitation” (ibid: 
p.109). Heidegger takes the fact of our pleasure at how agreeable we found the dinner party as 
evidence of a situation-independent basis for this second form of boredom, one quite at odds with 
the former type which was situation-dependent, i.e. the situation of the station. There was nothing 
about the dinner party that we found boring, and yet, he claims, there is still a basis for what he’s 
calling a more profound form of boredom to emerge from this example. How so? Because we have 
left ourselves time (in this case, for the party): we see that we have sufficient time, and so do not 
feel oppressed by the dragging of time as in first instance of boredom. In this second case, our 
relationship to time is different, in that we are less concerned to lose time; we have carefully 
apportioned the time of the party as ours to take, and yet once taken we realise that it was wasted. 
This situation of wasted-ness is what Heidegger accords as boring, with time itself as that which 
both triggers and is that over against which boredom occurs. 
 
With respect to the first form the question is surely: Why do we have no time? To what extent 
do we not wish to lose any time? Because we need it and wish to use it. For what? For our 
everyday occupations, to which we have long since become enslaved. We have no time 
because we ourselves cannot keep from joining in everything that is going on. This not having 
any time is ultimately a greater being lost of the self than that wasting time which leaves itself 
time (Heidegger, 1995: p.129, emphasis in original). 
 
Realising the absurdity of wanting oppressive time to pass in the first instance of boredom, 
especially in the face of having so little of it, brings one to one’s senses about spending the precious 
time that one has. So no wonder that the ultimate baddie is revealed to be time: that in boredom 
one is brought before that which grants the very possibility of Dasein’s “doing and acting” 
(Heidegger, 1995: p.140). Dasein is brought before Dasein: as if Dasein is tuning into Dasein FM, 
we have attuned to our home station, though this is not some interior process. It is a way of getting 
in tune with the world that allows us to reveal how we, as Dasein, interact with our worlds in unique 
and authentic ways. But who does the tuning? Boredom? 
Is this, what he calls a more profound form of boredom, in fact boredom at all, instead of 
simply an inconvenience, or a chore we felt we ought to endure, or an overdue favour that we 
owed the host: or was our attendance at the party itself one giant ploy to assuage a mood of 
boredom we were overcome by before going out to the party, only after which, in reconnecting to 
what the party interrupted, we were landed back into, but which now arose with an even greater 
force by dint of the contrast to the earlier evenings’ activities? In what way is this second form of 
boredom more profound and against what is this profundity gauged? 
The temptation at this stage is to concentrate one’s critical efforts to unpick these two 
examples Heidegger uses (the station and the dinner party) to illustrate the first two forms of 
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boredom15, and thereby to miss the ultimate claim he makes, that boredom presents an 
opportunity to attune Dasein to resolute self-disclosure, of bringing Dasein before itself, as he goes 
on to explain in the last of the three forms of boredom. If the first form arises, as it were, from 
outside, in being bored “by” a particular situation; and if the second form arises not from the 
outside but from Dasein itself, in the sense of being bored “with” ourselves; then the third form of 
boredom, correspondingly more profound, surprisingly does not actually arise at all. Without a 
singularity to its cause, this form of boredom “can occur out of the blue, and precisely whenever 
we do not expect it at all” (Heidegger, 1995: p.135). In a characteristic and by now familiar tendency 
to clothe his culminating arguments in increasingly Byzantine prose, we find Heidegger, in the last 
level of this three-level structure, stacking all his favourite concepts on top of one another, ending 
in the giddy lather of the opening epigram, whose principle concept, by the way, is the Augenblick 
or the Kairotic moment of vision, and whose corresponding arch nemesis is “entrancement”. The 
profundity of the third form of boredom comes from it revealing to us the burdensomeness of our 
existence: that we have to be. This is not a simple “arising” but has to be worked at, given space 
and freedom as was mentioned earlier, since we find it a heavy burden. This heft is acknowledged 
in how the situation in the first form of boredom refuses to give us what we expect (escape from 
oppressive time), and in the second how a “return” on our time invested (at the party) is likewise 
refused. In the third form of boredom, confronted by the sheer “timeishness”16 of our existence, 
we become dazzled, or “entranced” (Heidegger, 1995: p.147) by time, affording a sight of the 
Kairotic moment at which we can become open to see not only our own being, but the world and 
our relationship to it. It becomes, in the third level of boredom, “boring for one” (Heidegger, 1995: 
p.134), not boring for me, not for you, but for one. Says Heidegger, in summary of all three cases 
of boredom 
 
Whereas in the first case of boredom we are concerned to shout down the boredom by 
passing the time so that we do not need to listen to it; and whereas in the second case what 
is distinctive is a not wanting to listen, we now have a being compelled to listen, being 
compelled in the sense of that kind of compelling force which everything properly authentic 
about Dasein possesses, and which accordingly is related to Dasein’s innermost freedom. The 
‘it is boring for one’ has already transposed us into a realm of power over which the individual 
                                                          
15 For instance, just such a diversionary body of critique, though one I have not come across, would be to have wished 
Heidegger had read Marcel Proust’s A la Recherche du Temps Perdu before embarking on his 1929/30 lecture course 
(Recherche was published in France between 1913-1927), if only to metal his example of how time can pass at dinner 
parties especially, and be passed and lost generally. I am indebted to Joshua Landy (2004, 2009, 2012) for pointing out 
how to do things with (Proustian) fictions. 
16 As comic as this locution sounds, it conveys “that which has to do with time-ness” in a way more straightforward than 
the formal term “temporality”; it is also John Haugeland’s preferred translation (Haugeland, 2013: p.154) for Macquarrie 
and Robinson’s lowercase “t” temporality. As a fan of Haugeland’s writing on Heidegger, this is reason enough to use it 
here. 
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person, the public individual subject, no longer has any power (Heidegger, 1995: p.136, 
emphasis in original). 
 
As Heidegger’s writing moves away from the Dasein-oriented and transcendental themes of Being 
and Time and the other texts of the 1920’s and 30’s that I’ve have been drawing on in this thesis 
thus far, he will continue to use the device of Grundstimmung, or ground moods17, to tune us into 
experiencing how Being is revealed in all its manifest indeterminateness, as his thinking moves into 
a decidedly historical register. Subsequent ground moods will include an analysis of Hölderlin’s holy 
mourning, Greek wonder, and the “reserve, shock, and awe” that is concomitant at the beginning 
of a new way of thinking – a “beginning” that, by the end of this thesis, will have brought us back 
to what can emerge after our world has collapsed in my interpretation of Heideggerian death, a 
new beginning, a beginning again from the excesses of a delinquent capitalism. We will encounter 
some of these ground moods in other18 source texts in the remaining chapters of this thesis. I would 
like to assess whether what I call the “mood of modern melancholy” can count as just such a ground 
mood. This change of register will be helpful to temper this discussion’s hitherto narrowly 
individual- (and Dasein-) focused slant that has had me bring Heidegger’s thinking to bear on the 
individual executive as the figure under scrutiny, in contradistinction to the broader structures, the 
grand dynamics that drive capital accumulation and its dangerously extreme inequalities. This 
register-change will also help to reconceive what we can and should expect from an executive 
education that is alive to the potential for a political response, for instance, to the discontent 
generated from these inequalities, clearing space to allow executive education to consider what 
kind of relation it has to this delinquent child it appears to foster. But who is fostering who? 
In what follows I would like to attempt this change of register, at the same time as making 
the connection between Heidegger’s levels of boredom and the mood of modern melancholy, 
specifically as this mood relates to the excesses of capitalism, as outlined by Piketty (2014) and 
David Marquand, in the latter’s book Mammon’s Kingdom (2014). That I believe the contemporary 
hyper-capitalist corporate workspace (at least a decent proportion of the executives I come into 
contact with) is afflicted by a form of modern melancholy will go some way to backing up 
Heidegger’s claim that moods don’t just take place inside your head, but instead happen out in the 
world. As we saw with Dominik Heil’s work, a change from Platonic and Cartesian philosophical 
traditions, and the undercutting of these traditions with the phenomenological discourse of 
Heidegger, sees a suspension of the subject/object dichotomy with its over-reliance on psychology, 
                                                          
17 Gründstimmung only appears once in Being and Time, according to Daniel Dahlstrom (Dahlstrom, 2013: p.134), 
although I can’t find it. 
18 According to Daniel Dahlstrom these include, from Heidegger collected works (Gesamtausgabe - GA), volume 39, 
Hölderlin’s Hymn ‘Germania’ and ‘The Rhine’; GA45, Basic Questions of Philosophy: Selected ‘Problems’ of ‘Logic’; GA65, 
Contributions to Philosophy (From Enowning). 
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and along with it an opportunity to say that moods can be outside of our heads and in the world. 
As Charles Taylor says, on camera this time (as part of Tao Ruspoli’s 2010 cinematic Festschrift to 
Hubert Dreyfus), we commonsensically say that there is a “joyful mood in the room; it’s plainly not 
a creation of my mind of your mind – what it is…is a creation of our interaction” (Taylor, 2010) in 
the room, outside of our heads: we similarly say “that the mood of the nation is downcast right 
now”, as Mark Wrathall says in the same film (Wrathall, 2010). These statements have captured 
something that is real in the world, and not just some private and psychological state, from which 
I project outwards onto the world. This accounts for the frustration and disappointment I initially 
felt when I came across Heidegger’s discourse on moods in Being and Time, believing this to be an 
unwelcome renege on his anti-Cartesian and non-psychologistic stance that attracted me to him in 
the first place, not understanding that he was using mood as a means by which to have Dasein 
confront itself. Reconceiving the fundamental mood of boredom (and anxiety) now as a means by 
which Dasein confronts its own temporality, seeing in mood that time is both a power over Dasein, 
yet always coming from Dasein (Ó Murchadha, 2013: p.81), allows me to explore how we 
simultaneously suffer time, and suffer time as that on which we depend. Chronologically speaking, 
we depend on the timely meeting of our ontic commitments using standardly sequential measures 
of clock time: no one doubts the value of standardised clock time in regulating our worldly 
concerns, least of all Heidegger. But our chronological conception of time, a conception that is 
purely quantitative in its tendency to reduce time’s passing as a calculation of the sum of instances 
of now, and even accounts for the future with the same calculative intent such that the future is 
relegated to the possibilities not yet calculated as nows, fails us in the task of transcending our 
everyday, which is the wish of every figure of revolution, be that in politics, art, science, or religion. 
We can only fulfil a new beginning, the next revolution, by conceiving the revolutionary act not 
outside of time – that would be a fantastic impossibility – but outside of time chronologically  
understood, hence my pejorative use of the term “chronic” to describe a hopelessly 
overdetermined definition of time. Such revolutions require a break with the past and the future, 
whose time is better understood as Kairotic, the opportune time of action, the right moment to do 
something. In the world of the corporate executive, there is even a phrase for this sort of time: 
quality time.  
Concerning the “outside-of-our-heads-and-in-the-world” mood of boredom – 
substitutable for any of terms from the long list of synonyms for “anxiety” in the previous chapter, 
including the archaic, though sensible term “melancholy”19 – I would like to illustrate what the 
                                                          
19 In my attempt to establish a connection between the archaism of the term “melancholy” and its contemporary stand-
in “boredom,” thereby drawing attention to that fundamental disposition with which the term has long been associated, 
I’m drawn to Peter Toohey’s book Boredom: A Lively History (2011). The author, true to his sub-title, peppers his account 
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lethargy of boredom (and manifestation of ground moods generally) can attune us in to in assessing 
the dumbfounded-ness of our capitalistic existence, and the not-at-home-ness of our anxiety in 
the face of it. Consider Sanjay, three years on from commencing his role of CHRO for X-Corp, now 
also promoted to a member of X-Corp’s Board, having comfortably settled in to his luxurious 
business district apartment, five-minute’s drive from the company’s high rise headquarters in an 
Eastern Texas city in the US. We join Sanjay on the opening day of a newly launched X-Corp 
executive education programme, taking place in a plush suite of rooms in a golf resort on the 
outskirts of the city. As CHRO, and thereby responsible for all aspects of the management of human 
resources in X-Corp, he is acting as chief sponsor of the programme, keen to give the programme 
and its intent his “blessing”. 
 
o-----o 
 
Sanjay was distracted, swivelling to and fro in his comfy chair at the back of the training 
room at the venue. This 3-day development event was coming too close to Quarter End for his 
liking. It was only half-way through a long phone conversation during the drive to the venue that 
he’d felt his sixteenth-floor team had understood the finance update he’d wanted. Now he just 
needed a quick follow-up with some of his direct reports he knew would be there, the ones he’d 
nominated to join this programme, about some of those figures – it shouldn’t cause much of an 
interruption; he needed this at the earliest opportunity, which looked to be during the mid-
afternoon coffee break, judging by the schedule he’d been handed by the lead trainer from the 
business school as he entered the training room, who he’d met several times since he’d selected 
this high ranked school to design and run the programme. He was sat low in his swivel chair at the 
back of the room, behind a large “U” shaped table, around which sat twenty of X-Corp’s brightest 
and most talented senior managers. Sanjay was willing himself to relax, though he was up next in 
a few minutes, to set the context of the programme, and say a little about your own leadership 
journey to the top, as the woman’s consultant colleague had put it to him as he was being whisked 
from reception to the room. He couldn’t see the managers’ faces, which were turned towards the 
business school woman at the front, busy introducing the programme, but he knew most of them, 
and certainly their potential, on paper at least.  
He’d fought hard for this programme: it had been part of his pitch for the CHRO job: there 
hadn’t been one like it in X-Corp for many years. Whilst he’d capped the seat and $4m budget 
                                                          
of boredom with reproductions of famous paintings, most notable of which are Albrecht Dürer’s copperplate engraving 
Melancholia I, 1514, (ibid: p.118); and that of Durer’s contemporary, Lucas Cranach the Elder, and his Melancholia, 1532, 
(ibid: p.123). Both depict, not surprisingly, bored-looking figures, surrounded by timely symbols of their disposition. 
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allocation for this programme, he had, with the assistance of his Talent Review Boards in each 
global region, personally earmarked the outstanding balance of one hundred and seventy potential 
attendees within the senior manager population across X-Corp to join this nine-month long 
programme within eighteen-months of its launch, provided everything went well. The Board 
needed to show the stock market that it was serious about the strength and long-term viability of 
the company’s management structure, as the market for outsourcing services was changing faster 
than the company had foreseen. Academics in Business Strategy were on tomorrow, to map these 
market changes against the company’s strategy, so as to inform this group, and ultimately the 
entire management community, of their responsibilities to effect the necessary changes: after, that 
is, the participants had received feedback on their psychometric profiles from coaches they’d each 
been appointed to later that afternoon, as background to their personal development plans taking 
place during and after the programme – they were expected to fit the programme’s activities in 
around their day-jobs. There hadn’t been this sort of mass profiling in the company for a long time, 
and it had caused quite a stir amongst the group and their “directs”. Consequently the programme 
was a big deal for participants, for Sanjay, and for X-Corp as a whole. 
As the PowerPoint™ slides began to fly, and as the sixty-forty split male/female group 
began to sit back in their chairs – this being the first time most of them had been together – during 
one of his swivels, Sanjay caught the view out beyond the shaded veranda over onto an adjacent 
lake this side of the golf course, down which the training room looked, the green visible in the far 
distance. The view was sublime, though the mood he realised he was in terrifying. He kept staring. 
He couldn’t very well share with the group how profoundly bored he realised he’d become in the 
job: the endless round of team lunches, budget meetings, talent forecasts, remuneration 
committees, disciplinary hearings, appointment boards, union gatherings, most of which required 
lengthy trips overseas. He was fine with each of these, understanding their respective importance. 
In fact, his diligence was acknowledged by the self-appointed reward – along with his own pay, 
beyond his capacity to spend – of giving himself leave, when time permitted, to lead some HR-
related seminar sessions on the local university’s MBA course. His style was popular, though it was 
in the fresh faces at these seminars, where he confronted his ideological young self many times 
over, that he realised he’d become a stranger to his own past. His was a seven-figure liveable-with 
sense of profound boredom, but profound all the same: did it show? 
It was time to be introduced to the group, by the woman from the business school, whom 
he now knew to be a “Human Resources” academic with many years of experience in leadership 
development. A flash of panic shot through his body as she gave a light-hearted précis of his much 
publicised past, as he made his smartly besuited walk to the front of the room, to face the talent. 
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At dinner later that evening, in the same dark suit, after drinks in the bar with the business 
school team, a number of people from the group had spoke to him about how inspiring they’d 
found his story, which he’d told without slides. All Sanjay could think of, looking out at a hastening 
dusk over the mist-hung fairways, after he’d made his apologies to the group, having drifted out to 
the carpark, and having climbed into his classy car, was his son back in Gurgaon. 
 
o-----o 
 
As a pacing out of the contours of Heidegger’s notion of “profound boredom,” this 
description is a tad excessive. Though what the excess portrays, I would say, is the extent to which 
we have to have become wholly entranced by time, knowingly captivated by the lavish timeishness 
of our quotidian existence, before we can even begin to catch a glimpse of how our lives do or do 
not (for the sake of the revelation, it doesn’t matter which) embody an understanding of our 
existing at all. Sanjay has done that. Glancing back at the chapter’s opening epigram – just one of 
many of Heidegger’s explanations as to what the fundamental mood of boredom gives us over to 
realise – we can catch in it a picture of Sanjay, slumped over his steering wheel in the car, given 
over to an experience of the “properly authentic possibility” (Heidegger, 1995: p.153) of his sheer 
existence, a sense of existence for him “only possible in the midst” (ibid) of his everyday 
engagement with his CHRO job. That in terms (of the opening epigram) of which has “vanished” 
and has “refused” is more accurately referred to, I’d say, as a coming together, a “unity,” of Sanjay’s 
chronological existence – his necessary accounting for his existence using standardly conceived 
sequential time – with the less standard, but no less necessary, Kairotic temporal existence that 
brings him in front of his own existence, evidenced by his son acting as a token for Sanjay’s 
existence. This unity of the chronic with the Kairotic is, rather theatrically put, nothing less, in 
temporal terms, than the meeting of the finite with the infinite – something I’ll pick up on in the 
next chapter. 
Let’s try and map Heidegger’s three levels of boredom onto this scenario. At no point was 
Sanjay bored by the naked passing of time, chronologically speaking, of the event, or its 
preparation, since too much was riding on its success for that case of boredom to arise. Likewise, 
at no point was Sanjay bored with himself – distinct from the situation he found himself in – and 
needed to make no effort to avert his senses to the time of the event, since he was perfectly 
familiar with the various temporal structures of the event – its duration and span beyond its 
publically understood duration. No: it was a boredom he had no option but to face, coming as it 
did, “out of the blue” (Heidegger, 1995: p.135), and revealing to Sanjay, via this fundamental mood, 
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his own burden of pure existence, a revelation over which he had no power, despite his well 
wadded and privileged status. Although it doesn’t seem like it, Sanjay, or Sanjay’s Dasein, has done 
itself a favour, in this vignette, and now faces a choice. Whether to be bowed by the limits, the 
chronological limits, set by a calculative view of time that will bring a familiar, and conveniently 
apportioned, future sequentially into view, now-point by now-point: or whether to face the infinite 
squarely. In Part Two of this thesis, I will explore how the infinite, the eternal, is an excess closer 
than we’re minded to think.
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4 
__________________________________ 
 
 
The Gods of Technology 
 
 
 
 
The men [sic] of this earth are provoked by the absolute domination of the essence of modern 
technology, together with technology itself, into developing a final world-formula which would 
once and for all secure the totality of the world as a uniform sameness, and thus make it available 
to us as a calculable resource. The provocation to such making-available orders everything into a 
single design, the making of which levels the harmony of the infinite relation. The togetherness of 
the four “voices of destiny” no longer rings out. 
(Martin Heidegger, Elucidations of Hölderlin’s Poetry, p.202) 
 
 
 
4.1 Introduction 
Remaining with the theme of what counts as excess, I would like to approach my examination of 
the relationship between time, technology and executive education from outside, or in excess, of 
an approach we might expect to take. An expected approach might take an historical line, in 
showing how, over the ages, the “perceptual moment” (Canales, 2009: p.3) has shrunk in 
measurable duration from seasons, days, minutes, to tenths of a second, and now to the 
attosecond, one billionth of billionth of a second, and to Plank time – about 10¯43 second – all of 
which is in keeping with our preference for materialistic and scientific explanations (Scientific 
American, 21 (1), 2012): the expected line might be to subject to scrutiny how, so-called, consumer 
oriented information communication technologies (ICT), given these shrinking perceptual 
moments, speed up our lives, revealing our “always on,” or 24/7, existence; then, possibly, how 
this abiding and temporally oriented episteme, or techne, either is or is not manifested or 
countered in educative practices, in perhaps the more political dimensions of education. Such 
approaches to an examination of the relationship between time, technology and executive 
education have a compelling, sometimes beguiling, explanatory force. Even Heidegger’s own 
writing on technology, especially his translated essays The Question Concerning Technology and 
Discourse on Thinking, can themselves be readily interpreted as quaintly anti-technological and 
anti-acceleratory in this runaway manner, when he points out that “[n]ature becomes a gigantic 
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gasoline station, an energy source for modern technology and industry” (Heidegger, 1966: p.50); 
or when his apparent fears that “technology threatens to slip from human control” (Heidegger, 
1977: p.5) seem to reveal our powerlessness in the face of modern technology. In my view, 
however, as such, they have a tendency to distract attention away from a simpler means of 
encountering time, namely through those fundamental moods associated with the traditionally 
Romantic complaint of melancholy – constituted, in this study, by reflections on death, anxiety, 
and boredom – that emerges from the contrast between a chronological and  a Kairological 
conception of time. What was revealed in our examination of Heidegger’s concepts of death, 
anxiety, and boredom, was the “between-space” (Ó Murchadha, 2013: p.63), the excess, between 
chronos and Kairos, where Dasein found itself in its temporality. In this second part of the thesis 
I’d like to examine the basis of a different set of fundamental moods, ones that open Dasein onto 
the Kairological moment of vision, via an examination of the Heideggerian concepts of technology, 
history and the event of appropriation, or Ereignis.  
In the previous chapter, it was only Sanjay’s dealing in and with the world that revealed to 
him his raw existence. He didn’t gain that revelation by effort of will; it was given amidst his cares 
for his world. The issue I have with the standard descriptors1 that emphasise, critically or positively, 
the grip that technology has on the time of our lives is that the site of this enslavement or 
redemption – depending on which stance is taken – is an actual piece of technology, the gift of its 
use and the telos of that particular gifted use. What is actually gifted, I would say, are not the 
affordances of the specific piece of technology, however compelling it seems,  and however swept 
up we are by it; rather, the Kairotic aspect of the time its use reveals, beyond techne, and 
irrespective of any specific knowledge (of profit maximisation, say), which is dangerously 
unproductive. Our being swept up by technology, constitutes a missing of the true gift technology 
brings, a revolutionary gift of having us realise, through technology, our own revolutionary 
possibilities. As the Oxford Classical Dictionary entry for “Kairos” has it, Kairos is “personified 
opportunity” (OCD, third edition, 1996: p.806); consequently, our being swept up by technology, 
our treating it as the ultimate distraction, constitutes the negation of Kairos and the Kairotic 
moment of opportunity. As Felix Ó Murchadha says of Kairotic time, “[t]he kairos is characteristic 
of a time and a certain history; it is occasioned by that history and refigures that history. The time 
of revolution is one in which the past and the future is transformed and a new chronology becomes 
possible, such that the past can no longer be thought except in relation to that revolution, to that 
Kairos” (Ó Murchadha, 2013: p.197). This is the new beginning, the Kairotic revelation I’m here 
                                                          
1 A standard not uniquely, though iconically, represented by Neil MacGregor’s 100th object in his History of the World in 
100 Objects (2012), the solar-powered charger, a technology that has the power to “change almost every aspect of [our] 
domestic existence” (ibid: p.555). 
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attempting to theorize, for the jemmying apart of the relata of the order-execution cognate, such 
that the past of executive education can no longer be thought except in relation to the revolution 
that can be enacted only once Kairotic time is revealed: I’m saying that education is the mode of 
experience in which Kairotic time comes to appearance. If the chronic time of death, anxiety and 
boredom slip away as a train into the night, then a different kind of time stands the chance of 
emerging through the Kairological understanding of – as this chapter deals with – technology. 
Based on one of Heidegger’s neologisms, das Geviert, from his 1951 essay Building 
Dwelling Thinking, and translated into English as the “fourfold” (Heidegger, 1971: p.150), I would 
like to approach Heidegger’s critique of the dangerous place we allow technology to assume in 
modern society – where, as we will see, “the danger stands that man is completely delivered over 
to technology and one day will be made into a controlled machine” (Heidegger, 1966: p.590) – via 
an analysis of this fourfold of earth, sky, divinities (or small “g” gods) and mortals. By basing my 
analysis of Heidegger’s critique of technology on the ‘fourfold’ in Building Dwelling Thinking 
(Heidegger, 1971), as well as from Elucidations of Hölderlin’s Poetry (Heidegger, 2000) – distinct, 
say, from the standard analyses of his arch-essay on the topic, The Question Concerning Technology 
(Heidegger, 1977) – it allows me to begin to talk about the (scare quoted) “sacred,” distinct from 
the current secular orthodoxy that is suspicious of a “sacred”. This in turn, facilitated by an 
interpretation of Heidegger’s notion of the “fourfold,” allows me to rehabilitate the dangerous (as 
in the human as a “controlled machine”) technology under a range of new orders: new orders of 
non-sequential or Kairotic time, higher orders of transcendence, ranking orders of intelligibility as 
these relate to the order-execution cognate, and, thereby, new orders of meaning in the sense of 
re-establishing a different order, or as Hubert Dreyfus and Charles Spinoza have it, of “bringing 
technological ordering out in its ownmost” (Dreyfus and Spinoza, 2006: p.277). I will delight in 
upholding the perversity of Heidegger’s anachronistic seeming notion of the “fourfold” being 
applied, as I’m doing, to a business world completely purged of all talk of “gods,” evacuated of all 
consideration of “earth” and “sky,” emptied and cleansed of any “mystery” and “enchantment” of 
whatever sort. 
The world of the business executive, the world of technology, is a disenchanted world with 
its own correspondingly disenchanted and malevolently absolutist ontology, one that restricts 
what can be experienced and, crucially from Heidegger’s point of view, what can be thought. I 
would like to explore what a consideration of the enchanting and Romantic poetic fable, as I view 
it, of Heidegger’s “fourfold” can teach – dare I say it – the late-career executive and those in an 
educative position to influence their (temporal) assumptions about the order-execution cognate. 
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I will structure this seditious-seeming re-ordering into the following sections. Firstly, and 
briefly, by reminding the reader of Heidegger’s standardly conceived concerns about technology 
and its correlate “machination”. Secondly, by establishing a connection between Heidegger’s 
notion of technology and its desiderata of ordering, or summoning; which in turn points to the 
index of freedom, or slavery, by which to evaluate the extent of the law-like grip in which 
technology holds us. Thirdly, by examining each of the constituents of the “fourfold” of earth, sky, 
divinities and mortals, and suggesting how the form of dwelling within the fourfold “compass” 
relates to the distinction between chronic and Kairotic time. Fourthly, in an attempt to establish a 
boundary between credulity and scepticism regarding Heidegger’s thinking, a boundary between 
dream and reality in the case of the world of philosophy versus the world of business, and in order 
to test out some of these boundary-crossing workings, I will “use” my own tame executive, Sanjay, 
to explore this. 
 
4.2 The Question Concerning Machination 
Heidegger had begun his considerations of the effects of a technological approach to the world in 
his 1938 manuscript Beiträge Zur Philosophie, long before the commonly referenced thirty-two 
page 1953 essay became popular, whose title I have parodied to include “machination” rather than 
“technology”. Translated into English as Contributions to Philosophy (Heidegger, 1999), his 
“technological approach to the world” in that book went by the name of Machenschaft – a term 
which, as Daniel Dahlstrom notes, like the term for power, Macht, is related to the word for 
“making” or “doing,” machen (Dahlstrom, 2013: p.125) – or “machination” where, unsurprisingly 
given Heidegger’s principle concern about the forgottenness of being, this approach is a way of 
understanding beings as a whole, and markedly distinct from the design, the build and use of 
machines per se. With “machination” all beings, every instance of occurrence, is construed as 
some-thing that humans can manipulate, calculate and produce. In his 1938-39 manuscript titled 
Besinnung written shortly after Contributions, and translated as Mindfulness (2006), Heidegger 
reiterates that “Machination means the accordance of everything with producability, indeed in 
such a way that the unceasing, unconditioned reckoning of everything is pre-directed” (Heidegger, 
2006: p.12, emphasis in original) and that as such machination is a “coercive force” (ibid). In 
Contributions Heidegger conditions this coercive force of machination through our “lived-
experience,” a concurrence that banalizes machination’s negative effect of obscuring the proper 
“beingness” of being, thus: 
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If machination and lived-experience are named together, then this points to an essential 
belongingness of both to each other – a belongingness that is concealed but is also essentially 
non-simultaneous within the ‘time’ of the history of be-ing. Machination is the early and still 
long hidden showing of what is precisely not ownmost to the beingness of beings. But even 
when in certain shapings it emerges into the openness of interpretation of beings – as in 
modernity – it is not recognised as such nor grasped at all. On the contrary, the spreading and 
rigidifying of what is not its ownmost is accomplished by actually retreating behind that which 
seems to be its utmost opposite, even as it remains totally and solely its own making. And 
this is lived experience (Heidegger, 1999: p.89, emphasis in original). 
The foundation for most of the (more presentable) technical jargon from the 1953 The Question 
Concerning Technology is buried here in this passage, and neighbouring passages from 
Contributions, along with a hint that Heidegger sees machination reflecting not only the 
interpretive limitations of being within our modern age but that the same limitations stretch 
forward from the very beginnings of Western thought – this is his not untroublesome notion that 
he can diagnose Western humankind’s understanding of being as a symptom of “modern,” i.e. 
Aristotelian, metaphysics. Something to bear in mind as we come to grips with Heidegger’s critique 
of technology, as Richard Polt points out, is that Heidegger’s analyses of technology are themselves 
“technological” in the critical sense he employs, in as much as “he writes as if he has a technique 
for unlocking the mechanisms of history” (Polt, 1999: p.174, my emphasis). Contrary to Polt, I could 
imagine Heidegger defending his point by affirming the “coercive force” of machination through 
his own lived experience, as evidenced by him falling back into the locutions of modern 
metaphysics. So let’s grant him that privilege for a moment, until we’ve grasped his tools of 
critique. 
Heidegger’s principle claim is that the essence of technology is not the manifestation of 
technological equipment; not simply a means, an instrument or human activity, not even of a 
particular techne, as in knowledge of how to run a profitable business. Rather, it belongs more to 
the realm of knowing, in that “technology is a mode of revealing” (Heidegger, 1977: p.13): that is, 
technology reveals beings – being as things and thingness, not the being of Dasein – as available 
for our exploitation. For the lived-experience of a technological Dasein, to be means only two 
things: to be an occurrent object ready to be exploited, or to be the exploiter of that occurrent 
object. Hence a technological approach to the world only reveals beings as resources ready for 
exploitation, in the manner of which objects present themselves to us as “standing-reserve” 
(Heidegger, 1977: p.17), and hence the being of Dasein “is not recognised as such nor grasped at 
all” (Heidegger, 1999: p.89), which is a problem for Heidegger. Interestingly for my argument, that 
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beings are standing-by ready for exploitation means for Heidegger that beings can be ordered2, 
thereby adding to my list of senses of order the notion of “summoning”. 
This summoning sense of order will be examined in relation to establishing an exploitative 
(technological) basis for execution – in the standing-reserve sense of “human resources” (that 
department within an organisation tasked with determining policies for ordering of the 
organisation’s human resource) and as an orderable activity, as in the order-execution cognate – 
in the next section on the “fourfold,” from which this technological basis, as well as the 
commensurate forgottenness of being, can be seen more clearly. When technology has to do with 
“revealing,” and when the “fourfold” (as we shall see) concerns a form of corrective balancing that 
assists in un-hiding the being of Dasein, it is not surprising that Heidegger invokes the original sense 
of the Greek term aletheia3, meaning un-hiding or revealing, in marked contradistinction to how 
aletheia is commonly understood as “truth” in modern metaphysics. This distinction, he claims, 
established in Plato’s Cave Allegory (Plato: The Republic, 514a–520a, in Cooper, 1997), represents 
the root of modern metaphysics, and the root of the problem of the essence of technology, in that 
confusing aletheia with truth of beings, and not the un-hiding of being leads us to assume that the 
opposite of aletheia is not the multiple forms of hiddenness but simply falsehood: that beings only 
have the attribute of truth (aletheia) as being available to be accounted for and used, and hence 
to be merely present as standing-reserve. Towards the end of the essay, in this regard, and in 
mordant phrasing, Heidegger proclaims that “[t]he coming to presence of technology threatens 
revealing, threatens it with the possibility that all revealing will be consumed in ordering and that 
everything will present itself only in the unconcealedness of standing-reserve” (Heidegger, 1977: 
p.33). 
The “revealing” that rules this particularly pervasive form of knowing, translated as 
“challenging” (Herausfordern), as a form of “provoking” or “setting upon,” conveys both the 
unreasonableness of the demand we continually put on our natural resources – for energy, say, in 
Heidegger’s “gasoline station” quote at the start – as well as conveying something of the taken-
for-granted-ness with which we routinely “execute our commands” or exercise dominion over 
                                                          
2 I am using two translations of the Heidegger’s The Question Concerning Technology; David Farrell Krells’s Basic Writings, 
(1978) who has “altered the translations slightly” (p.311) from William Lovitt’s collection, on which Krell’s is based, 
namely The Question Concerning Technology and Other Essays (1977). Both translations use the term “ordered” 
(Bestellung, and bestellen and all the senses of stellen, as in Gestell or “enframing”) to denote “summon” and “send for”. 
3 Aletheia, Heidegger acknowledges in Parmenides (Heidegger, 1992), his lecture course of 1942-43, is a Greek goddess: 
not a representative of “truth” but truth itself. “The goodess is the goddess ‘truth’. ‘The truth’ – itself – is the goddess. 
Hence we shall avoid the locution that would speak of a goddess ‘of’ the truth. For the expression ‘goddess of truth’ 
evokes the idea of a goddess to whose patronage and blessing ‘the truth’ is only entrusted. In that case, we would have 
two items: on the one hand ‘a goddess’ and on the other ‘the truth,’ standing under divine protection” (Heidegger, 1992: 
p.5, emphasis in original). Straight away we see that Heidegger is not playing with a “mere” myth or symbol, given that 
later in Parmenides he mourns the transformation of a-letheia into its counter essence veritas – truth, correctness and 
certitude (Heidegger, 1992: p.17). 
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resources, be they animal, mineral or vegetable. Says Heidegger about this form of challenging, 
“[t]he revealing that rules in modern technology is a challenging…, which puts to nature the 
unreasonable demand that it supply energy that can be extracted and stored as such” (Heidegger, 
1977: p.14). This provocation Heidegger terms Gestell or the act of framing, or “enframing”. 
“Enframing means the gathering together of that setting-upon which, in turn, sets upon man, i.e., 
challenges him forth, to reveal the real, in the mode of ordering, as standing-reserve. Enframing 
means that way of revealing which holds sway in the essence of modern technology and which is 
itself nothing technological” (Heidegger, 1977: p.20). In characteristic fashion, and using his ironic 
method of “formal indication”4, whereby a philosophical concept should only ever be indicated 
provisionally, for want of misinterpretation, Heidegger is in this quote reiterating the earlier point 
that we should not misinterpret technology via instrumental means, as what we use technology to 
achieve, for instance; neither should we employ anthropological definitions (ibid), as these 
misinterpretations occlude the essential point – that the essence of technology concerns the wrong 
sort of “revealing”. Somewhat theatrically, and with a touch of megalomania, he claims his thinking 
reveals the “essence of all history” (Heidegger, 1977: p.24), and that Western humankind’s starting 
out on the path from Plato’s Cave to revealing (only) the coming to presence of being as standing-
reserve is, what he calls, destining (Geschick). It seems to be our destiny to misconstrue aletheia 
as veritas (truth). 
A relatively common5 criticism of Heidegger’s position, a position quickly sketched in the 
foregoing summary of The Question Concerning Technology, and a criticism that Richard Polt 
rehearses in response to that essay alone, is that Heidegger is “too passive, too quietist and even 
fatalistic” in presenting his essence of technology. “Is there really nothing we can do”, Polt asks, 
“other than to let Being play with us?” (Polt, 1999: p.174). In a similar fashion to the 
embarrassment that John Haugeland (2013: p.44) attributes to the way in which Division II of Being 
and Time is often met, how are we meant to take the closing lines of The Question Concerning 
Technology that seem to trail off into mystical and unaccountable reverie? Consider the following: 
“[t]he closer we come to the danger, the more brightly do the ways into the saving power begin to 
shine and the more questioning we become. For questioning is the piety of thought” (Heidegger, 
                                                          
4 Says Daniel Dahlstrom of Heidegger’s concept of formal indication, “A formal indication is a way of pointing to existential 
phenomena, roughly fixing their preliminary senses and the corresponding manner of retrieving those sense, while at 
the same time deflecting any ‘uncritical lapse’ into a conception that would foreclose pursuit of their genuine sense. 
Formal indications accordingly have a ‘referring-prohibitive’ function. Their ‘fundamental sense’ is based upon insight 
that, while any interpretation must emerge from our original access to phenomena, existential phenomena are not given 
to us directly. Hence, they need to be indicated but in a purely formal, revisable fashion. The sense of a concept as a 
formal indication is less a matter of content than a matter of enactment or performance” (Dahlstrom, 2013: p.74). See 
Phenomenological Interpretations of Aristotle (Heidegger, 2001: p.16, 25, 40, 45) for Heidegger’s own definition of formal 
indication. 
5 We see Lee Braver mimicking Richard Polt’s “quietistic” point in Braver’s Heidegger’s Later Writings (2009: p.97). 
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1977: p.35). Or consider any of the otherworldly and allusive, symbolic-seeming – frankly, baffling, 
as Lovitt himself admits (ibid: p.xiii) – passages in the closing pages of his essay. What can be made 
of these? To persist with my earlier defence of Heidegger regarding the coercive force of 
machination, against Polt’s accusation that Heidegger’s own thoughts on technology are 
themselves technological, I’m keen to draw similarities between the coercive force of machination 
and the regulative aspects of the order-execution cognate.  
To regulate means to put in good order: as such, the order-execution cognate is the 
embodiment of good order, in that it is the governing token, as it were, of the putting into effect, 
via execution, of an order. The law-like, or regulative, normalcy of the order-execution cognate has 
a coercive force, in the manner of the coercive force of an overarching sense of aletheia that is 
machination, ending in the current historical epoch that requires, says Heidegger, the clarity of an 
ontological difference between beings and being to save us from complete enslavement by 
technological thinking. As such, given the cognate’s regulative lawfulness, and in the context of its 
motivational status within capitalist corporations, it seems unassailable and beyond decoupling. 
Fortunately, I don’t think it is.  
It is under suffrage of the Heideggerian-induced melancholy in the preceding chapters that 
I turn to an analysis of his fourfold, so that I can properly question machination, to have a go myself 
at experiencing such questioning as “the piety of thought,” and in so doing, heave this thesis 
around into the homeward bound tailwinds of “the ways into the saving power” that I’m claiming 
is the saving grace of Kairotic time. The easy work is done now: in true Odyssey form, the hard work 
of returning home to defeat the “suitors” (of technology in this chapter, but of the hiddenness of 
Kairotic time generally) is just about to begin. 
 
4.3 Ordering, Enframing, and Enslaving 
With the order-execution cognate always in mind, I would like to examine the role that order has 
in a machination that, in Heidegger’s opinion, effectively underwrites the entirety of modern 
metaphysics, and impinges on our own freedom. As Daniel Dahlstrom notes, “[a]s far as 
machination is concerned, there are only beings, and they are exclusively what human beings can 
manipulate, calculate, and produce. Any resistance to it is mere material for its expansion. There 
may be problems and difficulties, but nothing is fundamentally questionable (herein lies the seeds 
of its nihilism) since what things fundamentally are has been decided” (Dahlstrom, 2013: p.125). 
Given machination’s seeming inevitability, I’m keen to chaperone “order” in seemly congress with 
its cousins “manipulate,” “calculate” and “produce” for the purpose of three particular outcomes: 
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firstly, to see how they relate to each other and to ascertain whether they’re all as rum a bunch as 
sponsors of Heidegger’s concerns would have us believe; secondly, to isolate some positive 
influence that order may have on these relations; and thirdly, to present the basis of some of these 
new and positive orderings, via Heidegger’s “fourfold,” and claiming a Romantically oriented 
provenance to this concept. 
If, for Heidegger, technology orders, via enframing, our complete world into a standing 
reserve (Bestand) of resources for us to calculate and manipulate, what would the opposite of this 
exploitative enframing be? What would be counter to this ordering compulsion? If it were possible, 
how could we suspend our impulse to order the world in a manner that has become the 
fundamental way in which the world of human beings is revealed? Assuming for a moment that 
this is even a legitimate opening question, and not barefaced sophistry acting as guilty accomplice 
to Heidegger’s argument, we would be better off adjusting the direction of our enquiries slightly 
towards the motivations to order, in this case, the enframing impulse itself: who or what orders 
the ordering, and why? Consider the place of ordering in Heidegger’s argument: “[e]verywhere 
everything is ordered to stand by, to be immediately at hand, indeed to stand there just so that it 
may be on call for a further ordering. Whatever is ordered about in this way has its own standing. 
We call it the standing-reserve [Bestand]” (Heidegger, 1977: p.17). Or, later on the same page, 
speaking of an empty airliner at an aerodrome, and in a parenthetical disagreement with Hegel 
who would characterise such a machine as entirely autonomous, says Heidegger in 
contradistinction, “[s]een in terms of the standing-reserve, the machine is completely 
unautonomous, for it has its standing only from the ordering of the orderable” (ibid: my emphasis). 
For standing-reserve to even be a reserve, it needs to be ordered as such, which is where the 
“ontological difference” between being and beings comes into play in this instance – according to 
Hubert Dreyfus, “his single great contribution to Western thought” (Dreyfus, 2006: p.265). This 
represents a maturing and enlarging of his earlier concern regarding tools and machines, namely 
his interest in the being of equipment as “readiness-to-hand” (Macquarrie and Robinson’s 
translation of Zuhandenheit: Heidegger, 1962: p.98) or “available” (Hubert Dreyfus’s translation: 
Dreyfus, 1991: p.61), distinct from the modern metaphysical sense of being in toto as merely truth 
and falsity (the supposed epoch-setting misinterpretation that is distinct from aletheia, which I will 
expand on in the next chapter as it relates to his understanding of history) that Heidegger treats as 
“presence-at-hand” (Vorhanden; Heidegger, 1962: p.7) or “occurrent” (Dreyfus, 1991: p.60). 
Heidegger’s dig at Hegel echoes his Being and Time emphasis on tools only making sense within 
their context, where “there ‘is’ no such thing as an equipment. To the Being of any equipment 
there always belongs a totality of equipment, in which it can be this equipment that it is. Equipment 
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is essentially “something in-order-to…” (Heidegger, 1962: p.97). His point is that Hegel cannot have 
an autonomous machine, a “self-reliant tool” (Hegel, 1910: p.117) because the tool only makes 
sense, only is, in the context of its use, which in the case of Heidegger’s concern about technology 
is extended to include its potential for use – that it is “orderable” (Heidegger, 1977: p.17). 
What conclusions can I make about “ordering” from this? I would like to say that ordering 
is not just akin to the terms Heidegger uses that position the occurrent as a resource for us to 
exploit, such as manipulate, calculate and produce, but that these terms and “order” are 
interchangeable. By setting up this congruence I can usefully equate the manipulative, predatory, 
and acquisitive aspects of the average business corporation of contemporary capitalism with 
Heidegger’s notion of machination. News that the activities of the average corporation, its 
executives, and the wider context of its markets and consumers – be those relationships of the 
business-to-business (“b-2-b” as business schools term them) variety as the majority are, or of the 
business-to-consumer (“b-2-c,” which is you and me as “mall rats”) kind, such as the retail industry 
– are subsumable under Heidegger’s concept of machination can hardly come as a surprise at this 
stage of my argument. Under his terms, naming the department that broadly deals with the staff 
of a corporation under the title “human resources” is an inevitable, though telling, consequence of 
the not especially extraordinary fact that corporations operate under the same modern 
metaphysics – as revealed by our approach to technologizing of everyday life – that so concerned 
Heidegger in the last decades of his life. His own term for how we ourselves have fallen fowl of the 
enframing logic, in the fashion of the Ouroboros eating its own tail, is to see humans as mere 
“functionaries of enframing” (Heidegger, 2012: p.30). 
Not only is this a relatively trivial observation. That a corporation’s operational – including 
its financial, marketing, logistical – strategy routinely orders its world, and ours vicariously, via our 
direct or indirect consumption of its products and services, is surely the main benefit of, so called, 
“in-corporating” the manipulation and production of “resources” into a legally constituted body 
called a “corporation” in the first place – so that we don’t have to do the manipulation of resources 
ourselves. So that we don’t have to smelt our own ore, build our own car, drill for and refine our 
own oil to fuel it, and trade our own stocks and government bonds to fund the insurance of it, to 
use a rather gross example. We tolerate corporations’ ordering of the world on our behalf because, 
as Heidegger has it, we expect as much: we’re all collusive in that same technological approach to 
the world. It’s not as if the convenience of our delegating to corporates, in the previous example, 
demarks a boundary of metaphysics, only the corporate side of which is properly (improperly, for 
Heidegger) “modern”. Not only that. Technology (die Technik) reveals our world in a very particular 
way (enframing), if you concur with Heidegger’s grandiose historical schema, which at the moment 
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I do; which is one of the possible explanations I put forward to account for the obscene disparities 
of wealth that Thomas Piketty evidences (Piketty, 2014) in his influential book about capitalism in 
the twenty-first century. Since our lostness in enframing  and technologizing reveals the world as 
just so much stuff that shows up for us to use, the world as an orderable set of resources has, as a 
consequence, lost any inherent significance it may have once had – in the religious sense in 
particular, before, that is, Nietzsche pronounced the death of  God. The ultimate index of purpose 
has since become, in the face of this devaluation of the aletheia sense of being, the accumulation 
of wealth: or as David Marquand terms it, we live in “mammon’s kingdom” now (Marquand, 2014). 
Aiming to become wealthy, getting wealthy, maintaining and growing that wealth, these are our 
newly ordained daily offices in the holy order of enframing. 
Conscious of mirroring Heidegger’s grandiose pronouncements myself, my reference to 
Piketty’s work throughout this thesis stems from the relation aspect of my argument – which, along 
with a concern about the delinquencies of capitalism, and an expectation that education can 
mitigate these delinquencies somehow, are significant motivators in this study. But here’s the 
crunch, based on the foregoing logic. Executives working for the corporation of mammon, as the 
political philosopher David Marquant would have it, or working at the accumulation of capital for 
the purposes of increasing shareholder return, as the Chicago School economist Milton Friedman 
would have it, or the executive as a functionary of enframing, as the philosopher Heidegger would 
have it, far from being the ruling apparatus of the capitalist society, are instead its slaves6. 
Think about it. Executing against orders, in the business context at least, is the paradigm 
case of technology revealing our world, a malevolent corporative body that is only vaguely hinted 
at in Heidegger’s non-commercially focused philosophising. Executives, then, are not only intimate 
in this extractive process, bearing the responsibilities, as they do, of sequencing-out the fine-
grained orders of the abiding arch-order that conforms all things into mere “resources”; they are 
owned by the enframing process itself, with their freedom wholly impinged. Not only are they 
beholden to the capitalist owners, shareholders and rentiers of the corporations they execute on 
behalf of, executives have nowhere to turn to evade a modern metaphysics that has predefined, 
without question, the being of all entities. And whilst it is laying it on a bit thick to affirm that 
enslavement by the melancholy of an executive’s anxieties – and by their boredom, foreshadowed 
                                                          
6 I summon my courage to make this bold claim from Cornelius Castoriadis, and his book Philosophy, Politics, Autonomy: 
Essays in Political Philosophy (Castoriadis, 1991). Against the potential to disenfranchise business schools, and all involved 
in training, developing and educating both proto-executives and those in mid-service, Castoriadis reminds us that in 
ancient Athens “the task of execution in the strictest sense, is left to the slaves” (ibid: p.110, my emphasis), and that 
“[r]igorously speaking, there is no such thing as ‘executive power.’ (Its functions, which were in the hands of slaves in 
ancient Athens, are performed today by people acting more or less as ‘vocal animals,’ and they may one day be 
performed by machines)” (ibid: p.169). His robust argument continues, claiming that the Athenian state’s “ruling 
apparatus stands opposed to a mass of executants who, theoretically, form its ‘base’ but who in reality remain outside 
it” (ibid: p.208). 
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as it is for us all by the prospect of death – it is nonetheless within the precincts of Heidegger’s 
argument to claim that we can be saved, released from slavery, from our Ouroboros-like capture 
by technology, by “divinities” (see the “fourfold” in the next section), just to add some more 
piquancy to the slave metaphor. As Mark Wrathall describes life under servitude to technology, 
“[i]n such a world, nothing is encountered as really mattering, that is, as having a worth that 
exceeds its purely instrumental value for satisfying transitory urges” (Wrathall, 2011: p.198). Now, 
this smacks of enslavement to me, at least a subjugation to a form of temporality that restricts one 
to merely satisfying one’s “transitory urges”. Though isn’t this a little strong? Have I let my ordering 
get the better of me? 
I’ve been careful to restrict my interchangability of “machination” and “order” to the 
rationale of average corporations. Mine is not a thesis of business administration, and space does 
not permit analysis of the wider spectrum of corporate operations that put “machination” to the 
test in non-capitalist and non- (overtly) exploitative contexts. Arriving at my point, my claim is that 
even such incorporated paragons as these alluded to, along with their executive flesh and blood, 
still operate under the sway, under the mastery, of the enframing essence of the technological 
approach to the world, which is the root of Heidegger’s concern, which can also be described as 
“ordering the world”. As a restatement of my abiding concern over the seeming ineluctability of 
the order-execution cognate, the question that now emerges is, how can a corporate executive 
freely order at the same time refusing the enslavement of enframing? How should they execute 
on that which should never be seen as wholly a resource? 
Let me give an instance of the enframing sense of ordering first. James Edwards, in 
illustrating the implications of our engaging with enframing, with our technological approach to 
the world, uses the business-to-consumer examples of his use of an Oral-B toothbrush and Grape-
Nuts each morning, to show how the ordered outcomes of the production process in turn order 
our lives. “Today’s breakfast Grape-Nuts taste exactly like yesterday’s, and mine taste just like 
those sold in Seattle or in São Paulo – and (this is the crucial point) that is what makes them what 
they are. That anonymous interchangeability is what gives them their being as Bestand 
[enframing]” (Edwards, 2005: p.459, emphasis in original). Their anonymity and interchangeability 
are not accidents: “they are essential to our need for these entities readily to disappear into our 
use of them. In practices given over – as Heidegger thinks almost our whole life is – to ordering for 
the sake of ordering, the more easily and quickly an entity can be thoughtlessly taken up into its 
particular task of ordering, the better” (Edwards, 2005: p.459, my emphasis). Taking an admittedly 
large leap, but being true to the seditious intent of my thesis – where I am expecting education to 
mitigate the delinquencies of capitalism – my interest is in how this particular task of ordering 
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manifests in the process of educating corporate executives to better order their company’s own 
resource-ordering processes. In light of my labelling executives as slaves, how can we re-order the 
standard educative process such that it sees its own ordering, its own orders within the order-
execution cognate, and offer its hapless charges, as a consequence, no legitimate distraction or 
deviation from what Heidegger identifies as the destination of all our not-at-home, our unheimlich, 
wanderings, namely “dwelling in the fourfold”? 
Obviously, the hiddenness of these multiple orders translated over into contemporary 
executive education processes is guaranteed, once one acknowledges that this educative process, 
any educative process, is predicated on a modern metaphysics that has already decided what 
things fundamentally are (Dahlstrom, 2013: p.125). So is that it? Is this the end-stop of our concern 
about the essence of technology, a concern about its revealing of a hopelessly impoverished 
understanding of what it means to be? Does Richard Polt’s (1999: p.174) criticism of Heidegger’s 
view on technology as “fatalistic” stand? Does our epoch’s approach to technology simply confirm 
Heidegger’s worst fear, stated at the very beginning of Being and Time, that “the question of the 
meaning of being” (Heidegger, 1962: p.1) has been answered, but answered prematurely and 
incorrectly? Consequently, is there no hope in expecting education to assist in bringing Heidegger’s 
project of reawakening an understanding of being coming to fruition? Fortunately not. 
 
4.4 The Fourfold 
Heidegger’s introducing of the “fourfold,” in his essay Building Dwelling Thinking 
(Heidegger, 1971: p.143-161), and later in The Thing (the very next essay in Hofstadter’s 1971 
translation Poetry, Language, Thought: p.163-186), is his attempt, as Mark Wrathall explains, “to 
uncover the way that real things, as opposed to mere resources and technological devices, show 
up” (Wrathall, 2011: p. 204). This is good for us, as it points the way out of slavery to enframement. 
However, I need to caveat my treatment of the “fourfold” at this early stage as being open to the 
same type of criticism that Richard Polt surfaced above, namely that I am using it as a resource to 
solve a problem – the problem of executive education under the sway of a wrongly ordered order-
execution cognate. As I mentioned earlier, Heidegger nullified this objection by pointing to the 
coercive force of the lived experience of technology. He uses the term Gelassenheit (translated as 
“releasement”) to acknowledge our living within technology knowingly, as it were, a knowing of 
both its positive and negative aspects: says Heidegger of this handy get-out clause, “I would call 
this comportment towards technology which expresses ‘yes’ and at the same time ‘no,’ by an old 
word, releasement towards things” (Heidegger, 1966: p.54, emphasis in original). In which case, in 
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the manner that Hubert Dreyfus terms “releasement” as “a kind of holding pattern we can enter 
into while we are awaiting a new understanding of being”7 (Dreyfus, 1993: p.309), I will venture 
my treatment of the “fourfold” as constituting releasement, a knowing suspension, of an enslaving 
sense of enframement. 
The enormity of the Odyssean task left to me is not only to acknowledge as a cul-de-sac 
that which appears in the guise of the “fourfold” – at least to those seemingly immune to the 
oppression wrought by the coercive forces of machination – but to transform this seeming dead-
end into a departure point for new orders for executive education, as the thesis title has it. The 
first means of lessening the burden of the task is to situate the task in our “everyday,” and by this 
I mean the (largely chronologically conceived) time of the everyday. Throughout Being and Time it 
has been Heidegger’s abiding concern to show Dasein as a discloser of worlds, in the equipmental 
sense mentioned earlier with reference to the airliner at the aerodrome. In the essays The Thing, 
Discourse on Thinking, and Building Dwelling Thinking, he begins to talk about local gatherings that 
set up local worlds, and, I would say, the time of local worlds – though he is less overt about the 
temporal aspects of these local worlds. Hubert Dreyfus (Dreyfus, 2006: p.274) champions Albert 
Borgmann’s designation of these local worlds as “focal practices” (Borgmann, 1984: p.196-210), 
which is handy for me as I prefer to interpret talk of the fourfold in these three essays of 
Heidegger’s as temporal focal practices which the fourfold uncovers. Hidden amongst the seeming 
nostalgia and faux Romanticism of Heidegger’s resistance to consumerism, his disaffection with 
our exploitation of the earth and of the ills of mass media, in preference for the world of simple 
peasants, peasant cottages, rustic hearths and jugs, lies in the essay “What are Poets For?” the 
following warning; 
What threatens man in his very nature is the view that technological production puts the 
world in order, while in fact this ordering is precisely what levels every ordo, every rank, down 
to the uniformity of production, and thus from the outset destroys the realm from which any 
rank and recognition could possibly arise (Heidegger 1971: p.117, emphasis in original). 
In response to this warning I interpret Heidegger’s introduction of das Geviert, the fourfold, from 
his 1951 essay Building Dwelling Thinking, as a non-technicised (non-) solution as is possible to 
give, under the circumstances of an exploration of a solution oriented technology as he sees it. 
                                                          
7 Interestingly, though relegated to a footnote nonetheless for fear of distraction, Gelassenheit is sometimes attributed 
as a meditative state, one that is adduced by enthusiasts of Heidegger’s so called “mystical” element in his thought as 
evidence of a connection to both Occidental and Oriental mystical religious traditions. For instance, John Caputo, in his 
book The Mystical Element in Heidegger’s Thought (1978: p.213), equates Gelassenheit with a Zen-like “letting be”. 
Despite being a meditative adept and a formal enthusiast (in the true sense of the term enthusiast) of the mystical, I 
discount Heidegger’s claim to any meditative ability in light of his appalling political decision-making ability. For me, the 
lines of prejudice and critical orthodoxy are too firmly drawn to cause a shift in the way Heidegger is perceived, 
notwithstanding any whiff of piety caught downwind. 
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Bringing together earth and sky, divinities and mortals, I take to be a commitment to suspend our 
enslaving sense of enframement not only with regards to releasing ourselves towards what a 
positive disclosing of the world as a resource can mean; but, in parallel, as releasing us towards a 
more positive sense of time than the merely chronological sense that accompanies our 
enslavement in a resource based view of the world8: as if strict adherence to chronological time 
equated to treating time merely as a resource, like any other act of enframing, distinct from an 
alternate evaluation of time in terms of the Kairotic, or Augenblick. 
For instance, circumventing for the time being an explicit set of environmental concerns 
with respect to earth, we can ground our temporal focal practices, pace Borgmann, in our local 
worlds. There is a tempo and a pace to habitual everyday practices, which serve to ground our 
ontic cares and make them matter to us. This is no less the case with our resource-framed 
corporate executive, with his or her rounds of daily deadlines, weekly and monthly targets, and 
quarterly returns. But temporal focal practices, in the fashion that I’ve introduced the term above, 
imply a more localised context, which is at odds with the hegemonised tempo by with the average 
(neoliberal) corporation habitually operates, itself the homogenised temporal essence, the beat, 
of globalised capitalism. In contradistinction to the “homogenous, empty time,” as Walter 
Benjamin terms what I’m calling chronic time (Benjamin, 1999: p.263), such localised tempos can 
be seen as the basis for grounding the operations of a particular team, department or division 
within a company, in distinction to the beat of the stock markets that sets the overarching tempo 
of the corporate. Mine is not a Romantically nostalgic yearning for older or slower times; rather, a 
revealing of a different “ground” to the beat, which more often than not remains withdrawn and 
only barely perceptible, as all good rhythms are. My example of Sanjay later in this chapter will 
reveal more of this. 
With respect to the sky, I take Heidegger to mean the enduring and stable possibilities for 
action that arise via localised temporal focal practices, such that certain actions become naturally 
appropriate given that local “beat,” and others naturally prohibited. For instance, where the 
localised corporate tempo values a particular celebration of remembrance of a founding father, 
say, or the anniversary of a figure or event of special significance to the corporate, or to its 
influential clients or suppliers, those adopted and temporally stable possibilities discourage actions 
based on a conflicting set of temporal values, such that are disrespectful in moods of such acts of 
remembrance. In establishing and valuing corporate cultural paradigms – be they at the level of a 
                                                          
8 It should come as no surprise that such a resourced-based view of the world is one ascribed by the majority of business 
school academics to the bundle of tangible and intangible assets a company can muster when considering its competitive 
strategy in the marketplace. As an early (1959) statement of this view, see Penrose’s The Theory of the Growth of the 
Firm (2009). 
Part Two: Sublimely Kairotic 
 
- 112 - 
 
team, or across an entire division – that distinguish distinct temporalities, the brave guardians of 
that paradigm have taken on a responsibility that enshrines a particular view of the wheeling of 
the heavens, the turning of the sky. 
By divinities, with respect to temporal focal practices, I take Heidegger at face value and 
interpret this as an ushering back in of the (small “g”) gods so alien to a monotheistic culture, and 
yet so germane to the numerous Kairotic moments in our days. I can give a personal instance of 
this, concerning my reverence – part lexical, part practical – with the printing gods at my work; be 
that reciting the anxiety-inducing mantra “think before you print” before I decide whether I actually 
need the current document in my hands, rather than just on the screen of my computer; or second 
guessing the mood of the alive-seeming giant photocopier, via its blinking red eye and complicated 
litany of “clear paper jam” instructions, one floor above my desk; or taking (or gifting, out of my 
schedule) the time to talk to those gathered around the photocopier god, either concerning who 
is next in the printing queue, or about nothing work-related in particular. Whilst I hardly say grace 
to the divine processes and the gods involved in the elaborate printing ceremony, the whole 
devotion to this particular temporal focal practice does lend a graceful ease to my time in the office, 
lending its own momentum, whether I couch all this, in jest or otherwise, or in the language of 
“gods” or not. 
Lastly, with respect to mortals as it touches upon our temporal focal practices, this refers 
to our finitude, our short lives in contrast to the vast durations of time before our birth and the 
eternity after our death, in distinction to the immortal forces that seem conjureable via our 
imaginations. As we saw in the chapter on death, Heidegger means by death our willingness to 
curtail our current identity in order to assume the next identity, in light of which our next set of 
attunements opens up a new world, and a new response to boot. This transformation, I’d say, 
comes not only in our capacity as disclosers of worlds, but in our ability to disclose new worlds 
through new, Kairotic, appreciations of time. The Kairotic opportunity open to us, via this 
conception of death, and via this subtly different conception of our own mortality, allows a new 
world to show up for us, as well as for those for whom we are guardians of this new temporal 
paradigm. This Kairotic opportunity is in stark contrast to a form of self-enslavement, a Rousseau-
esque “born free, and he is everywhere in chains” (Rousseau, 1762) sense that comes with the 
commanding and regulative-seeming order-execution cognate. 
Thus, having now staked a claim at a temporally-oriented fourfold, and standing on the 
very borders of credulity, possibly summoning bafflement from both sober minded academicians 
and equally sober minded executives, I would like, all the same, to confront what being guided 
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forward by the compass of the fourfold might look like in the context of an educative, or at least 
developmental or formative scenario, inside a Piketty-esque corporation. 
o-----o 
Activity in and around Sanjay’s corner office on the sixteenth floor at X-Corp’s 
headquarters, the home of its Human Resources department, was reaching a crescendo, as it had 
done towards the end of this particular week – week 14, the week of Quarter One’s sales return – 
ever since Sanjay became CHRO, seven years ago. Not that the department’s preparations this year 
were directly associated with the frenzied Quarter End: that version of frenzy was taking place two 
floors up, on the sales floor, generating its own form of madness and sour mood, made worse by 
changes in top management as a result of the recent twenty percent buy-out of the firm by activist 
investors. Sanjay’s was a more joyous busy-ness, and centred on preparations for Fool’s Week, 
something he’d introduced to his department of 50 headquartered staff five years ago, which he’d 
rolled out to the remaining globally dispersed 50 staff only last year. The view from the windows, 
for those that looked up from their work, was of the sun setting behind the cluster of high-rises 
around the park on the other side of the river, across from the 30 storey glass tower that housed 
X-Corp and a handful of law firms. It was going to be a working evening for Sanjay and his 
expensively flown-in immediate team, but the mood was buoyant. Hanne, Sanjay’s personal 
assistant, was especially pleased this evening, as she followed him back from the conference room, 
where the 12-strong corporate HR leadership team had just broken up from a status briefing he’d 
given, to his magnificent and dimly lit corner office. She’d taken up his offer to move with him from 
his previous post in Brussels, and in the interim had seen his status and the respect the company 
paid him rise incredibly, hers along with it, even with the buy-out. Like everyone else in the early 
years, she’d been sceptical of the idea of Fool’s Week, but this year, for the first time, its approach 
was being heralded by other departments, even Sales. In the past month she’d seen his mood lift, 
out of the gloom that last year’s spin off of a non-core subsidiary had plunged him, into a joyous 
lucidity that all his little ‘festival days’ somehow seemed to bestow; she’d sensed an equal lift in 
the whole department’s mood as it too turned the corner and rallied behind him with the 
preparations. She was a convert now to the madness that was about to be unleashed, and was 
proud to be working with Sanjay to bring it about. This year, for the first time, there were to be 
press interviews, which she’d help to arrange with the company’s Public Relations team. 
Sanjay was back at his broad wooden desk, cluttered with two laptops, several expensive 
fountain pens, two smart phones, papers, and bordered with a selection of dusty executive bric-à-
brac from his travels – mostly statuettes and a collection of photos of him with his teams, taken in 
front of far-flung monuments and temples. In the middle of the desk, beneath the light from an old 
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style lamp, Hanne had placed a familiar and battered old clipboard, complete with string-tied 
pencil. His tanned sixty-year old face creased into a broad smile at Hanne, who beamed back as 
she closed the door. 
Sanjay’s briefing for Fool’s Week had sent his leadership team scurrying to their allotted 
tasks: mostly checking the role descriptions for each member of their respective teams, and making 
sure amendments from last year’s festivities were incorporated: conducting final checks with the 
HR Legal team, union representatives and the Senior Vice Presidents of the company; and going 
over the contingencies in case things went wrong. The letters had already been sent to all 100 HR 
staff, laying down the rules for the week, along with their non-negotiable temporary roles assigned 
to them during the forthcoming week: it took a lot of planning. This was the one time, in all of the 
observances that had begun to crop up in the department’s calendar year, where chaos was 
actively embraced, distinct from just celebration; it was amazing that the Board let it happen. But 
Sanjay had shown a canny foresight, and had convinced them and the investors of the benefits…for 
now. Known by its other name as the “carnival of misrule,” and by his one detractor on the Board 
as “FU week,” Fool’s Week saw the HR department turned upside down. On plan at least, this year 
would see all the department’s senior managers don headsets and take to the switchboards to 
answer HR related calls from the company’s 20,000 employees; team supervisors would become 
senior executives in charge of arbitrating the call centre’s escalated issues; the junior members of 
staff, and probationers, become the leadership team, executing a prescribed set of orders that 
became more daring and the outcomes more sacrosanct each year; and the department’s three 
interns take over Sanjay’s role, along with his office and meeting schedule, in a predictable ecstasy 
of terror (he’d remembered to leave the salted peanuts in the top drawer, in compliance with item 
three on last year’s strategy addendum). Sanjay himself was demoted to the mail, copier and store 
rooms, with his clipboard schedule of drop-offs and pick-ups, which he’d only half-heartedly 
attempted to memorise; there was no point. For this one week they were all (April) fools at their 
jobs, enjoying the part protest, part safety-valve let-off to an otherwise smooth running and boring 
corporation. 
Sanjay swivelled excitedly to and fro in his comfy reclining chair, which he scuttled out to 
the side of his desk, positioned to enjoy the exhilarating view from his office, clipboard in hand, 
watching the lights of traffic on the downtown beltway through his own reflection in the dark glass. 
He rehearsed the suggested responses the Public Relations team had given him in preparation for 
the press interview on Monday, secretly cherishing the surprise he had in store. Who’d have 
thought? 
o-----o 
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Yes: who would have thought that such a temporary truancy9 from the orders of 
neoliberalism was defensible? Talk of gods is apt to repel the modern reader, and yet here I am 
talking about a form of god-given foolery inspired by Martin Heidegger, a throwback to the times 
of medieval mayhem we thought we’d finished with. That I present Sanjay as fooling to the top of 
his bent as a valuable contribution to this discussion of Heideggerian temporality reveals, I’d say, 
the extent and timely import of his thinking on time, as well as its lethality. And with contemporary 
economic and class-tensions rising, as a result of increases in obscene wealth inequalities, it’s not 
as if my attempt at describing a release (at least temporary) from these tensions is 
unprecedented10. Charles Taylor, writing in Secular Age (Taylor, 2007: p.45-54), champions the 
medieval Christian Church’s attempt at releasing the tensions in that society via carnivals of 
misrule, Feasts of Fools, festivals, and the spectacle of boy bishops: 
 
These were periods in which the ordinary order of things was inverted, or ‘the world was 
turned upside down’. For a while, there was a ludic interval, in which people played out a 
condition of reversal of the usual order. Boys wore the mitre, or fools were made kings for a 
day; what was ordinarily revered was mocked, people permitted themselves various forms of 
license, not just sexually but also in close-to-violent acts, and the like (ibid: p.46). 
 
Taylor’s is an ordered and academic engagement with this mockery of order. A more accessible 
example of this Roman Saturnalia, complete with pictures, is provided by Alain de Botton in his 
bestseller Religion for Atheists (de Botton, 2012: p.63-67), which challenges our assumptions about 
religion halting freedom. What is called on in my playful Sanjay example above is a Dionysian form 
of freedom. Throughout the research for this thesis, I’ve observed a keen correlation between 
those edifying aspects of the mythic character of the Greek god Dionysus, and the strictly Kairotic 
constituents of Heidegger’s notion of time. Three of the four11 salient provinces that the Oxford 
Classical Dictionary (OCD, third edition, Hornblower, 1996: p.479-482) identify of Dionysus map 
                                                          
9 I came across this Kairotic phrase in my investigation into the debt Heidegger pays to Romanticism. It is from C.S. Lewis, 
in his book The Allegory of Love (Lewis, 1936: p.52), where he is explaining the Romance of European medieval literature. 
10 Especially given Mikhail Bakhtin’s work on carnival and the carnivalesque in his Problems of Dostoevsky’s Poetics 
(1984). 
11 The fourth and principle Bacchic domain of influence, as the god of wine and intoxication, is nonetheless salutary for 
revealing the inhibitions that prevent ritual madness, and which curtail certain forms of freedom. As a parenthetical 
aside, Nietzsche’s famous dalliance with the Apollo-Dionysus distinction, in §20 of The Birth of Tragedy (in Basic Writings, 
Kaufmann, 2000: p.121-124), will help me to make the connection between Heidegger and the thought of early German 
Romantic philosophy, though Nietzsche’s is a “dubious contribution” (Kerényi, 1976: p.138) to Dionysian scholarship 
when it comes to fully appreciating ritual madness, of the type I’ve attempted to illustrate for Sanjay. Whilst, as the 
Dionysian scholar Carl Kerényi says, “[i]t is quite erroneous to assert that the [Dionysian] cult originated in ‘spontaneous 
attacks of mass hysteria’”(ibid.), it is conceivable there is something of use in a connection between Heidegger and 
Dionysus. The principle connection I’ve found comes, appropriately, in §13 of Hölderlin’s Hymns ‘Germania’ and ‘The 
Rhine’ (Heidegger, 2014: p.169-177) where he says of Dionysus that he is “not just one demigod among others, but the 
distinctive one. He is the Yes that belongs to life at its wildest, inexhaustible in its creative urge, and his is the No that 
belongs to the most terrifying death and annihilation. He is the bliss of magical enchantment and the horror of a crazed 
terror. He is the one in being the other; that is, in being, he at the same time is not and in not being, he is” (ibid.). 
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nicely over aspects of my study. Says the OCD, throughout antiquity the myths and cults of the 
often violent and bizarre Dionysian rituals were “a challenge to the established social order” (ibid). 
His rites were associated with ritual madness or ecstasy, in the fashion of Heidegger’s ecstasies of 
time, and the ideal form of originary and ecstatic/Kairotic time; with masks and the impersonations 
of the fictional world, as in my use of fiction in this thesis; and with “the mysterious realm of the 
dead and the expectation of an after-life blessed with the joys of Dionysus” (ibid), which chimes 
with Heidegger’s claiming that when mortals die their death in life they usher in new opportunities 
for revealing being. We should mourn the death of foolery and consider rebirthing our inner 
maenad, if we are serious in “bringing technological ordering out in its ownmost” (Dreyfus, 2006: 
p.277). 
To do this we can start by dwelling in the fourfold, where one is truly free. This is what 
Heidegger seems to be saying in his introducing the fourfold as a palliate to the chronic grip in 
which we are held by technology. If the fourfold is the site of a form of dwelling that discloses 
being, then Heidegger’s interest in freedom and what he sees as freedom’s five distinct types12 
become the conditions by which Dasein is able to reveal its own being. As he says in his gloss on 
aletheia, the goddess in Parmenides poem, in Heidegger’s lecture of that same name, “[t]hereby 
we might grasp the freedom man must first attain, in accord with this essence, if he is to be able 
to let beings be in the open what they are as beings” (Heidegger, 1992a: p.143). So, in my example 
of Fool’s Week, what I’m having Sanjay reveal is his being, Sanjay’s Dasein – along with the Dasein 
of his entire department – via a decidedly temporal, and temporary, suspension of the chronic time 
of the corporation, in favour of an embrace of Kairotic time, the time of opportunity, the time of 
the opportune moment, the non-sequential time of medieval carnival from the orders and misrule 
customs of the medieval Christian church13. Kairotic time is, in this sense, a temporary truancy. 
The freedom of Fool’s Week has created a temporal clearing for this embodied 
understanding of being, at the same time as representing a highly politicised act of championing 
freedom from enslavement by technology, in the purely Heideggerian sense; a releasement from 
humans as resources, as the unfolding drama of the sixteenth floor Human Resources department 
illustrates. What I hope the above example begins to show is how it is possible to remain open to 
mystery while in the temporal now of a seemingly entirely non-mystical – resource-centred, hence 
technological, and hence chronic – setting. Namely, to be free to follow a way of being that 
embodies an understanding of being, but still via explicitly technological ordering: or as Heidegger 
says in his Discourse on Thinking, “I call the comportment which enables us to keep open to the 
                                                          
12 See footnote 12 of chapter 7. See also Heidegger’s Schelling’s Treatise on the Essence of Human Freedom (Heidegger, 
1985b: p.83-84, 88). 
13 Of the sort detailed in Chris Humphrey, The Politics of Carnival: Festive Misrule in Medieval England (Humphrey, 2001). 
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meaning hidden in technology, openness to the mystery” (Heidegger, 1966: p.55). Only, in my 
iteration of this, the mystery which concerns us is the emerging mystery of Kairotic time, part of 
which remains inviolate from chronic sequencing-out. 
 Given that I’ve just re-appropriated a medieval instance of Kairotic time from the ancient 
Christian church to the modern capitalist corporation, it only seems proper to examine, in the next 
chapter, how Heidegger conceives time with respect to history. 
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__________________________________ 
 
 
Being Mindful of History  
 
 
 
 
The happening and the happenings of history [Geschichte] are primordially and always the future, 
that which in a concealed way comes toward us, a revelatory process that puts us at risk, and thus 
is compelling in advance. The future is the beginning of all happening. Everything is enclosed within 
the beginning. Even if what has already begun and what has already become seem forthwith to 
have gone beyond their beginning, yet the latter – apparently having become the past – remains in 
power and abides, and everything futural encounters it.  
(Martin Heidegger, Basic Questions of Philosophy, p. 35) 
 
 
 
5.1 Introduction 
The idiom historia magistra vitae was coined by Marcus Tullius Cicero in his De Oratore, 
written in 55 BCE, and seems germane to our discussions of time and education. It appears in the 
following passage by Cicero: “By what other voice, too, than that of the orator, is history, the 
evidence of time, the light of truth, the life of memory, the directness of life, the herald of antiquity, 
committed to immortality?” (translation by Watson, 1860: p.92). Usually truncated to “history is 
life’s teacher,” the idiom epitomises our ambiguous relation to history’s literal pedagogic 
precedent, as Reinhart Koselleck observes in his Heidegger inspired book Futures Past (Koselleck, 
2004): the ambiguity, in our era at least, he attributes to our dissatisfaction, since the 
Enlightenment, with history determining our future, congruent with our ability to learn about the 
future via historical exempla. Paraphrasing Diderot, Koselleck’s mock Enlightenment-style rallying 
call is that we should “work through the past as quickly as possible so that a new future could be 
set free” (ibid: p.39). For my present purpose the ambiguity transforms, via executive education of 
the present day, into a desire to learn from best (historical) practice, at the same time as 
attempting to envisage improved (future) productivity and profits. Considering the last chapter’s 
culminating throwback to the epoch of medieval mayhem – times we thought we’d finished with 
– and to what my neoliberally encorporated contemporaries probably see as the principle 
degeneracy of my argument, its historical determinacy,  it seems sensible to ask how, in a given 
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present, the temporal dimensions of past and future are related. Unsurprisingly, given his interest 
in time, Heidegger has a lot to say about history. Though his is not a search in vain for the 
periodization of phantom epochs – the Greece of Dionysus, the Rome of Cicero, medieval Catholic 
England, or the Romantic period of Hölderlin – that our archetypal historian is steeped in. 
Before we engage with Heidegger’s unusual treatment of history, l would like to call to 
attention the parallel track of observation that has been bubbling up throughout this thesis thus 
far: namely, German Romanticism1. That Heidegger has claims on our attention far beyond the 
restricted purpose for which I cite him – famously, his being a Nazi – must be admitted. One of the 
less well explored claims is his channelling of certain traits in early German Romantic thinking, most 
evident in his embrace of the poetry of Hölderlin, and manifest in his deliberately strained use of 
words and phrasing, or catachresis, that is a hallmark of his writing. Having wandered among these 
Romantic headwaters and precursors of Heidegger’s thought myself, and detected in his own 
thinking an employment of elusive and Romanticised modes of representation, I feel as though it 
is possible to aid the future reception of Heidegger’s thinking, and my modest contribution to its 
scholarship, by recourse to his own historical precedent, in the manner that historia magistra vitae 
suggests. 
Take the above epigraph, or any of the preceding chapters’ epigraphs for that matter, as a 
typical example of catachresis that is a standard trait of German Romantic philosophy2: the 
deliberately paradoxical and strained use of words (beyond that is the obvious stresses and strains 
involved in its translation from the German original). For instance: “history is dependent on the 
future”; “the future is the beginning of everything”; “the past remains in power”: these are surely 
examples of the use of words to convey meanings that are opposite of history’s literal meaning. 
What does Heidegger mean by this paradoxical usage? It wouldn’t take much to have a spluttering 
interlocutor exclaim, “this is not the meaning I was expecting!”, from talk about history, from talk 
about events in the past tense, from such oxymoronic talk, of times and happenings that have 
already slipped by.  
Yet Heidegger is comfortable with irony – which is what this is – especially when it comes 
to history, as we will see. His notion of formal indication alone, as we discovered in the previous 
chapter, is akin to what most of us would term irony, and what I wish to classify, technically, in 
Heidegger’s case, as Romantic irony. As I will defend later in this chapter, and as part of re-
establishing the connection previously stated of Heidegger’s own writing style as congruent with 
                                                          
1 In order to acknowledge the holism of the movement, what Stephen Prickett calls the “family resemblance” of 
Romanticism (Prickett, 2014: p.15), where Romanticism can be conceived of as a common language, despite its vast 
diversity across Europe in the period between 1780 and 1850, I will refer to Romanticism using an uppercase “R”. 
2 See John McCarthy’s ‘Forms and Objective of Romantic Criticism’ in Nicholas Saul’s (Ed) The Cambridge Companion to 
German Romanticism (McCarthy, 2009: p.106 and footnote 16, p.116). See also footnote 11 in the next chapter. 
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his philosophical intentions, Romantic irony represents a “creative liberation from the prison of the 
merely phenomenal world and the representational limitations of philosophical language” 
(Seyhan, 2009: p.17), that, as Azade Seyhan asserts on behalf of most literary theorists, is 
completely in keeping with the thinking of the German Romantic movement. In our case, actively 
sought for, such liberation succinctly accounts for Heidegger’s choice of the rhetorical conventions 
he uses to explain his sense of history (Geschichte) – not to mention the host of allusive tropes and 
mystical-seeming pronouncements right across his work – that mainstream Western metaphysics 
is incapable of acknowledging, least of all understanding, by dint of not appreciating the 
importance of what is meant by being (or, to be precise, be-ing). By his frequent employment of 
the ironic-seeming formal indication  – along with my exemplar correlates of catachresis, allegory, 
metalepsis and ellipsis – Heidegger is at once pointing to the limitations of our mis-inherited 
metaphysical point of view, as well as pointing beyond that limitation, to a view that could be ours 
were we sufficiently resolute/authentic/mindful/enowning3 enough to pick up the task of 
examining being (Sein), or properly, be-ing (Seyn), as he begins to call this less individualistic sense 
of Dasein, after Being and Time. He begins to despair that we will ever return to our rightful home 
in be-ing; that our philosophizing will become aimless. In Fundamental Concepts of Metaphysics 
we even have Heidegger quoting the arch German Romanticist, Hardenberg (Novalis, 1772-1801), 
complaining of the same. Says Heidegger, “Novalis on one occasion says in a fragment: ‘Philosophy 
is really homesickness, an urge to be at home everywhere’. A strange definition, romantic of 
course” (Heidegger, 1995: p.5, my emphasis). After this telling and almost involuntary piece of 
reverie, he goes on, in apologetic tones, reminding his readers, after Aristotle, that poets cannot 
be trusted: “Novalis – merely a poet, after all, and hardly a scientific philosopher” (ibid). This, as 
we will see, is one of many (somewhat hesitant) nods in the direction of Romantic sensibility, 
towards his intellectual neighbours, which, in a stroke, situates science, poetry and philosophy in 
the same line-up to be compared. This intermingling of genres is a common occurrence in the 
Romantic aesthetic. As the contemporary Romanticist philosopher Ernst Behler avows of such a 
coming together, it promotes a transcendence of “the dominance of one single principle (reason 
or imagination, theory or creation, classicism or Romanticism) in favour of a pluralistic movement 
of counteractive and interactive principles that seem to oppose, but in their interaction actually 
generate and maintain each other” (Behler, 1993: p.5). This is certainly the case with Heidegger. 
Hitherto in this thesis I have simply paired-up relevant examples of Heidegger’s written 
thinking with one or other critical tools from a suite of such, specifically those emerging from 
                                                          
3 This concatenation of Heideggerian concepts, whilst not strictly speaking synonymous, nevertheless represents the 
respective departure points for appreciations, or states of, Dasein’s being that occur across his oeuvre. The last of these, 
enowning, will feature in the next chapter. 
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German Romanticism (catachresis, etc); and this, for the purpose of effecting a slightly distanced, 
parallel and thereby productive, if artful and compassionate, sense-making of certain of 
Heidegger’s Romantically oriented claims, chief of which is Kairotic time. With this chapter on 
history, though, I would like to crash together these two lines of thought; to effect a reappraisal of 
Heidegger’s relevance to educational practice, specifically Romantically progressive educational 
practice as it could manifest in executive education.  
With Heidegger’s turn to history in his “middle period” (Guignon, 2005: p.392), in the 
lectures and writings subsequently translated as Basic Questions, Contributions, Mindfulness, and 
Country Path Conversations, his (mostly unacknowledged) embrace of overtly Romanticisable 
topoi, tropes and other elusive modes of representation becomes more evident. Any act of 
crashing, surely, is implicit in any consideration of his style of written philosophising, no matter 
how conventionally intolerant and damming it is of his often infuriating language. But beyond 
simply bemoaning his sibylline prose, as most introductory texts have it, I have found an 
explanatory companion in German Romanticism; one that serves not only to vindicate his tortuous 
style, but gives a singular voice to the manifest objections I have towards the delinquencies of 
capitalism as embodied in mainstream executive education, and as such, a voice that offers service 
to my unusual task. As David Halpin claims of this sensibility, “Like the process of education, 
Romanticism is the mood in which we feel we are or could become greater than we know” (Halpin, 
2007: p.1). Whereas Halpin limits his focus on what he calls “the chief features of [English] 
Romantic sensibility” (ibid) of childhood, love, heroism, criticism and imagination, my interest is in 
marking off Heidegger’s dalliance with some equally persistent, though less glamourous, themes 
of the German Romantic provenance. Though, along the lines of David Halpin’s argument, I will be 
exploring Heidegger’s Romanticist oriented thinking in the fashion of a specific fundamental 
attunement (Grundstimmung) that, with the exception of anxiety and boredom in the earlier 
chapters, Heidegger fails to provide, namely hope. I will be borrowing from Romanticism’s sense 
of hope as this applies to executive education. 
 
5.2 Geschichte, Historie, and Mindfulness 
Engaging with Heidegger’s sense of history is something of a test; a test to see if one is willing, 
and able, finally, to relinquish assumptions about sequential time, especially clock and calendrical 
(chronic) time, for this is what is being asked for by Heidegger, even if he doesn’t say as much. The 
bulk of this thesis has credited the reader with this ability, however reluctantly deployed: with that, 
and a growing realisation for the reader that being and time of Being and Time are, in some way, 
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synonymous – which will be similarly tested in the next section. For Heidegger’s sense of history is 
not about the past or past events, as we generally understand it: it is about “happenings,” which 
take place now and in the future, just as much as they did in the past. The essential differentiation 
emerging from this is between history as historie, and history as Geschichte, a distinction Heidegger 
uses in his Contributions to Philosophy (Heidegger, 1999). In introducing this work, Daniela Vallega-
Neu says of this distinction, “[w]here ‘Historie’ refers to past events from an objective, i.e., 
representational, point of view, ‘Geschichte’ bears the sense of both ‘history’ and ‘occurrence 
[happening],’ thus marking the temporality as well as the epochality of being as it is disclosed in 
Dasein, in being-t/here” (Vallega-Neu, 2003: p.8, emphasis in original). For the sake of grasping 
Geschichte, we need to understand that by studying happenings in the traditional way, via 
historical science or historiography (or, historie), we are not studying what Heidegger means by 
history: “history [Historie] means the exploration of the past from the perspective of the present” 
(Heidegger, 1994: p.33), which is not the proper focus, he claims, of history. As Heidegger has it: 
The word ‘historical’ [geschichtlich] means ‘happening’ [das Geschehen], history itself as a being. 
‘Historiograhical’ refers to a kind of cognition. We will not speak of historical ‘consideration’ but 
‘reflection’. For reflection [Be-sinnung] is looking for the meaning [Sinn] of a happening, the 
meaning of history. ‘Meaning’ refers here to the open region of goals, standards, impulses, 
decisive possibilities, and powers – all these belong essentially to happening (Heidegger, 1994: 
p.34). 
After quickly dismissing historiographical history as mere cognition, as simply a consideration of 
occurrences, Heidegger introduces another concept, reflection [Be-sinnung], by means of which 
the historical “happening” is made sense of. It is this process of meaning-making that encompasses 
the future and the present, as well as the past. This is (among others) the catachrestic move that 
Heidegger makes; the one that jolts our standard conception of history; the Romantic move that 
beckons a break with rationalistic reduction, and hints at a profound critique of homogenizing 
technological enframing. 
To establish this point, it is worth us spending a while reflecting on this meaning-making 
process itself, sometimes translated as “reflection” and sometimes as “mindfulness”. Under the 
latter title, Parvis Emad and Thomas Kalary have translated Heidegger’s 1938/39 text Besinnung 
(where, for the sake of expressing certain hermeneutic-phenomenological insights, Heidegger 
often hyphenates the “be-“ of that term, thus Be-sinnung in the above extract): a text that, along 
with his Contributions, represents the peak of his discourse on history, and one where history as 
Geschichte is accounted for as allowing for those happenings of Geschichte to continue to hold 
sway in our present, as well as in what will be our future. After all, what is the “open region of 
goals, standards, impulses, decisive possibilities, and powers” (ibid) to which he refers, other than 
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those of the future? It is no surprise that he claims of an event that it is partly determined by that 
“towards which” it is directed, especially when one considers the case of the hammer in Being and 
Time; in this instance, the towards which of the hammer, or its for-the-sake-of-which, points to the 
being of Dasein (Heidegger, 1962: p.116-7), as in being a house dweller, under a roof that needed 
hammering. To establish the meaning of a happening, one needs to look at that towards which the 
happening beckons, in the fashion of the hammering. But not only that: a reflection of, or a state 
of mindfulness for-the-sake-of, that same happening reveals that it somehow still holds sway over 
us, in some way – in our hammering example, that the roof is standing, and that we’re still dwelling 
under it. As Parvis Emad and Thomas Kalary have it, “Historie has no inkling of a past that still is in 
sway and is ‘on-coming’. Geschichte, on the other hand, is nothing but the gatheredness of that 
still swaying ‘on-coming’ past” (Emad and Kalary, 2006: p.xxix, in foreword to Heidegger, 2006). 
There is an aliveness to this on-coming past, a sense that it has not passed away, that it is still 
coming towards us. And it is keeping this reflection in mind that constitutes mindfulness. 
With Historie now revealed as a rather limited common sense of history, and with this 
forward looking sense of Geschichte installed as the proper (Eigen) sense of history, we can 
concentrate more on how swaying manifests itself: what is meant by swaying? In what thrall are 
we held by history, and how are we en-thralled, and what is doing the thralling? Heidegger is 
claiming, in Contributions and Mindfulness, that being mindful enables one to appreciate how an 
historical event can bring to presence a pastness; how it can, in a way, “send” the past to not only 
us (properly speaking, to Dasein) now in the present, but to us in the future; and, importantly, how 
the reception of that which is sent acts as an indicator of the readiness of the collective Dasein, or 
representatives of that particular epoch, to embrace a new beginning. 
Parvis Emad and Thomas Kalary, in their Foreword to their work of Heidegger translation 
titled Mindfulness (2006), provide an illuminating example from Heidegger’s own past as to how 
he saw this process of “sending” working out. In 1962 and 1967 Heidegger made two trips to 
Greece4. In providing an account of his trip, not surprisingly, his approach was geschichtlich, in that 
he spoke of the “suddenness and the coming to presence of a pastness of which the erudite 
historical archaeology has no inkling; that is, of the pastness that is the temple of Athena wherein 
the goddess is gathered and comes to presence in the midst of the technological hubbub and 
technologically organised and maintained tourism of the twentieth century” (Emad and Kalary, 
2006: p.xxx, in foreword to Heidegger, 2006). The somewhat awkward language in this passage 
from these proficient translators, themselves more than capable of crafting a decent Heideggerian 
                                                          
4 For a detailed description of these trips, and the effect they had on Heidegger and his wife Elfride, see Rüdiger 
Safranski’s biographical portrayal (Safranski, 1998: p. 401f). 
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sentence or two, gives some indication of the effort required to render this novel sense of history 
into something like acceptable prose. With my hope that the reader now appreciates that this 
awkwardness is in excess of the vagaries of translation, one has to question in what way the object 
of Heidegger’s point of using a geschichtlich account cannot be conveyed via the standard sense of 
history. What extra is added to the account of the trip, by dint of an affected italicised is and the 
use of (non)hyphenated abstract nouns that attempt to highlight a particular state – as in past-ness 
– that would not already be there in a more standard rendition? Why not aver; “I went to Greece: 
I roamed around the ruins of the Acropolis of Athens for a bit: I felt a sense of history: I took a home 
movie of me doing this as piece of history.”5 Even assuming there existed a Nobel Literature Prize-
winning account of the trip, in what way would such an eloquent account address a sense of the 
goddess Athene’s presence during my touristic stumblings, or thereafter, as I watched the home 
movie, say, in the comfort of my home? Or conversely, other than as a form of conspicuous 
Heideggerian branding, or tagging, or as a mark of scholarly partisanship, what limits is the 
language being put under that sanctions such awful prose – in this case mirrored by Heidegger 
scholars Emad and Kalary? We have encountered similar objections to Heidegger’s prose before in 
the preceding chapters. This stylistically oriented objection, for the seasoned Heidegger reader, 
becomes a common refrain, as one engages with the next (and the next) piece of lumpy, obscure, 
arcane and disjointed piece of prose from this thesis’s sponsoring philosopher. And so, with this 
recurring objection, I would like, in the manner of Judo, to use the opponent’s force to defeat the 
opponent: my hope is that the objection is not only nullified, but that the bluntness of the objection 
itself becomes a subject of mindful reflection (I don’t regard my accommodation of these concerns 
at this point as a detour into superficiality, along the lines of “stop worrying about how he says it; 
just concentrate on what he says,” especially not when the “how” and “what” in this instance can 
be shown, I believe, as related and co-created). 
Thus, two rejoinders to these stylistic objections come to mind at this stage, ones that have 
been slowly emerging across these pages; rejoinders that are intended to serve a parallel purpose 
to the remaining narrative. The first is oriented to Heidegger’s stylistic method, to which I offer a 
solution that sees us return to a Romanticised appreciation of his work, of how Heidegger does 
bring historical be-ing (Seyn) to words. The second rejoinder concerns a revealing of historical being 
itself, that almost indescribable and impermanent concept that suffers stuttering descriptions as a 
consequence. My (ambitious) intention is to neutralize, once and for all, the persistent stylistic 
objection via a parsing of Heidegger’s words about historical being against certain associated (and 
                                                          
5 Just such a home movie was made, of Heidegger and Elfride, stumbling among the rocks and ruins on the Parthenon, 
which can be seen on Youtube. See Jeff Morgan, Human all too Human BBC documentary, www.youtube.com, last 
accessed 16 September 2014. 
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calming) Romanticised sentiments; at the same time as coming to an understanding of allusive 
Seyn (be-ing) – not least how it differs from Sein (being), how it forms the object of Heidegger’s 
thought regarding history, and how it too is best encountered under the overtly Romantic disguise 
of Sublime Kairos, as the second part of this thesis has it. 
 
5.3 A Romantic Interlude 
Regarding the affinity of Heidegger’s thought and writing to aspects of thinking within the 
German Romanticist movement, these associative sentiments have seen Heidegger’s philosophical 
preoccupations linked to the movement’s predominant reaction to the excesses of Enlightenment 
reason, most notably as a reaction to the French Revolution and to the subsequent fifty-year 
period, up to c.1850, of intense political, social and intellectual revolution(s). Chief among these 
reactions, as David Halpin describes,  
Romantisicm represents a profound critique of some of modernity’s most problematic and 
dehumanizing features, in particular its rationalistic reductionism and homogenizing 
technism, which it wishes to see replaced by certain foundational human values that have 
been marginalized in modern society – values to do with the importance of individuality, 
spirituality, spontaneity, feeling and emotion and community. Indeed, Romanticism’s 
rebellion against the hegemony of technology in particular challenges us to create a utopia in 
which present reality is radically transformed, enabling us to live in ways that fuse together 
the material and spiritual, and the mechanical and the organic, while at the same time 
speaking out against narrow conventionality and traditionalism (Halpin, 2007: p.15). 
 
From the perspective of the excesses of capitalism; of executive education’s traditional relationship 
to this particular order; to executive education’s endorsement of the capitalistic hegemony and its 
excesses; to the concomitant targets of Heideggerian concern with the technicist discourse of 
enframing, brought about as a result of the unquestioned predominance of Western metaphysics; 
given this list, David Halpin’s articulation has hit upon a broad but productive rendition of 
Romanticism. Notwithstanding its sense of cliché and excess of ingratiation, it would be difficult 
not to imagine a bare bones agreement in the respective camps on these reductive points. Though 
there is something adrift in Halpin’s articulation, as it relates to the associative desiderata of my 
list; or is it the other way around? Perhaps it’s because my list seems so out of joint with so-called 
Romantic sentiment, a sentiment which, in some form or other across our lives, most of us 
subscribe to. And that, really, is the point I want to make here: to highlight this incongruity. There 
exists a blazing incongruity between execution and Romance: between capitalistic conformity and 
revolutionary zeal; between profit and spirit… The list of opposites could continue here; it wouldn’t 
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be difficult for the reader to compile further, once you got into the swing of contrasting a business 
related term with its Romanticised opposite. Which is an extension of my point. Even though this 
thesis is not an extended exposition of literary Romanticism, and even if you’re not fully acquainted 
with the works of Schiller, Novalis and Schlegel, or Wordsworth and Blake for that matter, there 
exists a natural antipode for corporate execution in Romanticism. In which case, to what 
philosophic work on the order-execution cognate can we employ this antipodean status? 
 Before I bring the focus of the discussion back around to history and sequentiality, I want 
to lay bare the Scylla and Charybdis nature of the foregoing, so as to temper my optimism in line 
with the sentiment of mindfulness introduced earlier – a particular sentiment whose complete 
thrall is in no way exhausted by Heidegger’s treatment of the term.  
In what could be called a (small “r”) romantic tiff, soon after the war, Heidegger’s former 
paramour Hannah Arendt delivered a series of stinging criticisms of her mentor, some implicit, 
others less so, in some of her writing. In publications of hers that built on his thinking (see Wollin, 
2001: p.31ff.), she nonetheless saw, and saw through, the pedigree from which his thinking 
emerged. Specifically, writing in the Partisan Review in 1946 (Arendt, Partisan Review, 13 (1), 1946: 
p.46), as Richard Wolin quotes, “she tellingly observed that Heidegger’s ‘whole mode of behavior 
has exact parallels in German Romanticism’”. Wolin goes on to quote Arendt, “he was ‘the last (we 
hope) romantic – as it were, a tremendously gifted Friedrich Schlegel or Adam Mueller’” (Wolin, 
2001: p.48). Richard Wolin summarises Arendt’s point by saying that “Heidegger’s case epitomized 
the risks of romantic ‘worldlessness,’ along with the concomitant megalomania and delusions of 
grandeur” (ibid).6 Arendt’s fear is presumably based on her associating Heidegger’s whiff of 
Romanticism – along with classing early German Romanticism’s (Beiser, 2003: p.37) embrace of 
the communitarian ethic as insipient totalitarianism – with the catastrophe that was National 
Socialism. As Frederick Beiser notes, “[s]ince World War II, romanticism has been discredited by 
both liberals and Marxists alike as the ideology of fascism, and not least because many Nazis 
embraced it as party ideology” (Beiser, 2003: p.1). I leave it to the reader to rehearse the standard 
arguments that see his overall thought neutralised (or not) on the basis of his disastrous alliances. 
But neutralised or not, this is not sufficient reason to equally discredit Romanticism per se, whose 
reception has warmed considerably since the time of Hannah Arendt’s suspicions (Beiser, 2003). 
Nonetheless, in the eyes of the reader, can Heidegger’s thinking, can Romanticism as 
fragmentarily presented here, and my overall endorsement of a Heidegger-inspired argument, 
                                                          
6 Interestingly, later in the same book (Wolin, 2001), Richard Wolin backs up his connecting Heidegger to German 
Romanticism when he attributes a similar connection to Heidegger’s former student, Herbert Marcuse. Speaking of 
Marcuse, Wolin affirms that “[h]is argument bears distinct affinities with the later Heidegger’s preference for ‘poesis’ or 
‘poetic revealing’ as opposed to the ‘enframing’ characteristic of modern ‘technics’ (das Gestell). The discourse of 
German Romanticism profoundly imprints the work of both thinkers” (ibid: p.171). 
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survive after Hannah Arendt’s critique? Obviously, I would say it can, though not via “historicising” 
Heidegger’s thinking in the sense of historie, which is always a temptation for scholars. Returning 
to this distinction, as he himself says, “[w]hoever without hesitation reads and hears the lecture-
courses only as a ‘historical’ presentation of some work and whoever then compares and reckons 
up the interpretation [Auffassung] with the already existing views or exploits the interpretation in 
order to ‘correct’ the existing views, he has not grasped anything at all” (Heidegger, 2006: p.372, 
emphasis in original). What is at stake in not having grasped “anything at all” of his argument is 
nothing less than humanity’s total abandonment to the devastating power of machination, the root 
of enframing that we encountered in the Technology chapter previously. The perils of machination 
represent the wake-up call, and the benefits that “temporal truancy” effect in having us 
acknowledge the thrall in which we are held by technological thinking. This retracing is a coming 
back to “be here”; as Daniel Dahlstrom says, “to carry out and belong to the hidden truth of 
historical being” (Dahlstrom, 2013: p.96). 
In preparation for the next section on “historical-being,” and by way of acclimatising the 
reader to the next chapter on historical-being’s metonym, the “event of appropriation” as a means 
to combat machination, and also as a chance to mindfully partake in some of Heidegger’s 
Romanticised bringing of be-ing to words, I offer the following example of the task that Heidegger 
thinks philosophers should be engaged in, in light of the looming monster that is machination. To 
pick up the Judo metaphor from earlier, rather than spinning the quote on its heels and flooring it 
on the mat of reasonable decorum, here’s a chance for the reader to attempt an attitude of 
mindfulness in its reception. Says Heidegger about the task of philosophy,  
…there is the dominant claim on philosophy (as ‘worldly wisdom’, as a ‘morality’ that sets 
values, and as a ‘science’ that solves the ‘mystery of the world’) to account for beings and for 
the security of the extant man. At the end, this twisted and presumptuous claim plays itself 
out as the court of arbitration that decides the failure and usefulness of philosophy. One 
could view these sort of things with indifference, if therein an unrecognizable and stubborn 
representation of philosophy would not always consolidate itself, and degenerate into a 
hardly noticeable but unassailable repelling of any inquiry into what is ownmost to 
philosophy. The consequence of this misinterpretation of philosophy expresses itself in the 
state of an epoch that allows this epoch to know everything ‘historical’ about philosophy and 
its history but to have no knowing-awareness of the one thing that is entrusted to 
philosophy’s ownmost, namely to ask the question of the truth of be-ing and in the midst of 
the disarray of beings to set up this question in its inevitability (Heidegger, 2006: p.44-45). 
 
At the moment (of writing this thesis) I subscribe to this task for philosophy – despite the balance 
of explanation owed “historical-being” – as an exclusive pursuit because my proximity to the site 
of mindful reflection for machinating executives allows me to encourage and experiment with it. 
For instance, the site referred to is executive education: the machinating executives are those, 
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including the body of educators themselves, in the sway of the order-execution cognate: and the 
experimentation is contained, along with this thesis, in the foil of my hopelessly Romantically-
headed worldlessness in the face of said cognate (not forgetting my kinship to that particular body 
of executants of education). Of course, I would claim that I fall shy of any megalomania and 
delusions of grandeur that Arendt considers a concomitant of this dangerous state. After all, 
arguing for or against Dasein’s worldly or worldless condition is, I suggest, a properly Romantic 
gesture anyway, which deserves consideration on its own terms. What if the same could be said of 
Heidegger’s ownmost task for philosophy: that it too is a Romantic gesture? Would that negate his 
project, or simply force our hand into treating it concomitantly and proportionately, whatever that 
would entail? I’m keen to explore how what would be entailed could form the basis of progressive 
executive education. 
 
5.4 Historical-Being (Seyn) 
Boundless (un-boundable) obstacles lie in the way of this double experimentation – those 
concerning philosophy, and those to do with executive education. Barring the former’s passage is 
that doughty court of arbitration, in front of whom my replaying of Heidegger’s arguments stand, 
as in the following.  
Firstly, a decision about being faces us: a decision to see, as Heidegger has it, “whether 
beings take being as what is ‘most general’ to them and thus hand being over to ‘ontology’ and 
bury it, or whether be-ing [Seyn] in its uniqueness comes to word and thoroughly attunes beings 
as happening but once –” (Heidegger, 1989: p.63, emphasis in original). Seyn is different from the 
being that Heidegger had used in Being and Time (Sein) in that its use is intended to represent a 
break in the traditional meanings of being, with the hyphen serving to indicate that break (though 
some translations represent it with beyng). After writing Being and Time Heidegger realised, partly 
via the way that reviewers spoke of the book and how they described his project, that he had still 
been using the language of metaphysics, when all the while claiming to question being in a more 
original way than metaphysics allowed. Reflecting on this error he said that “[t]his publication 
would not have let the misinterpretation of Sein und Zeit as a mere ‘ontology’ of man and the 
misconstrual of ‘fundamental ontology’ go as far as these misinterpretations have gone and are 
going” (Heidegger, 2006: p.367). In as much as his work Contributions to Philosophy can be called 
a book in the normal sense (Scott, 2001: p.1), he set out to account for and correct his earlier 
mistake with this revised engagement with language. In a sense, then, with be-ing, we are at fault; 
we, the upholders and traders (in an executive sense) in traditional Western metaphysics, are not 
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only unable to grasp being in any other sense than as objects that are, via our singular blindness in 
ontology; we failed as a consequence to understand Heidegger’s own failure to adequately convey 
his sense of being as be-ing. But all is not lost. I think I’m on to something with this, using the 
rejoinders I introduced earlier: rejoinders that will, in the course of this chapter, return us to the 
theme of temporality. Firstly, though, there is bad news, and there is good news. 
Sadly, to compound this failure, Heidegger gives us precious little clarity in Contributions 
by way of an out-and-out definition of “be-ing” – or, for that matter, clear definitions of 
“enowning,” “fore-graspsing,” “ab-ground,” “essential swaying,” “projecting-open,” “charming-
moving-unto,” “enseeing,” “enthinking,” “enopening,” “enquivering,” or “encleaving” – to help us 
Western metaphysicians who seem to require a definitive definition when grappling to understand 
a concept. Wonderfully, though, to account for this failure – as a failure on our part, let’s accede – 
Heidegger’s writing of his middle period is offered as, what in my world at least is called, a 
“developmental opportunity”. Consider it from the German Romantic movement’s tendency to 
help us re-remember those things that have been torn asunder by (modern) abstract analysis, as a 
“homecoming,” as Heidegger reminded us earlier of that arch-Romantic Novalis’ preference for 
understanding philosophy’s purpose (Heidegger, 1995: p.5). One such form of homecoming, 
pertinent in our case, is that of encouraging incomprehensibility – as incomprehensible as that 
seems to us. Referring to the objectives of Romantic criticism, John McCarthy claims 
incomprehensibility as the last of eight traits of Romanticism7: “Lack of understanding is not seen 
as something to be resolved, but as a state to be affirmed as inherent in an existence that is on the 
one hand concretely fixed and iterative and on the other elusively imprecise in its unexpected 
twists and turns” (McCarthy, 2009: p.107). As educators, being left to work it out, or employing the 
Socratic method, is an approach we’re all familiar with the usefulness of. So consider the corollary 
with regards to being thrown the challenge of understanding be-ing, via Contributions; how does 
one go about this? Susan Schoenbohm, in her helpful introduction to Contributions, the opening 
chapter of a Companion to Heidegger’s Contributions to Philosophy (Scott, et al, 2001),  cautions 
us early on about ready intelligibility; 
The commonly held belief that the success of a piece of writing can be measured by the 
degree to which an author makes something readily intelligible to already familiar ways of 
understanding is inappropriate here [in Contributions]. We need to be venturesome, to allow 
our familiar ways of understanding, which are at best limited, to be challenged, perhaps then 
                                                          
7 The other seven of which are worthy of note, due to their spectacular proximity to Heidegger’s thought. These are: 
elusive modes of representation; a subjectivist embrace of fantasy; perspectivism, to historicise narrated reality; nature 
as animate; the value of Greek antiquity as an invitation to experiment with the received canon; infinite perfectibility, 
which is why Romanticism embraces all forms of revolution; and a mingling of genres, combining poetry, philosophy and 
spirituality. Further work, across the expanse of Heidegger’s oeuvre that is still being published, is required to establish 
his provenance in the German Romantic tradition. 
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to become opened to interestingly different ways of thinking (Schoenbohm, 2001: in Scott et 
al, 2001: p.15). 
 
I can personally vouch for this method, encountered involuntarily in the process of compiling this 
research; an experience which was more sink than swim. Leaving behind the somewhat dizzy spin 
of relativism, though, we are presented with another call to arbitration. This time, the choice of 
either respecting Heidegger’s own – what can only be described as – pedagogic intentions8 of 
redressing his failure to purge his Being and Time language of metaphysics by re-engaging with the 
same task, but using (an even more) completely original language, and leaving us to get on with it 
after his death; or deriding Heidegger still further, for over-privileging a subjective, closed and 
essentially private-language so-called explanation of a concept that is beyond words anyway. I opt 
for the former, of course: and value how Heidegger has brought be-ing to words, the method of 
which I promised earlier to disclose. Which accounts for my attempt to stir a debate about how his 
bringing of historical be-ing to words can be amplified, can be better understood, by situating his 
efforts adjacent to German Romanticism’s earlier efforts at the same. For instance, what accounts 
for the endurance of Romantic efforts in the visionary work of William Blake, say, or Caspar David 
Friedrich, that is not also attributable to Heidegger, but which is likely not to be given the same 
airing in the less than public domains of “the court of arbitration that decides the failure and 
usefulness of philosophy” (Heidegger, 2006: p.44-45), namely academic philosophy? If, as Charles 
Scott says, Heidegger “sought a way of thought that would call people out of their unalert and 
insensitive lives with beings and would recover alertness to the temporal eventuation, not the 
spiritualisation, of living things in their coming to pass” (Scott, 2001: p.5, my emphasis), can we not 
suggest that the methods of how we go about this ourselves may rightly lie in the domain of the 
Romantics, and that it is to them that we, as educators, look for our means, if not our rationale, in 
wrestling out of our well-wadded state. 
Though I must say, the prospect of releasing this language of be-ing into the site of my 
accepting of the “developmental opportunity,” is daunting; the site where I intend to work it out, 
on my own, to dutifully accept, from my management, this “development opportunity” and blithely 
meander down the pathways of be-ing. Namely, and secondly, on the subject of unboundable 
obstacles that this section opened with, barring the forward passage of my experiment in executive 
education is a welter of worldly, most general, objections, not least of which are the perfect 
antipodes of the staunchly Romantic arguments against rationality, progress, technology, utility, 
                                                          
8 For a more ‘praxis’ oriented account of Heidegger’s pedagogic intentions, see Michael Ehrmantrat’s book Heidegger’s 
Philosophic Pedagogy (2010). 
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comprehensibility, practicality, certainty, permanence, productivity, modernity, conservatism, and 
the bounded systematise-ability of all of these that are the themes of European Romanticism9. 
By way of suggesting workarounds to these obstacles, now is the time to ask where history 
is in all of this? Why is it historical-being? In answer to what historical be-ing is, it is the thrall, the 
sway, the shadow of what be-ing holds us in, since its inception at the very beginning: that which 
captures us still, enthrals us, en-sways us, in the sense that we can be held in the “sway” of a 
masterful piece of music. Mourning his failure at conveying this sense of be-ing, and his maddening 
frustration at the persistence of purely metaphysical understanding of being, Heidegger attempts 
to portray a replacement for being as happening first, before metaphysics, at the (indeterminately 
chronological) beginning, thereby acting as the ground – albeit hidden – of our impoverished sense 
of metaphysical being. This is historical be-ing, this happening10. In asking what be-ing is, one can 
only describe its “swaying,” the influence this happening continues to have over us. “In contrast to 
this”, says Heidegger of metaphysical being of machination, “be-ing is unique, and therefore it ‘is’ 
never a being and least of all the most-being. But a being is not, and for that very reason thinking 
of beingness – forgetful of be-ing – attributes to a being the beingness as the most general 
property. This attribution has its legitimacy in the ordinary representation; and therefore one must 
say, over against this representation, that be-ing holds sway – whereas a being ‘is’” (Heidegger, 
1999: p.333, emphasis in original). This echoes his earlier claim that time is not: that one cannot 
say of time that it is, only that there is the “temporalizing of temporality” itself (Heidegger, 1962: 
p.428). The trap, in Heidegger’s opinion, into which our metaphysical thinking leads us, is to assume 
that, much like the being of objects, the time of Dasein should be treated in the same “objectified” 
way (ibid: p.430). Rather, Dasein’s relation to the time of history is predicated, via Dasein’s be-ing, 
as incompatible with the Western metaphysical conception of being. In one of his foot-stomping, 
italicised, and frequently re-quoted, emphases in §72 of Being and Time concerning Dasein’s 
relation to the time of history, he claims that: 
In analysing the historicality of Dasein we shall try to show that this entity is not ‘temporal’ 
because it ‘stands in history’, but that, on the contrary, it exists historically and can so exist 
only because it is temporal in the very basis of its Being. 
 Nevertheless, Dasein must also be called ‘temporal’ in the sense of being ‘in time’ 
(Heidegger, 1962: p.428-429, emphasis in original). 
                                                          
9 See Stephen Pickett and Simon Haines’ (Eds.) European Romanticism: A Reader (2014) for an extended engagement 
with each of these themes. 
10 Says Slavoj Žižek of this happening, “[a]s such it is an event: at its most elementary, event is not something that occurs 
within the world, but is a change of the very frame through which we perceive the world and engage in it. Such a frame 
can sometimes be directly presented as a fiction which nonetheless enables us to tell the truth in an indirect way” (Žižek, 
2014: p.10, emphasis in original). Speaking mostly of Heidegger’s concept of Ereignis, which will be the topic of the next 
chapter, I particularly like Žižek’s description here as it explains why I have taken recourse to the fictional character of 
Sanjay, as a frame through which I can tell the truth in an indirect way. 
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In keeping with this formulation of originary temporality, as a form of time that is not, as one which 
only temporalizes itself, the be-ing of history should be similarly treated. So as not to objectify 
either time or be-ing, and thus to avoid the self-same error from which machination arises, it is 
easier to describe be-ing as an historical (Geschichte) happening with which we are held in sway, 
from the beginning. Even saying that it can be described leads us back into the error of metaphysics, 
which is why it is more of a decision, as we saw at the start of this section where be-ing “happens 
but once” (Heidegger, 1999: p.63). By way of a reminder as to the importance of this decision for 
this thesis looking at chronic and Kairotic time, be-ing happens, as temporal historicality, non-
sequentially: only time ascribable to beings as (Western metaphysical) objects happen 
sequentially. History, for Heidegger, should not be thought of as a sequential passage of bygone 
times (Historie), where the bygone sequence of events and objects has slipped into a sequential 
past (Heidegger, 1962: p.430): instead, history as Geschichte for Dasein is conceptually dependent 
– I would say, intoxicatingly so – on a framework of non-sequentiality, of Kairotic time. As such, 
Geschichte offers the best hope for pulling the plug on the lifeless, standard, chronic – because 
sequential – and stupefyingly habitual time-dimension of the order-execution cognate as it stands 
in contemporary executive education, and substituting a dashing, ecstatic, multi-storied and 
disruptive (to the cognate, at least) sense of time, one kissed by the Romanticised urbanities of a 
“grander time,” as the contemporary Romanticist  novelist and playwright Peter Handke terms the 
sophistication of such a time sense (Handke, 2007: p.43). So, given this reminder, and this strange 
new candidate for temporality, which will we decide? Being or be-ing? Or is there another way of 
approaching this decision? 
5.5 Time and Historical Be-ing 
In the guise of the corporate executive, I believe there is reified Heidegger’s epitomised 
sense of machination par excellence. Machination: that bogeyman for the sake of which Heidegger 
reminds us of our historical be-ing, of our original historical happening; a hope that in our living 
from this be-ing we might recognise and overcome machination in all its alienating force – a force 
whose metier of productivity the corporate executive is master. Though, the corporate executive, 
and the order they stand for, is not a perfect incarnation of machination. Not that the rest of us 
are not either complicit in, or hapless dupes of (delete as appropriate), Western democracy, 
consumerism, capitalism and neoliberalism, religious and nationalistic extremism, or any other 
competing Lyotardian meta-narratives or fundamentalist eschatology, or mendacious and 
alienating propaganda, against which liberating forces are equally arrayed, from atop equally 
inventive soap boxes. Only, with the executive, there’s a handy reminder of a means by which it is 
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possible to stave off machinating tendencies – in the sequi (Latin: sequence) of ex-sequi (sequence-
out) in “executive” – when it comes to enacting the order-execution in a temporal sequence. A 
revised mastery of time that could be well within reach of the executive to seize and make their 
own. Not that this reminder of execution is any more persuasive than Heidegger’s reminder of be-
ing. Why should we be more leery of machination than with any of the other bogeymen? I would 
say, parroting Heidegger, because the above more familiar sounding roll call of ne’er-do-wells are 
the consequences of machination, not the cause of it. They are the consequences of our habit to 
found beingness on instantiations of being, rather than on, say, that neighbour of be-ing – time – 
that Heidegger gave a front row seat to in Being and Time, in that (faulty) attempt to provide a 
non-instantiated, non-grounded (not un-grounded; rather, “ab-grounded”) ground for be-ing. In 
Being and Time, says Susan Schoenbohm; 
Heidegger orients his rethinking of the question of the meaning of being by giving priority to 
the temporality and disclosive phenomenality of beings, that is, to temporality as the 
occurrence of being in distinction to a representation of beingness. In this way, Being and 
Time begins Heidegger’s reorientation of philosophy to the task of engaging in the as yet 
insufficiently answered question of the meaning of being by locating itself where it is, namely, 
within temporal, historical, always questionable being-in-the-world (Schoenbohm, 2001: in 
Scott et al, 2001: p. p.16, my emphasis).  
 
What does it take to firm-up our hitherto limp grasp of what it means “to be, or not to be,” by 
recourse to temporality? In a very real Hamlet-like sense, it requires that, as Dasein, we attend to 
our historicity as it encompasses our contexts of living. In other words, that we attend to the 
mortal, hence temporal, fragility of our lives as Heidegger’s concept of care has us appreciate, 
which was introduced in chapter two. With respect to history, we’ve seen what it takes to grasp 
be-ing via temporality: namely, to be mindful in regarding the past, regarding history of the 
Geschichte kind, not as an inventory, or chronicle, of representations of beingness, as Historie 
would have us do on behalf of our legacy of a metaphysical sense of being. Instead, by regarding 
the happenings of history as the happenings of the (“disclosive phenomenality of” as Schoenbohm 
has it) being-in-the-world as care, we stand a chance of living our lives not as a succession of 
experiences between the thrownness of our birth and the anticipation of our death, but within the 
timeliness that Heideggerian care is. 
 It is worth reminding ourselves of the care concept, since it forms the basis of my claims 
for a non-sequential temporal sense of the order-execution cognate. Let me compare Heidegger’s 
original formulation of the concept in Being and Time (the first of the quotes below) with one of 
its less frequent occurrences in his later writings, on this occasion from Contributions: 
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The formally existential totality of Dasein’s ontological structural whole must therefore be 
grasped in the following structure: the Being of Dasein means ahead-of-itself-Being-already-
in-(the-world) as Being-alongside (entities encountered within-the-world) (Heidegger, 1962: 
p.237). 
 
In this way the inceptual mindfulness of thinking becomes necessarily genuine thinking, i.e., 
a thinking that sets goals. What gets set is not just any goal, and not the goal in general, but 
the one and only and thus singular goal of our history. This goal is the seeking itself, the 
seeking of be-ing. It takes place and is itself the deepest find when man becomes the 
preserver of the truth of be-ing, becomes guardian and caretaker of that stillness, and is 
resolute in that. Seeker, preserver, guardian, and caretaker:  this is what care means as the 
basic trait of Dasein (Heidegger, 1999: p.13, emphasis in original). 
Aside from the interesting comparisons these quotes afford, I suggest this combined Geschichte 
sense of history opens up a Kairotic sense of time: or speaking of time in a spatial sense, of a vertical 
sense of time; a time distinct from the standardly conceived horizontal or chronological senses of 
time. Care, in the strictly Heideggerian senses outlined above, gives onto this vertical prospect of 
time in a unique way.  
As we saw in the conclusion of the previous chapter, Charles Taylor also champions this 
Kairotic or vertical sense of time extensively in his writing on “closed world structures” (Taylor, 
2003: p.47f.). In that work he equates “closed” with “horizontal” and states that our world, in the 
Heideggerian sense, abandons any sense of vertical or “transcendent” time (ibid). I disagree with 
the sentiment expressed with the term “transcendent,” when it is used to describe the time of care 
and of historical be-ing, since Heidegger was at pains to have us engage with our lives – through 
historical be-ing – more thoroughly than through the objectification of (even) a transcendent being. 
Recalling Heidegger’s injunction, we have to exercise mindfulness in discriminating our be-ing 
oriented from our being oriented locutions; and as with any form of mindfulness, this can be tricky. 
Charles Taylor has, however, gone on to expand his “closed world structure” sense of time in his 
book A Secular Age (2007), calling it, variously, “Kairotic” (ibid: p.54, 124, 712, 715), “quasi time” 
(ibid: p.69), “higher time” (ibid: p.54, 59, 195, 208, 265, 541, 713), “the time of carnival or misrule” 
(ibid: p.129), “everywhen” (ibid: p.153), “exemplary time” (ibid: p.194), “God’s time” (ibid: p.265), 
and “multiform time” (ibid: p.712), among others. It is gratifying to see the extent of Taylor’s 
engagement with temporality throughout his examination of the negative effects of “secular time”. 
It is also understandable, in a book about the secularisation of modern societies, that Taylor 
account for a supreme and “transcendent” ground for all beings, in the onto-theological sense: 
though, despite the considerable disagreement with Heidegger’s critique of onto-theology (in 
particular, see Wrathall, 2003),  the use of “transcendent” in my immediate context is 
inappropriate. 
Other travellers towards and articulators of a peculiarly vertical time include many writers 
in the Romanticist aesthetic, too many to enumerate under the strictures of this thesis, but 
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including the recent and noteworthy engagements with Romanticism of Peter Handke (b. 1942) 
and Botho Strauß (b. 1944), as recommended (along with others) by Margarete Kohlenbach in her 
useful overview of the legacies and transformations of German Romanticism across the arts 
(Kohlenbach, 2009: p.257f.). And that’s really the glaring issue here isn’t it, if we can bracket for 
the moment our Romantic meddling with temporal appearances: all of this stands a chance of 
making sense in the domain of art and fiction and storytelling, but not, for some crucial reason, in 
the domain of business, of politics and the execution of capitalistic imperatives, art’s antipode. For 
us moderns, perhaps we have come up against the final, though idealised, antithesis between 
these contrasting domains. On the one side, that of a desire, and a corresponding ability, as C.S. 
Lewis describes allegory, “to represent what is immaterial in picturable terms” (Lewis, 1936: p.55), 
in distinction with a thoroughgoing disenchantment of the material world by Enlightenment 
reason. Or, speaking of irony, as Manfred Frank describes ironic speech, as keeping “open the 
irrepresentable location of the infinite by permanently discrediting the finite as that which is not 
intended” (Frank, 2014: p.24), versus Madonna’s material girl, living in a material world: or, the 
ethereal versus the concrete. 
Let me test the sanctity of this division, along with your appetite for experimentation. Let 
me test with you, dear intermediate reader11, what part of the business domain comes crashing 
down, what cherished business, or capitalist, or commercial, logic becomes corrupted, once I hand 
over the narrative to a supposed antipode to business – let’s say, a Romantic fairy tale. And 
remember the task I set the intermediate reader: namely, to suspend the sharply delineated 
disciplinary regimes of Heidegger scholarship and/or executive profit-making respectively. The 
challenge I’m laying in front of you is to allow you to experience that which is beyond language; to 
lay bare language as the “order” that, itself, can be gone beyond, in the manner in which I’m having 
us look beyond the merely sequential aspects of the order-execution cognate; to enact a mood of 
restraint12, a holding back on our (scholarly or executive) impulses to consider truth as a 
representation of some state of affairs, i.e. outside of our heads and in the “real world,” as well as 
a restraint to theorise. If for no other reason, consider the following as a re-enchanting enactment 
of Kairotic time, but one you have to carry out/execute. 
o-----o 
Once upon a time there lived an ambitious potter who, through no fault of his own, was 
extremely poor. One day, walking through the forest to gather berries for his supper, he came 
                                                          
11 See last paragraph of the Introduction. 
12 As Richard Polt says of the mood of “restraint” in his The Emergency of Being (2013), “[r]estraint lets us respond to the 
strange without reducing it to the familiar” (ibid: p.17), which is what I’m expecting the reader to do in what follows. 
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across the king of the land who was out hunting with his servants. “Potter!” ordered the king. 
“Make me a pot so I can cook this stag. I will give you whatever you want for it.” The potter said in 
reply: “With clay from the land, the pot from my hands, no payment is necessary sire.” The king 
was pleased. So masterful was the potter at his craft that he’d quickly made the pot and handed it 
to the king. The stag cooked to perfection in the lovely pot and the king was well fed. Next, the king 
ordered “Potter! Make me a hundred more pots so I can cook these fowl. I will give you whatever 
you want for them.” The servants looked at the potter, wondering what extravagant reward he 
would claim. The potter said in reply to the king: “With clay from the land, the pot from my hands, 
no payment is necessary sire.” The king was even more pleased, though the servants were 
surprised. In next to no time, the potter had the pots ready and presented them to the king. The 
fowl cooked to perfection in the curvaceous pots and the king handed them to his servants to eat. 
They were all well fed. Sensing something magical, next the king ordered “Potter! Make me a 
thousand more pots, decorated with gold, so I can serve dainties to the entire royal household. I 
will give you whatever you want for them.” In a dreamy instant, with the glimmering pots ready, 
and surrounded by a host of incredulous servants, the potter addressed the king “With clay from 
the land, the pot from my hands, no payment is necessary sire.” The king’s party returned to the 
castle with the pots, buzzing with chatter from the astonishing event. The potter disappeared back 
into the forest. 
The king and queen had a son and a daughter. The prince was haughty and conniving, while 
his beautiful sister, the chaste princess, was loved by everyone in the land, especially by the king. 
It just so happened that the prince, who had many spies amongst the royal servants, soon heard 
of what had happened in the forest between the earnest potter and the king, and decided to trick 
the potter into admitting his secret. With great fanfare he announced a competition to reveal the 
best craftsman in the land. However, unbeknownst to the king he offered as a prize the ultimate 
royal favour; the hand in marriage to the princess, his sister. As a result, on the appointed day, 
hundreds of spinners, weavers, cooks, potters, candle makers, craftsmen and journeymen of all 
trades and ranks of life crowded into the lofty great hall of the castle, all with samples of their 
excellent wares, all expecting marriage to the beautiful princess.  The glorious items were arrayed 
on the high table for the prince to judge, among them a handsome cooking pot, which caught his 
eye. “This pot,” announced the prince, “is fit for a princess. May the proud maker of this pot come 
and claim his rightful prize.” The throng in the great hall fell silent, until a voice from the back called 
out “With clay from the land, the pot from my hands, no payment is necessary sire.” In 
embarrassment at being found out, our poor potter dashed from the hall sobbing and ran back to 
his simple hut in the forest. Waiting for him by the modest hearth was the chief goblin who, along 
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with his thousand strong goblin workforce, the potter secretly employed to make all of his pots, 
since time was very precious. 
“You treat us ill, sir,” said the chief goblin, in a weak voice, to the potter, “Stealing our time 
to make your pots, which you give away for nothing, in order to curry favour. We demand all of 
our pot-time back, time that has worn out the period of our longer goblin lives. Along with it, we 
want back all of our walking-to-work-time, our gossip-time, our dancing-in-the-woods-time, our 
uncanny-time, our sand-between-the-toes-time, our sky-in-the-treetops-time, our time-to-look-
at-stars-time. A word to the prince and he will disgrace you in front of the king.” The now contrite 
potter thought long and hard about what the once loyal goblin had said. He resolved to make 
amends, though not before he had found out how to recover these grander times and return the 
balance owed to all the hardworking goblins. 
The prince, in the meantime, had a long wait before news of the potter’s fate reached him. 
The potter had put himself under apprenticeship, over many years, to a wizard potter in the heart 
of the cloudy mountains, far from the castle. With persistent wizardly guidance, and with clerkly 
training, over the years our potter became the most skilled in the land at making and selling the 
most ravishing pots, one at a time, without assistance from the goblins. With little effort his wares 
began to fetch huge sums, and before long the king became a generous benefactor, recognising in 
them the hand of the potter he had met in the woods all those years ago. One piece in particular, 
silken to the touch and with a breath-taking lustre, sold in amazing numbers, due to its unusual 
properties. Amid the melancholy of life’s travails, taking a moment to glimpse the reflection cast 
upward from the gleaming wine within this enchanting bowl was sufficient to stay fleeting time for 
whomever held the bowl. So pleased was the king to be in possession of such a pot that, 
unbeknownst to the prince, he offered the potter, who was now very wealthy, the hand in marriage 
to his still beautiful daughter. The first the prince heard of the potter’s fate was on the day that an 
impressive phalanx of a thousand goblins trooped through the castle gate, each in high spirits, and 
each carrying one of these bowls. They had come to join in the high times at the royal wedding of 
the potter-king to the princess. 
The potter inherited the kingdom and lived happily ever after with his wife, until they 
died13. 
o-----o 
                                                          
13 I am thankful to Maria Tatar and her beautiful book The Annotated Brothers Grimm: The Bicentennial Edition (2012), 
and to the Grimm brother’s Household Tales, as well as to E.T.A. Hoffmann and his The Golden Pot and Other Tales (2008), 
for the inspiration behind my own (fictional) fairy tale 
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What is it about this mode of narrative that is so at odds with the domain of business and 
execution? What does the limit that this fairy tale touches tell us about the order of business, the 
order of capitalism, or the standing orders of commercial logic, in contrast? I present it as a 
Romantically-inspired, and Kairotic, pitch against the dominant order, in as open-handed a manner 
as I can gesture in words. I offer it not as a riddle or something to be solved; nor as a text to be 
cross-referenced against Sanjay’s fairy tale life story14; nor against any specific aspect of 
Heidegger’s thinking; not even as a token of levity with which to decorate the moment with suitable 
Romantic ostentation: I offer it as an antipode plain and simple, in the same manner in which I 
believe Heidegger is offering “originary temporality” in Being and Time. Says Novalis of fairy tales 
generally: 
 
In a true fairytale everything must be marvellous – mysterious and unconnected – everything 
must be animated. Each in its different way. The whole of nature must be mixed in a strange 
way with the whole of the spirit world. Time of general anarchy – lawlessness – freedom – the 
natural state of nature – the time before the world (state). This time before the world brings 
with it, as it were the scattered features of the time after the world – as the state of nature is 
a strange picture of the eternal kingdom. The world of the fairy tale is the absolutely opposite 
world of truth (history) – and just for this reason it is so absolutely similar to it – as chaos is to 
accomplished creation… In the future world everything is as it is in the former world – and yet 
everything is quite different.  The future world is reasonable chaos – chaos which penetrated 
itself – is inside and outside itself – chaos squared or infinity. The true fairy tale must be at once 
a prophetic representation - an ideal representation – an absolutely necessary representation. 
The maker of true fairy tales is a prophet of the future (Novalis, 1798-9: p.34, emphasis in 
original, quoted in Prickett, 2014: p.149). 
 
 
In a not especially self-explanatory way, but in attempting to keep with Novalis’s sentiment from 
this quote, I present my fairy tale as a breakthrough; a rather blunt one, it has to be admitted, and 
rather fey, but a breakthrough all the same, to a Geschichte sense of history, one that bares the 
sense of both objective history and continual happening, but by way of marking the time-ness and 
the epoch-making-ness of being as it is disclosed by Dasein, where we are alive to the past that is 
still coming towards us.  
Chances are this needs to sit with you some more: in which case, I will move on to looking 
at this blunt and slow-motion breakthrough from the angle of Heidegger’s Event of Appropriation, 
and his baffling concept of Ereignis.  
                                                          
14 With the assumption that the fictional Sanjay is a member of the Dalit or untouchable caste; and given his miraculous 
climb out of poverty, his esteemed education and ascent to the top of X-Corp, it is as if the Sanjay story can not only be 
regarded as fictional, but as a fairy tale. 
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The Event of Appropriation 
 
 
 
 
Appropriation grants to mortals their abode within their nature, so that they may be capable of 
being those who speak. If we understand “law” as the gathering that lays down that which causes 
all beings to be present in their own, in what is appropriate for them, then Appropriation is the 
plainest and most gentle of all laws… Appropriation, though, is not law in the sense of a norm which 
hangs over our heads somewhere, it is not an ordinance which orders and regulates a course of 
events. 
(Martin Heidegger, On The Way to Language, p. 128-129) 
 
 
 
 
 
6.1 Introduction 
In this chapter, I want to remain with this type of breakthrough, but on the level of the 
breakthrough as an event, one that we feel comfortable staying with: not as an event in time so 
much, as strange as that sounds, since don’t all events occur in time, but as an event which marks 
our ability to abandon ourselves to that self-same event. This excess of circularity here should not 
distract us, nor come as a surprise – not now. Heidegger, of course, has a name for this remaining 
with and abandoning ourselves to such an “event” – he calls it Ereignis – the grasping of whose 
meaning requires, quite possibly, the most exotic philosophic effort of imagination we will have to 
muster across his entire oeuvre, whose effort will make some more sense of the vertical time we 
met with at the end of the previous chapter. But I feel as though we now have the requisite 
conceptual resources at hand, this far into the thesis, to understand Ereignis, for the sake of taking 
possession, on behalf of the sequencing-out of execution, of the time of executive education. I 
want to examine executive education as an event, and the (new) role that time plays in that 
educative event. 
The term Ereignis itself is essentially untranslatable. It is formerly rendered by most 
translators as “appropriation” or the “event of appropriation,” and sometimes just as “event,” 
though perhaps it is more appropriately (pun intended) translated as “enowning,” as we shall see. 
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Even turning to the opening page of one of Heidegger’s books with Ereignis in the title1, Beiträge 
zur Philosophie (Vom Ereignis), where the key term lies secluded in brackets, but where you’d at 
least expect, early on, to be provided with a clear definition of said key term, we get instead the 
elliptical statement “being owned over into enowning” (Heidegger, 1989: p.3) as an early sense of 
Ereignis (we’ll come back to this quote later). That book’s public title is translated as Contributions 
to Philosophy: Heidegger himself says of its bracketed subtitle (From Enowning) that this is the 
book’s “Essential Heading” (ibid.); so we are dealing with hot property (properly speaking)2 here, 
and have found ourselves under the knife, yet again, of translation3. However, when one realises, 
as Hans Ruin does, that “being owned over into enowning” translates rather straightforwardly into 
German as “to abandon oneself to the event” (Ruin, 2005: p.365), one begins to see that something 
else is at play – something like the act of owning, deciding to own, or en-owning some such, and 
via this act, this “en” of enowning, one gives oneself over to something worth owning – that is 
spectacularly short-changed by “event” in the sense we normally give that term. 
My strategy for reading Ereignis, and of using the concept to explore the event of executive 
education, emerges naturally from the notion’s attendant responsibility of “owning,” itself: 
namely, as Richard Polt says, “[t]he responsible way to gain a sense of Ereignis is to combine close 
reading with independent thought” (Polt, 2005: p.375). I want to own my response to the term, 
and my appropriation of the term to my own ends. In fact, given the spats in the secondary 
literature over owned-interpretations, I’m self-conscious of not owning the term; of, instead, 
bandying around Heideggerian language in the fashion of mere imitation and intellectual 
dandyism, distinct from responsible interpretation, especially when Heidegger himself spoke of 
                                                          
1 Besides Beiträge, the other two books in Heidegger’s complete edition (the Gesamtausgabe or GA) with Ereignis in the 
title are Das Ereignis and Zum Ereignis-Denken (GA 71 and 73 respectively, both as yet untranslated), as per Daniel 
Dahlstrom’s Heidegger Dictionary (2013). 
2 To my punning about “appropriate” and my usage of “properly” and “property,” it is worthwhile referencing in full a 
quote from Carol White, in one of her own instructive footnotes, who admirably captures the etymological characteristics 
of the ‘proper’ “eigen” language Heidegger is using when he writes about “Ereignis”. Says Carol White: “Heidegger is 
playing off ‘eigentlich’ (‘authentic’) and ‘eigen’ (‘own’), and many of his points tacitly appeal to the etymological 
connections of the ‘eigen’ words he uses. I am tempted to translate all the ‘eigen’-rooted words with terms related to 
‘proper,’ that is, to use ‘proper’ and ‘properly’ instead of ‘authentic’ and ‘authentically,’ ‘appropriate’ instead of ‘own,’ 
and ‘most proper’ instead of ‘ownmost’ (‘eigenst’). This would have the very distinct advantage of linking them all 
etymologically, both with each other and with ‘das Ereignis’ as ‘Appropriation,’ as they are in German” (White, 2005: 
p.40). Carol White continues, “[t]he proposed translation would also have the advantage of emptying words of all the 
meaning associated with authentic as the term has been used by other philosophers, psychologists, and assorted 
commentators…However, the usual translations of these terms are well entrenched…” (ibid). The ensuing discussion will 
reveal this entrenchment, though a position not without promise (see next footnote). 
3 Not only do I have no choice but to stick with the translated versions of Heideggers’ texts, given that English is, sadly, 
my only language: I will go on to claim that translations are perhaps the best way of grasping notoriously difficult concepts 
such as Ereignis. My interest in situating Heidegger alongside the conceptually sympathetic and parallel theme of 
European Romanticism – a movement for whom translation was essential – stems partly from, as Novalis says, the need 
for the translator to “be an artist himself and be able to produce the idea of the whole at will in one way or another” 
(Novalis, 1797-99: p.34). 
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how Ereignis was untranslatable (Heidegger, 1960: p.16-17). This has led, as Thomas Sheehan 
mentions, to the sad fact “that Heideggerian thinking has become a prisoner of its own hermetic 
jargon,” which leads him to say that “[a]s a result, practitioners of Heidegger discourse end up 
warbling to each other like a flock of narcissists” (Sheehan, 2013: p.382). This was a particularly 
pointed harangue of Hubert Dreyfus’, in his podcasted lecture series on Being and Time (Dreyfus, 
2007: “Philosophy 185” Heidegger), at fellow scholars ostensibly concerned in interpreting 
Contributions (Heidegger, 1999) but who, in his opinion, merely imitated his language. As Richard 
Polt warns, in his introduction to the concept Ereignis in the chapter of that title, in Hubert Dreyfus 
and Mark Wrathall’s A Companion to Heidegger (2005: p.375-391); 
if Heidegger is right that interpreting is the pursuit of a projected possibility rather than a 
disengaged staring at the given (SZ: 150), then we have to bring words and concepts of our 
own to bear on Heidegger’s texts – otherwise we are parroting instead of reading. However, 
these concepts continually have to be tested both against Heidegger’s own words and against 
‘the things themselves (SZ: 153)’ (Polt, 2005: p.375). 
 
Standing up to the issue of ownership, I draw two distinct conclusions from this observation of 
Richard Polt’s, regarding Ereignis, both of which will influence my strategy for reading this concept 
in this chapter: namely, that the act necessary to appreciating it is interpretation, distinct from 
“disengaged staring”; and that the act of interpretation itself is subjective, despite the appropriate 
correspondences against Heidegger’s texts. While somewhat underwhelming seeming conclusions, 
their simplicity will serve us well as straightforward entry points into the difficult concept that is 
Ereignis. 
 Before we turn properly to this business of elucidation of Ereignis, and by way of a loan to 
kick-start this enterprise, it’s constructive to remind ourselves of how critics of Heidegger’s thinking 
perceive his endeavours; principally, his subversion of our inherited Western metaphysical 
structures of thought with regards to understanding being, and, more importantly, in un-forgetting 
Being (properly, “be-ing”), as the opening injunction of Being and Time has it (Heidegger, 1962: 
p.1). A particularly damming criticism of Heidegger’s thinking comes from Jürgen Habermas, that 
arch critic of any and all attempts at a deconstruction of reason and metaphysics, who points out 
that “[t]he totalizing self-critique of reason gets caught in a performative contradiction, since 
subject-centred reason can be convicted of being authoritarian in nature only by having recourse 
to its own tools” (Habermas, 1987: quoted in Behler, 1990: p.132). Though, as we saw in the 
previous chapter, Heidegger was acutely aware of his explanatory failings of Being and Time in 
attempting to get beyond the language of Western metaphysics; so much so that he invented a 
new language in Contributions (Heidegger, 1999) to circumvent having to use the same “tools”. 
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Thus, Habermas’ critique is cruel, betraying a reluctance to engage with this new language. 
Nonetheless, he remarks of Heidegger’s method that he “flees from this paradox [of tool abuse] to 
the luminous heights of an esoteric, special discourse, which absolves itself of the restrictions of 
discursive speech generally and is immunized by vagueness against any specific objections” (ibid). 
Perhaps the reader has sympathy, at this stage, for such a basis of criticism. For, as we venture 
further into the intellectual territory of Ereignis, it will become apparent what Habermas is getting 
at, when Heidegger attempts to go beyond the history of being, beyond common language, even, 
and thereby “beyond everything that can be named by it”, as Derrida says of his own intellectual 
sponsor (Derrida, 1973: p.157: quoted in Behler, 1990: p.130); a thought which plays out in 
Derrida’s famous aphorism, “il n’y a pas de hors text” (there is no outside of a text) in On 
Grammatology (Derrida, 1974: p.158), where even he affirms that it is better to brave the text than 
look beyond it. So what is the transition point, I ask, between jargon and communication? What is 
at stake in this ‘beyond’? 
To talk allegorically for a moment, the particularly Gothic monster and sense of danger 
that is invoked and overspills from Heidegger’s dense texts, scurrying off into the dark undergrowth 
of the text’s own “beyond” as it were, is the marvellous-taken-as-fact and the marvellous-known-
to-be-fiction, as CS Lewis calls these equipment of the poets in The Allegory of Love (Lewis, 1936: 
p.103). Given Heidegger’s affinity with the poetry of Hölderlin (and Georg Trakl, for that matter) I 
cannot but conclude that Heidegger’s appreciation of Hölderlin came from the latter’s 
“enthusiastic” (Zweig, 2012: p.69) and “creative ecstasy” (ibid: p.71) that fully embraced the 
marvellous-taken-as-fact and the marvellous-known-to-be-fiction. It is in this poetic spirit that I 
offer my own Romantically inspired imaginings of my fictional character, Sanjay, and his fairy tale 
doppelganger, the potter king, as suitable equipment – because owned by me, as a bizarre-
seeming, but “ur-responsible,” interpretation – with which to appropriate Heidegger’s own 
thinking. 
This is where I find myself wanting to nullify Thomas Sheehan’s accusations of “warbling” 
and Jurgen Habermas’ negative impression of “luminous heights of an esoteric, special discourse” 
that Heidegger’s texts deliver. I want to own for myself his “immunized” method of vague and non-
discursive speech that seems beyond specific “objections,” not least with regards to his 
“explanation” of Ereignis. Not for any love of the man: yikes! But out of sheer admiration that he 
even attempted such a Romantically inspired deed in the way he does. For this is what I think it can 
be explained as: a “Romantic” form of execution, a Romantic form of interpretation, that bares all 
the hallmarks of his intellectual forbears of the Frühromantick, or early German Romantic 
philosophy; namely, Novalis (Hardenberg, Georg Philipp Friedrich von; 1672-1801), the Schlegel 
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brothers (August Wilhelm; 1767-1845: and his brother, Friedrich; 1772-1829), Schleiermacher 
(Friedrich Daniel Ernst; 1768-1834), and, Hölderlin (Friedrich; 1770-1843). As Frederick Beiser says 
of the growing scholarly interest in the philosophy of early German Romanticism: 
Many scholars are beginning to recognise that antifoundationalism, historicism, and 
hermeneutics had their origins not in the twentieth century – in thinkers like Heidegger, 
Wittgenstein, Gadamer or Dewey – but at the close of the eighteenth century in the reaction 
against the Aufklärung [Enlightenment] among the early romantic generation (Beiser, 2003: 
p.3). 
 
Frederick Beiser goes on to caution against the excesses of postmodernism – for the sake of which 
my identification with Romanticism may appear as an apology – which the early German Romantics 
cannot be accused of: 
It must be said, however, that the postmodernists have pushed their case too far, so that it 
has become one-sided and anachronistic. For in other important respects, the early German 
romantics continued with, and indeed radicalized, the legacy of the Enlightenment. They 
never lost their beliefs in the need for and value of self-restraint, criticism, and systematicity. 
They continued to believe in the desirability of Bildung, the possibility of progress, the 
perfectibility of the human race, and even the creation of the Kingdom of God on earth. While 
they were not so naïve to believe that we would actually achieve these ideals, they did hold 
we could, through constant striving, approach them (Beiser, 2003: p.4, emphasis in original). 
 
To those readers comfortable classing the movement as predominantly literary, with the above 
named figures “lost in the swells of passion and with a will guided by nothing more than the 
indulgences and excesses of the individual creative spirit, and so bent on the path of the 
destruction of reason and science,” as Elizabeth Milán-Zaibert parodies the common reception of 
the movement, in her foreword as translator to Manfred Frank’s The Philosophical Foundations of 
Early German Romanticism (Frank, 2004: p.1), this is not the Romanticism to which, I’m claiming, 
Heidegger is a direct descendent, and in terms of which his thinking receives a renewed poignancy 
in light of the machinating delinquencies of contemporary capitalism. Instead, with reference to 
the avowedly philosophic dimensions of a Frühromantick championed by Frederick Beiser (2002: 
2003: 2014), Ernst Behler (1990) and Manfred Frank (2004; 2014), it will not only be possible to 
frame Heidegger’s method as Romantic – with all the attendant affordances that the Romantic 
methods of irony, catachresis, allegory, metalepsis and ellipsis lend – but even to ascribe to his 
intent an appropriately political end. 
 Which brings us back to appropriation, and the site of this Romantic ascription: what of 
the luminous, esoteric and special discourse that is Heidegger’s notion of appropriation, of 
Ereignis?; what philosophical favours does it bestow on execution? And, where Friedrich Schlegel 
asserts that “[t]he highest good, and the source of everything useful, is Bildung” (Schlegel, 1958: 
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p.259: quoted in Beiser, 2003: p.26), and where Novalis puts forward the similar view that “[w]e 
are on a mission: we have been called upon for the education (Bildung) of the earth” (Novalis, 
1960-1988; p.427: quoted in Beiser, 2003: p.26)4, what educative sense can be made of Ereignis 
that allows me to execute on it? How do I own it? 
 
6.2 The Oscillating Event of Ereignis? 
By way of a preliminary scene setting, I see Ereignis as a formative “event,” formative in 
the raw Bildung sense5, and one spread over an indefinite duration. What is formed during that 
indistinct event is an appreciation of being, but an appreciation that is no longer assumed as a 
once-and-for-all, definitive and permanent, most general form of being; nor a sense of being which 
assumes an a-historical, non-temporal, or a-temporal logic. In the following I will outline a method 
which I think encourages a temporal appreciation of being, but a non-static appreciation; one 
based on a movement of appreciation of time as the meaning of being, as Heidegger presents time 
in Being and Time; a back-and-forth “sway” between our acknowledging our common and chronic 
senses of time, and a venturing into Kairotic senses of time, alternately. It is this method that will 
form the basis of the “event” so-called. To do all this, I will be drawing from Heidegger’s own words, 
from his Contributions especially (Heidegger, 1999), as well as comparing the approach he adopts 
against a similarly reciprocal approach put forward by Friedrich Schlegel in the 1790’s, as replayed 
by Manfred Frank in his (translated) lectures on early German Romantic philosophy (Frank, 2004: 
p.177-219): thereby to contrast Heidegger’s approach, and provide a means to judge its worth. The 
subject for the reader to have in mind as undertaking this peculiarly oscillating “event” is the 
familiar (though maybe less so by now) late-career executive in the autumn of their productivity. 
The preceding chapters have provided the thematic content of these temporal considerations, and 
it is to these that I refer the reader to assist with the foregoing. In order to establish some evidence 
for this so-called “oscillating” interpretation of Ereignis within the literature, I present two 
contrasting but sympathetic bases for understanding Ereignis; religious and artistic. That Heidegger 
drew on his personal religious convictions in his thinking, certainly of his early period, is undisputed 
                                                          
4 Frederick Beiser says of the term Bildung that it “is notoriously untranslatable. Depending on the context, it can mean 
education, culture, and development. It means literally ‘formation,’ implying the development of something potential, 
inchoate, and implicit into something actual, organized, and explicit. Sometimes the various connotations of the term 
join together to signify the educational process or product of acculturation, or the ethical process or product of self-
realization” (Beiser, 2003: p.26). Notice that Beiser’s reference to “self” is a step too far for Heidegger scholars, 
potentially bringing into question my troubling engagement with what critics could see as a dangerously subjectivised 
Romantisicm. Suffice to say, I acknowledge this criticism and Heidegger’s rejection of a subject-object dichotomy. See 
note 19 of the Introduction. 
5 See note 4 of this chapter. 
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(see, for instance, Kisiel, 1993): equally, his conviction in the distinctiveness of art, in the language 
of poetry, as complimentary to6 but ultimately in excess of philosophy, of his championing of “the 
fragile force of poetic language as that which pushes back against hard reality and pulls free of flat-
footed philosophy” (Critchley, 2014: p.13), is likewise well documented, though not un-questioned. 
My drastic vigor is applied here to, so to speak, rock the boat. If I’m going to talk about oscillating, 
I need to enact a movement of destabilisation, of getting what was hitherto in an ordered balance 
into a sway and some dis-order. 
 
6.2.1 A RELIGIOUS BASIS FOR EREIGNIS 
Heidegger had strong religious convictions throughout his life, claiming, as we saw 
previously, that he was “still really a theologian” (letter to Löwith; quoted in Kisiel, 1993: p.150). In 
this regard, referencing Kisiel’s Genesis (Kisiel, 1993), we see that Heidegger had a deep 
attachment to the religious writings of Schleiermacher, in particular to his On Religion: Speeches 
to Its Cultured Despisers (Schleiermacher, 1799: Richard Crouter, 1988), which is worth spending a 
while on as it offers an instructive justification for my ‘oscillating’ interpretation of Ereignis, whose 
details will follow. 
Schleiermacher regards all religious life to consist of two elements: “[1] that man surrender 
(hingebe) himself to the Universe7 and allow himself to be stirred by the side turned toward him, 
and [2] that he internally transmit this stirring, which is only one particular feeling, and incorporate 
it in the inner unity of this life and being. The religious life is nothing but the constant renewal of 
this process” (Schleiermacher, 1958: p.58; quoted in Kisiel, 1993: p.91).  Heidegger was certainly 
stirred by these words (Kisiel, 1993: p.72f, 78, 91, 100, 106, 112, 218), as am I. This accounts, I’m 
claiming, for how he expects us (you and me) to live under the event of Ereignis; to be similarly 
bathed in the universe, irradiated as it were, and to assimilate this wonder into the (Kairotic) time 
of our everyday (chronic) lives. In other words, we get on with our everyday lives by unifying this 
awe and wonder we’re bathed in into the tasks in front of us. Now, a less mystical way of saying 
                                                          
6 Stanley Cavell is interested in this close relationship between poetry and philosophy. Referencing Friedrich Schlegel’s 
call for a new relation between philosophy and literature (Schlegel, 1958: p.261; quoted in Frank, 2004: p.219), and 
reflecting on a climate of scepticism surrounding such an association, he says this: “I guess such remarks as ‘poetry and 
philosophy should be made one’ would not in themselves have been enough even in my day to have gotten one thrown 
out of most graduate programs in philosophy, but their presence, if used seriously, as a present ambition, would not 
have been permitted to contribute to a Ph.D. study either; and like vestigial organs, such ideas may become inflamed 
and life-threatening” (Cavell, 1989: p.4-6; quoted in Frank, 2004: p.8). An insightful, though rather worrying precedent, 
given my own attempt in this thesis to mess with the (potentially) pathogenic cocktail of fictional literature, philosophy, 
and capitalism. 
7 The seditious, revolutionary, or at least enthusiastic, tone that Schleiermacher adopts in his Speeches (1799: in Crouter, 
1988) is somewhat hidden in our reading today. 
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this – and let’s face it, not everyone is appreciative of the elisions (the intentional gaps left to be 
filled by the reader), and can stomach the metalepses (e.g. “wonder” as a metonym for surrender) 
of the mystic’s lexicon – is that although be-ing lies hidden and forgotten within (metaphysical) 
being, be-ing still can’t be thought from out of that forgotten-ness, that place and time of hiding, 
our everyday dealings in the world. Instead, be-ing (and with it, Kairotic time) must be thought 
from out of itself, which, nonetheless can only be within our worldly (chronic) state of affairs. This 
begs a series of questions; “How are we supposed to unhide be-ing?,” and “Where are we getting 
this other view of being from, anyway?”: not to mention the questions, “Is anything actually being 
said here?,” and, if there is, “Why can’t this be said more straightforwardly?”. Let me share with 
you what I believe to be Heidegger’s equivalent articulation to Schleiermacher’s, one composed in 
May 1919 as part of a letter to Elisabeth Blochmann (with whom he corresponded on matters 
Schleiermachian). The piece comes from the instructive Genesis of Heidegger’s Being and Time of 
Kisiel (Kisiel, 1993). My purpose in presenting this quote is to offer it as a basis of what perhaps 
might just be a more straightforward articulation of Ereignis; though this was not Kisiel’s immediate 
intention, where instead he offered it into his text as an background to his summary of Heidegger’s 
“religious phenomenology” (ibid: p.112-113). Thinking back to Schleiermacher’s injunction to 
incorporate the “surrender” into the “inner unity of this life and being,” and speaking of how one 
should “attune” one’s life to the ebbs and peaks, Heidegger writes that this requires; 
inner humility before the mystery and grace of life. We must be able to wait for the high-
pitched intensities of meaningful life, and we must remain in continuity with such gifted 
moments, not so much to enjoy them as to work them into life, to take them with us in the 
onrush of life and to include them in the rhythms of all oncoming life. And in moments when 
we immediately feel ourselves and are attuned to the direction in which we vitally belong, 
we cannot merely establish and simply record what is clearly had, as if it stood over against 
us like an object. The understanding self-possession is genuine only when it is lived, when it 
is at once a Being. I do not mean by this the triviality that one must also follow what one 
knows. Rather, in a vehement life, becoming aware of one’s directedness, which is not 
theoretical but a total experience, is at once entering into it with gusto (Schwung), the 
propagation of a new momentum through and in very movement of life (Heidegger, 1919, 
quoted in Kisiel, 1993: p. 112-113). 
 
What stands out for me from this enthusiastic quote is the “ebb-and-flow-ness” between 
acknowledging some feeling of ecstasy, of being “attuned to the direction in which we vitally 
belong,” and living that ecstasy by incorporating these moments into “the onrush of life”. Even a 
sceptic – one not disposed to believe that there is such a Kairotic ecstasy to be received, or one 
willing to reluctantly permit such a revelation on condition of its purely cognitive or neuroscience 
grounds, or one only content with shifting the register of this whole quote’s sentiment towards 
meaning and new lucidities of meaning – would still be willing to acknowledge that something 
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Heidegger is talking about is somehow incorporated (enthusiatically) into one’s life, and that this 
passing on, this gifting, is continued, in a back-and-forth fashion. This reciprocity, this accepting 
with grace and passing on via one’s living, is what I’m keen for the reader to focus on, at this point. 
 Before I say more about how this reciprocity of senses of being – for that is what Heidegger 
is talking about with Elizabeth Blochmann – slides into a corresponding reciprocity of senses of 
time,  let me say more about the source of this sense of “high-pitched intensities of meaningful 
life”. For this I will use a quote from Friedrich Schlegel which provides a ground to the mystical-
seeming Kairotic frequencies that Heidegger is attuned to, and perhaps what we also are attuned 
to but just don’t realise. The quote is re-presented in a lecture by Manfred Frank, who is keen to 
understand the Romantic Movement’s artistically and subjectively inspired notion of feeling. As we 
can see from Heidegger’s Blochmann quote, he too talks in terms of feeling, or “the understanding 
self-possession,” of feeling ourselves attuned, and it is this that I have in mind in reading the 
following. Says Manfred Frank, of Schlegel, writing about this feeling; 
Self-feeling (Selbst-Gefühl) (or ‘Self-consciousness’), adds Schlegel, delivers ‘[insofar as it is] 
related to knowledge, […only] the certainty of something incomprehensible’… According to 
Schlegel: 
The puzzle of self-feeling which always accompanies us, is also indeed the reason 
why thoughtful people are put into doubt by philosophers who try to explain 
everything. They feel certain (even if perhaps they cannot express this) that there 
exists something incomprehensible; that they themselves are incomprehensible 
(Schlegel, 1958: p.331; quoted in Frank, 2004: p186). 
 
While hardly appeasing to a hard core empiricist or materialist, I think this Schlegel quote nicely 
calibrates our appreciation of what Heidegger was referring to when he spoke of “inner humility 
before the mystery and grace of life”. Even given its awkward, adolescent-tinged, anxiety about 
never being fully understood, this puzzle of self-feeling translates well into relatively common 
spiritual sentiments, expressed in the canon of most of the world’s major religions. This ties back 
to Charles Taylor’s conviction, discussed in the previous chapter, about how the contemporary 
process of secularisation “has no place for unproblematic breaks with a [sacred] past which is 
simply left behind us” (Taylor, 2007: p.772), and which renders “homogenized” or chronic time as 
the only conceivable sense of time available. This, however, leaves us with another area to explore; 
namely the “us” of the previous sentence; the extent to which the something which beckons us – 
the universe, let’s say, from Schleiermacher’s quote – is best described in terms of a subject-object 
relation. 
Before I introduce Schlegel’s understanding of subjectivism – which is of the idealist and 
the Fichtean absolute “I” variety, and which I will use as a get-out clause for when Heidegger’s lack 
of clarity lands his whole enterprise of temporality in trouble with William Blattner (Blattner, 1999) 
Part Two: Sublimely Kairotic 
 
- 148 - 
 
as we will see in the concluding chapter – it is worth appreciating the subject-object relation of 
Ereignis a little better. 
The temptation – certainly given the Blochmann quote, and to an extent the Schlegel quote 
– is to phrase the something in terms of an “object,” and to phrase my appreciating, receiving (and, 
who knows, living) of that something in terms of a “subject”: hence the putative subject-object 
relation. But this is completely wrong for Heidegger; wrong because of the metaphysical baggage 
this conception carries, and wrong because this betrays a substantive being-oriented, or presence-
oriented, understanding of being. This means he has no alternative but to find some other way to 
portray the gift given by the grace he was describing in that quote. To remain true to the 
metaphysical frame-breaking job he’s signed up to do, he has to change the relationship between 
the knower and the known: that relationship must undergo a transformation from subject-object 
to something else; which for Heidegger emerges in the mode of discourse about owning one’s own 
being, or Dasein, or enowning be-ing, or simply enowning, and which is the complete purpose of 
Ereignis. Hence, and by way of re-cap, on the very first page of Contributions, Heidegger says “[i]t 
is no longer a case of talking ‘about’ something and representing something objective, but rather 
of being owned over into enowning” (Heidegger, 1999) – we came across this elliptical quote 
earlier, before we had the time to make any sense of it (if the reader can make any sense of this). 
Listen out, because this is where the meaning of Ereignis comes. He continues: “[t]his amounts to 
an essential transformation of the human from ‘rational animal’ (animal rationale) to Da-sein. Thus 
the proper title says: From Enowning” (ibid: p.3, emphasis in original). In essence, this 
transformation from a subject-object understanding – of a subject standing over against an object 
– to “enowning” is what Contributions is all about, and effectively nails the definition of Ereignis. 
Though hardly… As a ta-da! moment for revealing Ereignis, it falls a little flat, it must be 
said. Maybe that’s because we’re so immured in our metaphysical way of thinking that we’re just 
not ready to see it? Or maybe it’s because the resources available to Heidegger, to express this 
novel way of getting around the subject-object relation, were not up to the job; or that he didn’t 
call on a sufficiently diverse range of resources to aid his cause? His recourse to the Romantic 
poetry of Hölderlin and the call of this last embodiment of German Hellenism; his wish to draw 
from this poetic tradition, to summon Hölderlin’s evocative and classically tinged invocations to 
battle the finite bounds of mundane existence with the un-remunerative, un-productive and un-
realistic forces of poetry, becomes completely understandable in this regard. Only, I’m not sure if 
even this draw of Hölderlin’s creativity was up to the enormity of the task Heidegger had set his 
philosophy; of stopping the apparently unstoppable army of metaphysical barbarians hammering 
at the gates. Though, it’s in light of the urgency lent by this “sacking” metaphor that the question 
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of alternative supporting resources, of art in general, say, takes on a renewed relevance. This will 
be my conclusion, but it will take the rest of this chapter to build the case for a consideration of so-
called art in general becoming the most suitable supporting resource, even with an emergency 
draft of the supremely qualified massed ranks of the Romantic Movement in support. 
 
6.2.2 THE TEMPORAL ASPECTS OF EREIGNIS 
Throughout this thesis, when it comes to regarding being or be-ing, my interest has been 
in transposing every being sense that we come across in Heidegger into the corresponding time 
sense, given that time is the horizon of being. This has been an implicit process, and usually not a 
process at all in the preceding; simply one of those Romantic elisions that hand the task of 
transposition and interpretation over to the reader. I have to say that I feel self-conscious in this 
act of transposing, only because I’ve come across very few similar efforts to give me sufficient 
confidence; very few persistent treatments of the purely “time” components of Heidegger’s dyad 
of being and time (with the exception of William Blattner). If this venture into temporality was 
“uncharted territory” for Heidegger, as William Blattner’s concluding remark has it (Blattner, 1999: 
p.310), then it is for me too. 
There are multiple explanations for my anxiety regarding this act of transposing. Firstly, 
the fact that Heidegger’s overall project of Being and Time was never finished. Secondly, that he 
himself realised the argumentative failure of the temporal aspect of this project. Thirdly, that this 
admission lead to a general scepticism amongst the academic community, a doubt that anything 
of significant philosophical value can be extracted from his shaky lines of argument. Fourthly, a 
feeling – for that is all it need be – that such a project is too transcendental. Admittedly, these need 
only amount to easily dismissible impressions, especially since I will continue to lobby for the 
usefulness of an analysis of the order-execution cognate using this focus on the time component 
of Heidegger’s dyad. The confidence I do have is in the negative utility of my project. Not so much 
the absence of any perceivable, or conceivable, usefulness attributable to the project of “using” 
Heideggerian temporality as a framework to analyse the order-execution cognate in executive 
education; rather, the utility that that absence itself confers. This is a form of subversion of a so-
called principle of utility: where extrinsic value is a measure of the extent to which the 
consequences of something, or its relations, can be instrumental for whichever subsequent 
purpose or profit. Mine is a tempered utility, however, in as much as I’m still interested in how the 
project of “using” Heideggerian temporality (as a framework to analyse the order-execution 
cognate in executive education) plays out philosophically and pedagogically: the subversion comes 
Part Two: Sublimely Kairotic 
 
- 150 - 
 
from disrupting the standard associations of utility (with the notion of instrumentality indexed-out 
in the context of business as increasing profits, performance, cost-reduction, efficiency, market-
share, growth, etc.) with a consequent disruption to the standard conceptions of orthodox 
executive pedagogy. In that regard this subversion is political, in that it subverts the prevailing 
order, the capitalist orthodoxy. I think Heidegger’s Contributions (Heidegger, 1999) is an active 
demonstration of this sort of subversion, though he’s not calling it political; a sort of subversion 
that I think is the role of time to carry out, in the context of the new, and politicised, event of 
Bildung for the executive, not to mention a redeemed purpose for executive education generally. 
I push my tame Gothic monsters of the marvellous-taken-as-fact and the marvellous-known-to-be-
fiction to the front of the protest to act as mascots of this disruption. 
What I understand Contributions (Heidegger, 1999) to be actively demonstrating is a mode 
of philosophical discourse that itself becomes the central philosophical theme. As Hans Ruin 
explains it, this central philosophical theme “should no longer speak about something, so as to 
represent it, because when it speaks in such a way, or rather when it understands its purpose along 
these lines, then it will only reproduce a representational objectifying discourse in which the 
forgetfulness of being is enacted yet again” (Ruin, 2005: p.365, emphasis in original). The only way 
to avoid becoming bemired in this way of thinking is to live the event of Ereignis, over and over 
again: to own-up to owning, as it were, via one’s living, a non-objectified way of being, which is 
Dasein pure and simple. If you remember, John Haugeland defined Dasein as a “way of living that 
embodies an understanding of being” (Haugeland, 2013: p.81-82); this fits nicely with how 
Heidegger expects us to view Ereignis, as this way of living in Dasein, as a continual act of 
appropriating – almost as an act of converting – our objectified and metaphysical sense of being 
with a non-objectified sense of being, not once-and-for-all but continually. And it’s with this 
thought that my temporal interpretation of Ereignis is presented. 
Returning to our subject for a moment – the world of the executive – the being-in-the-
world of the executive consists of the time they’re involved with (caring for8) the sequencing-out 
all of the orders – the standing orders, the received orders, the self-imposed orders, the self-
generating orders – they’re executing against. Assuming part of their time involves guiding and 
developing others in receiving and executing against these orders, let’s also assume that part of 
that time allocation is involved in developing, in educating, themselves in improving that order-
execution sequence. What would an education in Ereignis for the executive consist in, given that 
he or she must suspend their standard subject-object distinctions, and resist objectifying their time, 
                                                          
8 As Heidegger itallicises in the crucial §65 of Being and Time, “Temporality reveals itself as the meaning of authentic 
care” (Heidegger, 1962: p.374). 
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as Heidegger’s anti-metaphysical warrant has it? If the subject of the executive should no longer 
be viewed as standing over against the object of their care, be that either the order or the means 
of its execution; and if at the time in/during/at/through which their care9 is manifest should not be 
regarded as an object, or in any way objectified – like I just did with my lazy litany of 
in/during/at/through – then what remains? Referring to our earlier discussion of world collapse in 
the chapter on death, coming out of an acknowledgement of the groundlessness of our daily 
projects, I spoke about “project-less projection” as a consequence of an acceptance of that 
groundlessness, and of how it is possible to have no specific projects onto which to act out one’s 
projection into the future, but to persist with that projection anyway. I proffered the concomitant 
locution “execution-less execution” as that project-less state. This is what remains of the executive 
after applying Heidegger’s strident anti-metaphysical critique embodied in the living of Da-sein in 
Ereignis: execution-less execution. As a residue, what appears to emerge from the process of boiling 
off, as it were, all the metaphysical liquids is the time of execution: the horizon only in terms of 
which the being of the executive has meaning at all. So, to avoid becoming bemired in this 
objectified way of thinking, pace Haugeland, one should practice a way of living that embodies an 
understanding of time, if one is to grasp Ereignis. 
As I mentioned earlier, in grappling with Ereignis, one is exerting perhaps the most exotic 
philosophical effort of imagination one will ever have to muster with Heidegger’s work. Hopefully, 
the method by which I’m suggesting one practice a living that embodies an understanding of time, 
one that serves to convert that imaginative effort into praxis, is one relatively unburdened by the 
exoticness of its theory at least. As I alluded to at the start of this section, the method involves a 
back-and-forth sway between the executive acknowledging his or her common metaphysical 
senses of time, and being exposed to non-metaphysical senses of time, alternately. In order to 
establish a little distance between my idiosyncratic interpretation and Heidegger’s own elliptical 
statements of Ereignis, I have been calling these two senses of time chronic and Kairotic 
respectively. It is this differentiation, and the oscillation between these two types of time, that I 
claim as a method10 by which to practice a way of living that embodies an understanding of time, 
and which the event of executive education can model. I will conclude that executive education is 
the mode of experience for the executive in which Kairotic time comes to appearance, if fleetingly. 
 
                                                          
9 See footnote 8 
10 This claim is partly based on Felix Ó Murchadha’s book The Time of Revolution (2013) where he introduces the Kairos 
and Chronos distinctions in Heidegger’s senses of time. I came across this book towards the end of my research, after I’d 
begun to draw out my own distinction between sequential and non-sequential senses of time in Heidegger, using similar 
nominations to Ó Murchadha’s. His book was both a heartening and heart-breaking find, ratifying my own work at the 
same time as precipitating much re-writing. 
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6.3 Temporal Ereignis as the Oscillation between Chronic and Kairotic Time 
Etymologically, “chronic” comes from the Latin “chronicus,” and the Greek “chronikós,” which is 
equivalent to “chrónos,” or time. The meaning centres around time; as in something continuing 
over a long period of time or constancy, as in describing a “chronic liar”; or the suffering of 
something, often a disease, over a long period of time, as in “chronic illness”. In classical mythology, 
Chronos is the personification of time and origin of the sequential time measurement of 
chromometry – time keeping – and the figure of “father time”. In the case of Kairotic11 or καιρός, 
or Kairos, we have to turn to the ancient Greeks to understand where the term comes from: they 
used the term to denote the right or “opportune moment,” given that Kairos names an ancient 
Greek god who personified opportunity (see the Oxford Classical Dictionary entry for “Kairos”), 
where “Ion…of Chios…called him the youngest son of Zeus (i.e. Opportunity is god-sent)” (ibid). In 
ancient Greek literature, “Kairos also encompasses time (differentiated from Chronos) and the 
seasons” (ibid.). In Christian theology, Kairos also refers to the time when God acts, for example, 
“the Kairos is fulfilled” (Mark 1.15). As far as I am aware, Heidegger himself did not use these terms 
to describe time. The only relevant reference to Kairotic time I can find is that of Theodore Kisiel, 
who uses it frequently to describe “a phenomenological chronology” (Kisiel, 1993: p.421), and who 
acknowledges that Heidegger himself “did not invoke” the term (ibid); and Charles Taylor, who 
likewise calls on it to describe a carnivalesque type of time as “kairotic: that is, the time line 
encounters kairotic knots, moments whose nature and placing calls for reversal, followed by others 
demanding rededication, and others still which approach Parousia: Shrove Tuesday, Lent, Easter” 
(Taylor, 2007: p.54). As such, I feel confident having ascribed these two appropriate terms to 
denote two distinct types of time relevant to a reciprocal appreciation of the new event of 
executive education. 
Chronic time is straightforwardly introduced, and has featured throughout this thesis as 
our standardly conceived temporal reckoning associated with conceptions of our own death, 
anxiety and boredom. In terms of the figure of the corporate executive, it’s easily parodied by 
referring to their headlong dash through their days, between sequencing-out meetings, multiple 
executions and rounds of major decision making, or strategic projections. While such a parody is 
not altogether fair, nor exclusive to the figure of the executive for that matter, the straightforward 
– or as Heidegger would call it, “ordinary time” (Heidegger, 1962: p.278) or vulgar – treatment of 
time is taken as a measured sequence of “nows,” with its Aristotelian pedigree, as we’ve seen. The 
seeming pride with which our technologically enframed culture is often breathlessly described as 
                                                          
11 See footnote 25 of Chapter 2 of this thesis 
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“always on,” “24/7,” and “driven by the clock” all find a natural resonance in the “time is money” 
aphorism of the (parodied) executive, where monetary equivalence is tied to an exclusively chronic 
sense of time. This chronic sense of time is our common temporal sense. As the prevailing chapters 
have illustrated, this temporal sense is our (proper) metaphysical inheritance, a sense of time we’re 
happy conceiving as objectified, over against which stands the counter force of Kairotic time. In 
that regard, the balance of effort to conceive of the two senses of time is decidedly asymmetric in 
favour of the chronic sense. But true to my mission of acknowledging new orders of time for the 
executive, this overwhelming temporal asymmetry is chronic, in the disease sense of that term. 
Our present, technological, or modern, epoch is an embodiment of how we have forgotten the 
essence of being, corresponding with a complete forgotten-ness of the essence of time. In the case 
of time, this forgotten-ness is chronic in our present epoch of “blank duration” (Auerbach, 2003: 
p.12), where Heidegger designates an epoch as the period through which being, and hence time, 
is “held back” (Heidegger, 2002: p.265), or “levelled off” (Heidegger, 1962: p.377), resulting in our 
dis-eased condition. It is conceivable this dis-ease could be appropriated, generally speaking, to 
account for the societal ills of suffering under delinquent capitalism, or all-pervading neoliberal 
ideology, with its unrelenting efforts to create markets out of everything: though, speaking 
generally, an ascription to such a strange-seeming cause of dis-ease with our current epoch would 
be too vague, too depersonalised, to stand up to scrutiny. Instead, specifically and chronically 
speaking, any constancy of disaffection with our current condition, I’m suggesting, is more usefully 
appropriable to our singular, and singularly inadequate, sense of time; chronic time. My hope is 
that the preceding chapters have given you – perhaps on behalf of our fictional executive, Sanjay 
– a reason to believe in a different sense of time, one which encourages executive educators (at 
least) to conceive of a braking (breaking?) manoeuvre on our ordered and sequential sense of 
chronic time, one which acknowledges the possibility of a deceleration from the headlong market-
speed of the executives involved in personalised (not generalised) executions of capitalism and 
neoliberalism, to a different order/rank of temporal conception altogether.  
In parallel to an earlier claim about the political nature of subversions of utility, this 
subversion of our standard chronological conception of chronic time is also a political act. Calling 
into question and actively disrupting the prevailing ordered sequentially of time has, if you stretch 
it a little, connotations of sedition, not to mention a disturbing (for the prevailing order) comfort 
with disorder. I’m not attributing this particular political agenda to Heidegger: he has his own 
disastrous political legacy overshadowing his reputation (which, in a sense, injects added poignancy 
to my making a political connection here). But I am, unexceptionally, attributing to him a sense of 
time which Heidegger would rather we did not hold back or level-off from: this is “primordial time” 
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first developed in Being and Time (Heidegger, 1962: p.377) and only inferred in Contributions 
(Heidegger, 1999). In my own act of owning (enowning) Ereignis, as a consequence of my earlier 
promise to execute my own interpretation of Ereignis, I’m equating Heidegger’s “primordial” time 
with what Ó Murchadha and myself are calling Kairotic time. 
For an understanding of the Kairotic sense of time – one that opens an acknowledgement, 
an un-hiding of this proper, or owned, sense of time – we need to have in mind my discussion of 
the religious basis for Ereignis stated earlier, and to Heidegger’s appreciation of Schleiermacher’s 
two-sided nature of religious feeling. As Schleiermacher has it, in the act of “surrender” to the 
“universe”12, there is a side of us which faces the universe, and a side of us turned away from it to 
our everyday lives. Heidegger, broadly speaking (see Kisiel, 1993: p.429-439), parses this division 
as one between the “ontological” and the “ontic”; although, in the Blochmann quote, this 
distinction is rendered as between a feeling of ecstasy, of being “attuned to the direction in which 
we vitally belong,” and living that ecstasy by incorporating these moments into “the onrush of life” 
(ibid: p.112-113). My interpretation of Kairotic time stands as that former ecstatic sense, as 
ontological in nature, in distinction to chronic time in the “onrush of life” as the everyday ontic 
sense of time. The point that both Schleiermacher and Heidegger make in the quotes provided is 
that these two sides – the ontological and the ontic – together constitute “the direction in which 
we vitally belong,” with neither one coming before the other, in a chronological or sequential 
sense, nor one being more important than the other. My interest in the event of education, of the 
temporal sense of Ereignis, is how it is possible to alternate between these two sides: at one 
moment, being resolutely focused on the Kairotic side facing the “universe,” and at the other 
moment incorporating that resoluteness into the chronic time of our everyday, into particular 
situations, and then back again; alternating between the ontological and ontic, and back to the 
ontological, thence to the ontic, and so on. Says Kisiel of this distinction and implied reciprocity; 
“Kairological time is the empowering milieu by which resolution, the ultimate ontic thrust of 
resoluteness, can find the way to its temporally particular situation” (Kisiel, 1993: p.437). Only via 
our (finite) ontic situation, our temporally particular situation which we find ourselves in moment 
by moment, can we make sense of our (eternal) ontological existence. Our so-called moment by 
moment ontic existence presupposes a primordial time that in no way limits our possible senses of 
ecstasy of the ontological limitless moment. Later, I will illustrate a mode of this oscillation between 
chronic and Kairotic senses of time, and suggest this as a valid form of educative care – in the true 
Heideggerian temporal sense of care – in the context of our dis-eased epochal condition, especially 
in light of our impending death. 
                                                          
12 See footnote 7 of this chapter for what “universe” denotes. 
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6.4 Heidegger’s Romantic Temporal Irony 
At the very real risk of tumbling off into Heidegger space, and needing to be mindful of anti-
Heidegger criticisms previously encountered – of “warbling” within the “luminous heights” of a 
closed and esoteric special discourse – I would like to anchor this bizarre talk of types of time in 
something more down to earth; in irony, or in Romantic irony13, to be precise. Not quite as far as 
suggesting Heidegger was simply jesting in all his talk of time: that he didn’t really mean it, that he 
was, for some reason, just being ironic, where here ironic can mean that one was only joking. It 
would be impudent to suggest, given his career-long engagement with time as a central theme to 
his work, that he was joking and in fact meant the exact opposite of what all his talk of time 
indicated. Such a flat denial is not the point I’m making about irony. Instead, I claim there is a valid 
current of what I formally identify as Romantic irony running through his primordial temporality 
sense of time – and through my Kairotic sense of time – one which I think strengthens the case for 
its usefulness, since by treating primordial temporality as an exercise in irony one at least is thrown 
down a challenge by which to disentangle the contradistinction between the terms opposed. In his 
The Concept of Irony (1841) Søren Kierkegaard explains irony thus: “In oratory, for example, there 
frequently appears a figure of speech with the name of irony and the characteristic of saying the 
opposite of what is meant. Already here we have a quality that permeates all irony – namely, that 
the phenomenon is not the essence but the opposite of the essence” (Kierkegaard, 1989). More 
than just opposition, irony also grants freedom, as Kierkegaard goes on to explain: 
If I next consider the speaking subject, I once again have a qualification that permeates all 
irony – namely, the subject is negatively free. When I am aware as I speak that what I am 
saying is what I mean and that what I have said adequately expresses my meaning, and I 
assume that the person to whom I am talking grasps my meaning completely, then I am 
bound in what has been said – that is, I am positively free therein…I am also bound with 
respect to myself and cannot free myself any time I wish. If, however, what I said is not my 
meaning or the opposite of my meaning, then I am free in relation to others and to myself 
(Kierkegaard, 1989: quoted in Prickett, et al, 2014: p.291). 
While there is much to discuss in Kierkegaard’s remark that is beyond the scope of my survey, this 
notion of “freedom through irony” resonates strongly with Heidegger, and, as I will elaborate in 
the concluding chapter, this freedom can be redeemed when one grants oneself freedom from 
                                                          
13 In keeping with my continued references to the movement of (predominantly) German Romanticism as scaffolding, so 
to speak, by which one gains better access to Heidegger’s thought, I invoke the standardly received Romantic notion of 
irony (see Nicholas Saul, 2009: A Cambridge Companion to German Romanticism). In terms of a convenient artistic 
periodization, this movement’s concerted and well known emphasis on irony as a means to promote an awareness of 
the contrast between ideality and reality; as a means to promote an avoidance of fixity and its consequences; as a 
paradox defining the means of true understanding; all of these senses of irony centre around the movements’ attempts 
at encompassing the infinite with the finite. It is with this last sense in mind that I employ the term as a parallel descriptor 
of Heidegger’s pairing of the ontological with the ontic, and my humble analogue of the educative means of playing 
Kairotic time off against chronic time. 
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chronic time, in favour of Kairotic time: one has the freedom, via the negative freedom Kierkegaard 
describes, to live within irony and to suspend sequential time, and to act from the non-sequential 
moment of vision, Kairotic time. I will come on to call this method “ironic productivity” in the 
conclusion.  
This freedom is also evident in Manfred Frank’s definition of Romantic irony, when he 
invokes irony as a means to bolster Romantic philosophy’s “yearning for infinity,” as Friedrich von 
Schlegel deems the purpose of philosophy (Schlegel, 1804: quoted in Frank, 2014: p.24). Says 
Frank: 
 
Something is uttered ironically when the way of saying it neutralizes the determinateness of 
the content, brings it into suspense, or sets in motion a withdrawal from it in favour of an 
infinity of options that might as well have been uttered in its place. Ironic speech keeps open 
the irrepresentable location of the infinite by permanently discrediting the finite as that 
which is not intended (Frank, 2014: p.24). 
 
 
This describes admirably the purpose of what Heidegger calls his method of “formal indication”14. 
By viewing Heidegger’s arch concept of time, primordial temporality, in this ironic way, notice is 
served on how we standardly determine chronological time, bringing chronic conceptions of time 
into the type of suspense that I (and Ó Murchadha) are calling Kairotic. This suspension of sense, 
this method of neutralisation through Romantic irony, in the manner of Manfred Frank, not only 
predates Heidegger’s formal indication, but its useful substitution better articulates the 
ontological-ontic ebb-and-flow between chronological and Kairological senses of time. Crucially for 
my argument, the employment of Romantic irony allows me to cross-fertilize Heidegger’s thinking 
about temporality with the Romantic’s thinking about infinity, and the role of reflections on the 
finite in bringing us closer to infinity. A compelling set of similarities are already in place to link the 
two strands of thought: divinities and man, infinities and finitudes, heaven and earth, ontological 
and ontic, Kairotic and chronic, the universe and our every-day lives. For this flip-flop between the 
infinite and the finite Fred Rush also uses the term “oscillate”. Quoting Friedrich von Schlegel, he 
claims that “[p]erhaps the most famous characterization involves the idea that the ironist 
‘oscillates’ between or ‘hovers’ over… self-creation…and self-annihilation” (Rush, 2006: p.181). I 
am claiming that this same oscillation is detectable in Heidegger, between Kairotic and chronic 
senses of time. 
Romantic irony also serves as a form of freedom: to free us up to consider how else 
existential phenomena can be given to us. Freedom through irony resonates strongly with all of 
                                                          
14 See footnote 5 in chapter 4 for more details of formal indication as a method. 
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Heidegger’s senses of freedom15, all of them related to the freedom for be-ing which Dasein 
fundamentally enjoys. In particular, in Basic Concepts (Heidegger, 1993), he talks about a particular 
realm of freedom, one where “the historical human stands out into an open, while subordinating 
everything needed and useful to it” (ibid: p.4f), indicating a type of freedom that liberates us (the 
executive) from the demands of utility. As Daniel Dahlstrom puts it, paraphrasing Heidegger in 
Basic Questions (ibid), “[w]e are handed over to this freedom in the thinking that lets be known 
that there is something that need not be productive or useful in order to be” (Dahlstrom, 2013: 
p.80). Now, I have to ask here, is Heidegger being ironic? Is his a positive freedom? Or do his 
meaning utterances – about time in particular – indicate the exact opposite of what is stated, 
thereby absolving him of any obligation to his audience, freeing him from any bond, and thereby 
releasing him to a negative freedom? One could argue for and against this positively bounded 
freedom at length. To short circuit such a discussion, my claim is that this liberating sense of 
freedom can be viewed as both ironic and transformatively so, and this has to do with the style of 
his writing. 
A recurring theme throughout this thesis has been the manner in which Heidegger has said 
what he has said, or usually, written in the manner in which he has written. In this regard, the 
“medium” of what has been said has been just as prominent as the “what” of what has (actually) 
been said. There’s nothing especially unusual with this particularly “mediumistic”16 observation 
about Heidegger, not given his famous interest in language: this, in fact, accounts for the very many 
departure points from Heidegger’s written thought into postmodern literary theory. Mine is a 
departure point in the same vein; in my case, drawing attention to the educative and formative (in 
the Bildung sense of formative) impact of Heidegger’s medium of words on the executive educatee. 
The rationale for my own departure point is as follows. When the overriding temptation is to mine 
                                                          
15 Despite Heidegger himself identifying five types of freedom (Heidegger, 1985.b: p.82-83, 88), Daniel Dahlstrom (2013: 
p.76f) categorises four main types of “freedom” in Heidegger’s work: existential, transcendental, liberating, and 
philosophical. Broadly speaking, in existential freedom, Dasein always has the freedom to choose to be itself, to be either 
authentic or inauthentic. In transcendental freedom, only by transcending beings in terms of the world is Dasein able to 
relate to them and to itself. Liberating freedom is a release from the sheltering of be-ing, a liberation from the idea that 
for something to be it has to be productive. And by philosophical freedom Heidegger is referring to a form of philosophical 
questioning, non-metaphysical in nature, which allows Dasein’s essence to emerge from beneath the cover of obscurity 
by which traditional philosophical questioning has traditionally disregarded the question of being. While all of these 
senses of freedom are relevant to aspects of my argument, the “liberation” sense of freedom is the one most pertinent 
to my point about the temporality of irony. 
16 Rene Arcilla, speaking about the “medium” of specifically modernist art, which often emphasises that with which it is 
composed – distinct from non-modernist art which can be said, simplistically, to have subverted attention away from the 
medium to that which the art supposedly “conveys” – says “that modernist art is not ultimately about medium, but 
establishes, via the stress on medium, the priority of the experience of existence, of our strangerhood, to given practical 
considerations” (Arcilla, 2010: p.47, my emphasis). The argument of his book Mediumism (Arciila, 2010) attempts to 
highlight the educational benefits that specifically existential considerations of the medium of modernist art in particular 
have on the student in the midst of their consumerist lives. I share this educative emphasis on the “medium,” in this 
case, of Heidegger’s philosophy. Arcilla attempts to broker his existential enlightenment via a contradistinction via art as 
an “object,” whereas I’m attempting to do it via a closer consideration of “non-objectified time”. 
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Heidegger’s texts for meaning, rather than simply enjoy the process of reading his texts for the 
transformative potential that reading offers, I suggest the longstanding literary device of Romantic 
irony is a congruent, and familiar, means to execute this alternate sense of meaning. Once granted 
freedom from what Joshua Landy calls “the meaning mongers,” (Landy, 2012: p.8) via irony, the 
process of reading and interpretation become dangerous at last; conventions are ripe for 
overturning, the prevailing order suddenly becomes questionable, and the ineluctable order-
execution can finally withstand subversion; but where, above all, the acts of reading, interpretation 
and subversion have to be owned. When Heidegger’s talk of temporality is considered as ironic, 
every interpretation is up for grabs; every means of ascribing a truth value to what has suddenly 
become non-propositional content is merely of secondary importance to owning – of grasping, 
seizing, of standing for, of eigen17, or Ereignis  – that interpretation to which one commits, and by 
which one can form oneself. This is dangerous talk indeed. There is a name for the class of these 
dangerous texts of the formative type I’m describing: fiction. We normally expect the direct 
instructional utility of a text to be granted via the outright rejection of the status of that text as 
fiction: that in order to save a text from utter futility in an instructional context such as normalised 
executive education, it usually needs to be denied any non-propositional, fictional, basis. Not so, 
I’m saying, for a new order of executive education based on a Heideggerian notion of temporal 
sequence. The manifold senses of order here include education in an order as “sequence,” and 
“sequencing-out,” but whose educative intent also alludes to the following senses of order: a novel 
order to the customary mode of educative provision; a reappraised order to the regular fixed 
arrangement; a redeemed order of econometrically authoritarian control; a revised order for the 
provision of capitalistic and neoliberal services; an unfamiliar order of the day for execution as 
usual; an unaccustomed way to order or conduct ones executions; and last, but not least, an 
unproductive, and hence wholly new type of order or command. 
o-----o 
I’ve been ordered by my doctor to rest: she says I have a heart murmur. What with 
overdoing it at work, and my age, she’s told me to slow down and hand over some control to what 
even she knows to be my capable deputies. I must’ve bored her with all my stories of encouraging 
their development and playing with time – planning my succession; who follows-on in my role; how 
what I’ve started will, or won’t, carry on; and how developing staff, bringing them on and seeing 
them flourish, has been my role in life. All of which is why I’m awake early this morning: I couldn’t 
sleep: I never seem to sleep on flights. It was the birdsong in the trees just outside my open window 
                                                          
17 See footnote 2 of this chapter. 
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that woke me, in this slightly shabby guesthouse which I arrived at yesterday evening, in the dark. 
I picked a small ashram on the Tapti River for my retreat, in the state of Gujarat, near the Arabian 
Sea coast up in north-west India: as soon as I heard the doctor pronounce I had Hanne make the 
arrangements: I’d wanted the excuse to come, and the family are used to me travelling. They 
weren’t surprised I chose an ashram to take some time out of the business. The place came 
recommended, though this bed isn’t comfy. Not sure what I’ll do. I’ve brought my battered old 
Bhagavad Gita, which was a prize from senior school, with my juvenile markings and profound 
underlinings in it: what was I hoping back then? What did I imagine I could see? I also packed a 
Dostoyevsky, a blank covered Lotus Sutra, and a well-thumbed thin-paper copy of the Diamond 
Sutra, with a Japanese print of Hui-Neng chopping wood on the cover: I used to have that as a 
screensaver. I’m happy with my portable pantheon, these books and my phones: my ying and my 
yang: my order and disorder; sacred and profane. Though, unlike with the books, I feel anxious 
without my phones. I can almost feel them, even though they’re at the bottom of my case, on the 
other side of the room, under the open window: nowhere to charge them, it seems. I need to let 
them go whilst I’m here: I’ve given myself a chance to suspend my normal daily structure, to 
decelerate, like yesterday’s bumpy plane landing. Travelling at market speed has made me into a 
chronic case, it seems. So I’ll join in the community stuff today, and begin my own braking 
manoeuvre: the lady last night said something about this… I should know the names of those birds, 
and that tree. What gorgeous blossom. I’m sure the whoosh of work in my head will die down; I 
can already feel myself opening onto something: enchanting... I can hear kids playing outside; I 
never seem to hear that back home. I wonder what time it is. Or rather, I wonder what episode I’m 
entering: it seems easier to talk of episodes, each with different times, or speeds of time, which I 
can step in and out of at will. Lying here in this episode in the lumpy bed, I seem to be at the mid-
point between a promise and its fulfilment: halfway between my doctor’s order and my execution 
of them, in who knows what way. Really quite liberating: I can obey or disobey, extemporise with 
time to my heart’s content: there are only different episodes, like this one where time is one way; 
and like the sixteenth floor, when time is, was, will be, another…
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7 
__________________________________ 
 
 
Ideal Romantic Remainders 
 
 
 
If what the term ‘idealism’ says, amounts to the understanding that Being can never be explained 
by entities but is already that which is ‘transcendental’ for every entity, then idealism affords the 
only correct possibility for a philosophical problematic. If so, Aristotle was no less an idealist than 
Kant. But if ‘idealism’ signifies tracing back every entity to a subject or consciousness whose sole 
distinguishing features are that it remains indefinite in its Being and is best characterized negatively 
as ‘un-Thing-like’, then this idealism is no less naïve in its method that the most grossly militant 
realism  
(Heidegger, Being and Time: p.251-2) 
 
 
Now, since originary temporality is the mode of time that structures Dasein’s being, and since 
therefore it obtains as the form of Dasein, time is explanatorily dependent upon an essentially 
human phenomenon. Time requires Dasein 
(Blattner, Heidegger’s Temporal Idealism: p.231) 
 
 
By endowing the commonplace with a higher meaning, the ordinary with mysterious respect, the 
known with the dignity of the unknown, the finite with the appearance of the infinite, I am making 
it Romantic. 
(Novalis, Philosophical Writings, vol.2, §4, no.105: quoted in Stoljar, 1997: p.60) 
 
 
 
 
 
7.1 Introduction 
This final cascade of epigrams is a knowing nod towards what has become, by some 
accounts, a “considerable controversy in the secondary literature” (Gordon, 2013: p.224) 
concerning whether Heidegger’s notion of originary temporality has a reality independent of 
Dasein, or whether originary temporality requires Dasein, and is therefore an ideal. The William 
Blattner quote holds that Heidegger is in the idealist camp: whereas the Heidegger quote is a tad 
ambiguous. I feel as though I should have an interest in the terms of this debate, if only to register 
my commitment to wanting my ideal – my upholding of the Kairotic – to be real, by which I mean, 
to matter: in other words, for there to be a parity between the realism of a reassuringly horizontal 
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view of chronic time, and the reality of plunging, “vertical”1, Kairotic times that are ecstatically 
unproductive. 
What the above epigrams also serve to represent, in shorthand form, is my own rationale 
for having played with the concept of Romanticism whilst exploring Heideggerian temporality (and 
execution): namely, that early German Romantic philosophy (and to an extent European 
Romanticism generally) throws some light on this idealist-realist controversy. This thesis has been 
an experiment in extending Heidegger’s stance on idealism – whose precise definition will come 
later in this chapter – to include what is conceivable as a Romantically-oriented conception of 
idealism2, but one which neutralises our negative assumptions of idealism as concerning self-
conscious subjects isolated against an independent reality, at the same time as tipping us towards 
(a sense of) the eternal. A downer mood of mine throughout this work has been a fear that my 
tinkering with Heidegger’s precocious thinking was nothing more than vacuous mentalese: until, 
that is, I realised I should just call the shot. “But even a bad shot,” to quote C.S. Lewis commenting 
on poorly executed medieval romantic allegory, “may sometimes give us a rough indication of 
where the target lies” (Lewis, 1936: p.111). So, by way of a provisional, bite-sized and semi-serious, 
statement of my overall argument, I present the following amuse-bouches of a conclusion. My 
claim is that the only way to defend Kairotic temporality is from the position of an idealist; though 
one needn’t fret over any distasteful subjectivism of that position, since, using the method of 
Romantic irony, one needn’t be a subjectivist for very long: irony ensures you’re always in a state 
of flux between chronic and Kairotic senses of time, using one’s everyday melancholically-tinged 
moods from chronic moments to propel towards more Kairotic moments, from which one makes 
sense of the chronic melancholy, so that one can glimpse the Kairotic, and so on back and forth: in 
a sense, living with the sublime, from within the mood of melancholy, for who knows what 
revolutionary effect. Chances are that this trailer to my conclusion may not have satiated the 
reader, in which case I present the more substantial haunch of my argument. 
Using what is still regarded as the primary monograph on Heideggerian temporality in the 
secondary literature, William Blattner’s Heidegger’s Temporal Idealism (Blattner, 1999), I will be 
concluding not in favour of a “grossly militant realism” (Heidegger, 1962: p.252) that opposes 
idealism – a forceful opposition which explains some commentators’ discomfort with William 
Blattner’s pro-idealist argument3 – but in favour of a boldly Romantic form of idealism, one which 
                                                          
1 Along with Charles Taylor’s use of the term “vertical” (Taylor, 2003, 2007), I also borrow its use from Eric Auerbach’s 
book Mimesis (1953: p.17, 74, 194) who uses it in the same sense as Taylor. 
2 The argument as to whether the philosophical movements of Idealism and Romanticism are wholly distinct, or nigh 
incompatible, will be discussed later in this chapter. 
3 One such (admittedly throwaway) expression of discomfort, from a prominent Heidegger commentator, came during a 
conversation with Mark Wrathall over tea and cake in the Senior Common Room of Christ Church College, Oxford, on a 
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resituates the chronic, but traditionally Romantically expressed moods concerning death, anxiety 
and boredom as integral to Heidegger’s understanding of time;  moods out of which emerge more 
Kairotic and brighter temporal moments, moments suited to challenging the delinquencies of 
capitalism via the event of executive education. Personifications of this movement, as I have 
attempted to provide, go like this. The movement is from the disposition (Befindlichkeit) of an 
unfortunate malcontent4 – such as Sanjay in chapter three, in the throes of his melancholic moods 
– to the affective state of someone open to the mystery of life and to multiple senses of the 
eternal5, living in the presence of the gods and the sublime – such as Sanjay in chapter six – then 
back again to the chronic, since this is where we must find a “way of living that embodies an 
understanding of being” (Haugeland, 2013: p.81-82). Such a bi-direction of travel is beckoned to in 
Novalis’s definition of the Romantic in the last of the epigram quotes above, where he points to 
the other dimensions of the “everyday,” the quotidian, of which Heidegger was keen to remind us. 
The remainder referred to in the chapter title is what Albert Borgmann identifies as the 
“Romantic complaint” (Borgmann, 2006: p.241); the complaint that a residue still remains, that 
something is still left over, that an excess still persists, even after ardent modernists, materialists, 
positivists, industrialists, and executives strip superstition and enchantment from what they see as 
a purely mechanical universe: 
 
Yet it remains that no one has been able to answer the romantic complaint that there is more 
to the world that a mechanical universe and a mercenary world and that we cannot be fully 
human beings until the missing regions of reality have been recovered by an appropriate 
ontology and appropriated by vigorous practices (ibid). 
 
 
Mine has been a working out of what I take to be an “appropriate ontology” for corporate 
executives, those (not unique) individuals whose extreme possibility of being is equating their time 
with money. I have chosen to acknowledge this remainder, to uphold the Romantic complaint as it 
were, using the supportive opposition between Heidegger’s two main temporal orders6 of chronic 
                                                          
visit I paid him during his Fowler Hamilton Visiting Research Fellowship, in November 2014, as part of my research on 
this thesis. 
4 Such as how Shakespeare’s character Proteus is described, by his friend Speed, in act 2, scene 1 of The Two Gentlemen 
of Verona. In this context a malcontent is someone made melancholy by love; or, as Shakespeare has it, to be disposed 
or affected by love (The Norton Shakespeare, 2008: p.120). Interestingly, Felix Ó Murchadha translates Heidegger’s 
notoriously untranslatable Befindlichkeit as “affective state,” distinct from “disposedness,” (Dreyfus), “state of mind,” 
(Macquarrie and Robinson), and “attunement” (Stambaugh), all of which nicely illustrates the transhistorical value of 
translation (see next footnote). 
5 Such as how Eric Alliez (in Barbara Cassin’s The Dictionary of Untranslatables, 2014) apportions eternity between 
Aevum, Aeternitas, Sempiternitas, and Perpetuitas, in his cross-linguistic and cross-cultural working out of the Greek Aiôn 
or Chronos. Especially revealing to this thesis are some alternatives Eric Alliez has for Aiôn, which include Dasein, eternity, 
God, history, moment and world. 
6 Main orders of time which contain Heidegger’s “world time,” “ordinary” or “clock time,” and “originary time” 
distinctions that come at the end of Being and Time (Heidegger, 1962: §78-§83), only the last of which played much of a 
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and Kairotic time, which are just about simple enough to grasp, but whose limits are nonetheless 
finite and infinite, temporal and eternal. Kairotic temporality, the vision it gives of the eternal, does 
not lend itself to a mechanical view of the universe; its reach is in excess of capitalism’s standard, 
and puny, models of how the world can be received monetarily and rationally patterned. “It doesn’t 
chart,” to use the line from David Cronenberg’s 2012 film Cosmopolis. The film’s 28-year-old 
billionaire, Eric Packer (Robert Pattinson), in a fantastic and disturbing ride across Manhattan in a 
stretch limo to get a haircut, receives advice from his currency adviser Michael Chin (Philip Nozuka) 
about betting against the Yuan, one of the many in-car advisers that bring the mercenary Eric 
Packer up short, as they inch through traffic; “what is happening doesn’t chart…we’re speculating 
into the void”. However, Packer’s ontology – his monetary ontology – is not a sufficiently 
appropriate ontology to have him appreciate just how far away from the void, and from the 
“missing regions of reality” (Borgmann, 2006: p.241), his currency speculations and wealth 
management regimens have carried him. Subsequent in-car advice from his fabulously titled Chief 
of Theory, Vija Kinsky (Samantha Morton), that “time is a corporate asset now; it belongs to the 
free market system; the present is harder to find; it is being sucked out of the world to make way 
for the future of markets and huge investment potentials. The future becomes insistent,” reveals 
the sad, the chronic, and calculative grasp in which his view of time is framed. As a lament this 
advice chimes with the disappointment of my chief goblin in Chapter 5. You’ll need to watch the 
film, but I’d say Packer does recover a sense of grander time before the film ends, the time of his 
death, held in eternal suspense by the movie’s last cut. 
The final element to introduce, in support of my conclusion, is some account of why the 
finite and infinite, temporal and eternal distinctions are relevant to Heidegger at all. The archetypal 
reference for my argument comes from Friedrich Schlegel’s (off with the fairies) model of irony, 
with his back and forth glances from eternal unity to the time of our lives, his own brand of irony. 
Since I’m putting great store in associating Heidegger with this method of Romantic irony, I’d like 
to present Manfred Frank’s gloss on Schlegel’s model of irony, as it’s the model’s “perpetuity” 
which fascinates me most, and which I take from it, thus: 
 
In order to become comprehensible, that which is pure must limit itself; any border 
contradicts the essential infinity of that which is pure, however; therefore it must always 
overstep the limits which it sets to itself, and then limit itself again, and then overstep these 
limits, and so on and on…the limits conflict with the infinite activity, which itself dismisses 
                                                          
role in his later thinking: and his Zeitlichkeit and Temporalität distinction (between temporality and Temporality, in 
Macquarrie and Robinson; or between the time of our lives, and the overarching time of being) in Basic Problems of 
Phenomenology (Heidegger, 1982: §19-§22). The chronic (Zeitlichkeit) and Kairotic (Temporalität) categories of time I’m 
using simplify Heidegger’s technical jargon, though at the expense of a certain, and possibly mis-directed, fidelity. 
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any limit imposed upon it. Precisely this surpassing of all self-imposed limits is what Schlegel 
calls irony (Frank, 2014: p.216). 
 
This is precisely the mode in which I see the chronic and Kairotic senses of time playing off of each 
other, whose reciprocal effects on Heideggerian reflections on death, anxiety, and boredom 
(collectively, a chronic sense of time), and technology, history, and the event (collectively, a Kairotic 
sense of time), I will show in this conclusion. 
So, in what little time remains, I will, firstly, summarise each chapter in the light of the 
above. Secondly, I will expand on the type of idealism I believe to be appropriate to Heidegger, in 
response to William Blattner. Thirdly, in the fashion of the Schlegelian ironist, I will explain how 
this reckoning with time equates to something like an “ironic productivity” for the corporate 
executive, and what this oscillating irony affords my critique of current executive education 
practices. Fourthly, I will account for the fiction-based method I have used to illustrate my 
arguments. Finally, I will attempt to reconcile this counter-productive ecstasy of time against the 
supreme productivity enshrined in the order-execution cognate. 
 
7.2 The Melancholically Chronic 
In simple terms, I have distinguished a quantitative from a qualitative sense of time in the 
chronic and the Kairotic respectively, with Part One of the thesis emphasising an orderliness that 
comes with time conceived purely as a continuity, as an inviolable sequence, as a mathematisable 
sequence. The inherent melancholy to this orderliness emerges from time’s allocation to us of a 
lifespan, however long that may be, and our getting lost in our own certain little parcel of time.  
With respect to the executive, the melancholy comes not only from the “living death” of 
contemporary management practices, outlined in Carl Cederström and Peter Fleming’s laugh-out-
loud book Dead Man Working (Cederström and Fleming, 2012), but from a growing realisation that 
our zombie-manager existence only exacerbates the obscene disparities of wealth outlined by 
Thomas Piketty, in his Capital in the Twenty-First Century (Piketty, 2014), the direction to the target 
against which this thesis is pitched. 
Our reflections on death, part of the natural order of things, can provide us with our first 
concerted existential considerations. Whilst not necessarily beautiful reflections, they are more 
often than not noble, where I can at least question my existing, or “Dasein’s being” as an issue. I 
can go further and not only ask why my being is an issue, but answer that question, provisionally 
at least. And this is what I suggested take place for the executive in the demise/death distinction 
in Chapter 1; to move from considering one’s demise, to considering what living through existential 
death might mean, using the tsunami metaphor. The suggested result, for the executive, was 
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execution-less execution, the mere potential of still being able to execute, even after a so-called 
existential death of the Heideggerian variety. Now there’s irony. I’ve presented this as a form of 
exercise in acknowledging one’s pure ability to execute – irrespective of whichever order one is 
executing – along with an acknowledging of the limits that our own mortality, our own finitude, 
brings to this pure ability to execute. My categorising of this unusual exercise under the heading of 
“melancholy” names the usual mood under which we suffer on mere mention of death, despite 
melancholy’s somewhat archaic charm. But this is my point in resurrecting such a disregarded term, 
since “[f]or most of western European history, melancholy was a central cultural idea” (Radden, 
2000), where use of the term at least attests to this longstanding cultural history, serving again to 
knock a deeper temporal sense into us. 
Along with existential death comes another melancholy mood, anxiety, which in the 
Heideggerian register at least reveals how everything in our world can become insignificant, or to 
which we can become indifferent and detached, given our reflections on existential death. The 
abiding sense of melancholy comes from how the mood of anxiety reveals the contingency of our 
world, bringing us up against a sense of nothingness, a looming daemon who dissolves the 
motivations out of which we pursued what we thought we cared for. Heidegger attributes a 
positive outcome to the mood of anxiety, but only in those rare instances where that in the face of 
which anxiety is anxious is our being in the world, rather than anxiety as just plain old fear. Such 
an authentic mood of anxiety is productive, in that it reveals to us our world, a world in terms of 
which Dasein’s being is an issue. Combining a Heideggerian consideration of death with one of 
anxiety gives one a stronger temporal appreciation, a stronger sense of the time one spends on 
that for which we care the most, and along with it the potential to audit our time spent on those 
executions of uncertain value: we become able to enact a transvaluation of our values, an ability 
which emerges from our new temporal sensibility. Such is my wink to this normative, cliché, and 
frankly rather comic sense of “time management” alluded to in the thesis title. 
The last of the overtly melancholic chapters, in the fashion of the previous two, champions 
boredom as an additional means through which to come to terms with the time of one’s life. As 
with the other fundamental moods that Heidegger identified, the concept of boredom rides on its 
own extensive history, annulling the years separating us from the acedia of the desert fathers, the 
spiritual desolation of ancient ascetics and mystics, the dark nights of medieval souls, affording us 
the opportunity to reappraise our own efforts at killing time. Most educative of Heidegger’s three 
levels of boredom, but equally the most costly to our established senses of self, is profound 
boredom. If contemplation of death and anxiety were not enough to raise our temporal awareness, 
profound boredom drops us right in it, leaving us to flounder in notional (at least) eternities of 
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time. In this sense, melancholy is the beginning of philosophy: by acknowledging one’s melancholia 
through boredom, one is opening oneself to thinking philosophically about the world and one’s 
executions in it. 
It took a survey of Heidegger’s main time-related themes7, across a broad span of his work, 
to discover what I’ve decided to class as a glorifying of melancholy, certainly in his early work. Not 
only do I believe it uncontroversial to gather these strands of thought under the Romantic banner, 
whose staple in the late eighteenth-century centred on the mood of melancholy, the movement 
famous for questioning the ineluctable rationality of the Enlightenment; it would seem as though 
Heidegger himself paid an unconscious debt of gratitude to his intellectual forebears of the 
Romantic by orienting significant portions of his thinking towards similar challenges to one-
dimensional, and certainly technicised rationality8. Interestingly, writing in the context of a 
Marcusian one-dimensionality, and commenting on our headlong embrace of technology, at the 
same time as acknowledging the clear debt Herbert Marcuse owes Heidegger, David Lewin goes 
on to accuse Heidegger of Romanticism, as if Romanticism was a standalone class of logical error. 
Says Lewin, “Heidegger faces the charge of romanticism or sentimentalism” (Lewin, 2011: p.89), 
with regard to a regrettable “nostalgia for pre-modern naïveté, about which philosophers of 
technology have been especially critical” (ibid). I agree that pre-modern nostalgia is an ineffective 
rebuttal of enframing and machination. Though simply parroting the standard critique of nostalgia 
dulls any shred of grace one may use to see something authentically Romantic in Heidegger: his 
resistance to consumerism, his disaffection of our exploitation of the earth, and of the ills of mass 
media, in preference for the world of simple peasants, peasant cottages somewhat like his own, 
rustic hearths, and jugs raised skywards, from which to serve drink from the earth, and for mortals 
to pour libations to the gods. Long live Hellenism! In keeping with Heidegger’s injunction to own 
up to thinking for ourselves, and being mindful of the need to break out of the unhelpfully circular 
critique of technology framed in self-referentially technological terms, I view Heidegger’s 
Romanticist tendency – signified by his meditation on the fourfold – as his attempt at forging a 
complete tangent not just to technological thinking, but to the task of philosophy generally. This is 
the task of the second part of my thesis to attempt to articulate. 
 
                                                          
7 With the exception of a detailed discussion, towards the end of Division II of Being and Time and in Part Two of Basic 
Problems of Phenomenology, of how “significance,” “datability,” “spannedness” and “publicness” explain time: and with 
the exception of his notion of “conscience,” of coming to realise how we are lost in our falling into the present, in §55 of 
Being and Time (see also footnote 4 of this chapter). 
8 See David Lewin’s excellent account of how Herbert Marcuse saw technology as essentially enslaving, distinct from 
sharing Marx’s view of technology as an essential aspect of liberation, in Technology and the Philosophy of Religion 
(Lewin, 2011: p.64). 
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7.3 The Sublimely Kairotic 
Part Two of the thesis emphasises a higher order, an order more transcendental, 
consequently less articulable9, and as a result an order that provides a moment of pause and 
disruption; herein lies this order’s political import. This higher order is rarely encountered within 
the precincts of the global corporation10. Often associated with a spiritual realm, with feelings that 
we are no longer at home in the world (the Heideggerian unheimlich), and where our imaginations 
are subordinated, in part, to the media, to the internet, to entertainment and to technology 
corporations, the order I’m referring to is the one summoned by Albert Borgmann’s Romantic 
complaint, a notion of order that can so easily be dismissed as “pre-modern nostalgia” and mocked 
for its saccharin sentimentality – a sentimentality characterised and upheld by the sensibilities of 
these very sentences. 
First in line for treatment under this dangerously Romantically-oriented salvage is the 
relation between technology and time. It would have been easier for me to have framed the whole 
thesis in Heidegger’s approach to technology, rather than to remain with the temporal theme, by 
dint of the technological theme’s worthier philosophical-productivity, and the theme’s sheer 
wealth of commentary. However, the temporal theme has allowed me to experiment in articulating 
the sublime Romantic remainder, the nagging bit that’s left, the excess that is usually spoken over, 
which would’ve been relegated to some lyrical concluding flourish otherwise. In my case it involves 
a playing out of Heidegger’s das Geviert, the problem-child that is the un-(re)presentable fourfold. 
Most definitions of sublime11 contain some reference to Edmund Burke’s A Philosophical Enquiry 
into the Origin of our Ideas of the Sublime and Beautiful (1757), and to how he asserts that the 
moods of astonishment, danger, horror and terror form part of the overall feeling of the sublime, 
as do obscurity and hiddenness, wonderfully summarised as “gloomy pomp” by Burke (Burke, 
1757: p.55). My risking of a sober acceptance of this particular interpretation of das Geviert (fat 
chance) into the folds of business school academe, on a hunch that Romanticism was a safe bet, is 
perhaps whimsical at the least, foolhardy at the most. But to my critics that accuse me of an ultra-
orthodox interpretation of, and fealty to, Heidegger, I would say that it is just this sort of risky stunt 
that responsibility to his thinking requires, and which I found little of in the secondary literature on 
                                                          
9 David Lewin’s account of Albert Borgmann’s often evocative challenges to our unthinking acceptance of technology, 
upholds Borgmann’s championing of a certain loss in the transition from “craft” to “industrialised production” as an 
“articulate inarticulacy” (Lewin, 2011: p.115). 
10 Given the rise of religious fundamentalism – in the form of Islamic State, its non-Islamic antagonists, and equivalent 
inter-religious intolerances that such fundamentalism escalates into – and the religiously oriented geo-political 
considerations that global corporations should take account of when formulating their medium and long-term 
operational and human resource strategies, it is not acceptable to say that religion is out-of-scope for a study of executive 
education. 
11 I’ve gained a lot from Philip Shaw’s book The Sublime (2006), who also draws heavily from Burke. 
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time, and none in works on the philosophy of executive education. In what I’m taking to be the 
same sense in which I read Homer, by invoking a god Homer is invoking for me a fundamental 
mood which attunes me to what matters most in my situations, allowing me to respond 
appropriately without much thought. Acting on mention of gods is becoming open to what a mood 
attunes me towards, which, for the executive, is a philosophical way of thinking. 
It is by way of a test of that way of thinking, and of some of our assumptions about the 
sequentiality of time, that I offer an exploration of Heidegger’s notion of history. On the edges of 
our (perhaps fragmentary) awareness of the Romantic movement is the sine qua non of 
Romanticism, the French Revolution, and how the first phases of the Revolution inspired most early 
Romantics (Hobsbawm, 1962). By grasping what Heidegger calls, in his typically hyphenated 
relation style, historical be-ing, equivalent new beginnings, new revolutions, can be imagined. As a 
form of mindfulness of what we care most about, a new moment arises, the Augenblick, or Kairotic 
moment presents itself. In its sublimity it is terrifying and dangerous, and to the non-revolutionary 
who is insufficiently anxious to question their own being in the world, the Kairotic moment is 
gloomily obscure. Coming to terms with the Kairotic moment offers us the chance to adjust, to 
break/brake, to regear our engagement with a time that is distinctly at odds to the time of our 
sequencing-out of executions. To model this I have offered my own peculiar and radical break from 
the standard discourse of business, by way of indicating the enormity of the fairy-tale-like marvel 
required to re-period the executive education event. 
On cue for suggesting a novel structure for this educative event is an analysis of 
Heidegger’s concept Ereignis. It is here that the chronic and Kairotic senses of time come together, 
and where, via this difficult concept, Heidegger comes closest to his appreciation of 
Schleiermachian eternity, in a Schlegel-like method of oscillating irony. I am in two minds as to 
whether I intend this as a practical suggestion – to actually formulate and present, in the fashion 
of a Zen Master, the infinite restlessness of a Koan in chronic-Kairotic temporality to the budding 
executive, as appropriate as this might be – or just as a strategy for reading time into an 
interpretation of Ereignis.  But then this is the remainder I’m talking about in this chapter, which is 
why it is perhaps better left unsaid, stranded as a Romantic fragment12. This suspense is followed 
through when we meet Sanjay in the first person this time, realising that he can execute against 
orders from within differing modes of time, or episodes, and that he can wander in and out of 
                                                          
12 Romanticism is famous for its method of the fragment. Stephen Prickett, in the introduction to his edited collection 
European Romanticism: A Reader (2014), cites Friedrich Schlegel, who “latched onto the idea of the fragment as being 
the perfect form by which to express the new spirit by which antiquity was to be experienced by his contemporary world” 
(Prickett, 2014: p.12). At a stretch, it is possible to conceive of Heidegger’s Contributions (Heidegger, 1999) as following 
in this vein. 
7. Ideal Romantic Remainders 
 
- 172 - 
 
them: that this is the “proper” way of understanding Ereignis or, in my case, the event of executive 
education. 
 
7.4 Idealism & Romanticism 
William Blattner concludes his book Heidegger’s Temporal Idealism by claiming that 
Heidegger already recognised the failure of his early philosophy of being. Most notably, that “his 
philosophy of time could not support his ontological idealism. And this recognition took him into 
uncharted territory” (Blattner, 1999: p.310). That territory was the quasi-mysticism of 
Contributions (Heidegger, 1999) and the “mystical dimension” (Blattner, 1999: p.309) of his later 
thought, well documented by commentators13. As the reader of this thesis will have gathered, I am 
not averse to mysticism. My erecting of the well-established intellectual scaffolding, as it were, of 
literary and philosophical Romanticism around the philosophical task Heidegger set himself, is 
testimony of this; though perhaps I’m confusing the temporary scaffolding for its permanent host 
structure. In terms of what does my scaffold of Romanticism compete with its host structure of 
Heideggerian temporal idealism? Am I erecting scaffolding as a means of (re-) constructing, 
conserving, or simply inspecting the work of Heidegger, from a more workable height? Continuing 
with the metaphor: for sure, my reader must have exerted considerable patience to have lain on 
his or her back on the scaffold for so long, up against the lofty coffered ceiling of primordial 
temporality, politely examining each filigreed panel of Heidegger’s argument, noticing the cracks. 
But to what end? Maybe Romanticism is a gruesome execution scaffold, set to dispatch the next 
clutch of the temporally inarticulate, watched on wide-mouthed by the Multitude14. 
With its aureate glimmer, its love of deliberate enigmas, rich allegory, arabesque allusions 
to the otherworldly, and its reputation for revolutionary thinking, not to mention the previous 
form, though now out of favour, it has in philosophy of education circles15, Romanticism for me is 
the (only) slightly more presentable assistant to the exegetical task than its close colleague, 
religious mysticism, for the following reasons. Firstly, despite Heidegger’s religious upbringing and 
training, he was exposed to, and therefore possibly heir to, at least the late Romantic period’s 
artistic flowering, on top of which his theological interests flowed and gained expression. This is 
                                                          
13 Commentators such as Lee Braver in Heidegger’s Later Writings (2009); John Caputo in The Mystical Element in 
Heidegger’s Thought (1986); Steven Heine in Existential and Ontological Dimensions of Time in Heidegger and Dogen 
(1985); and Reinhard May in Heidegger’s Hidden Sources: East Asian Influences on his Work (1996). A sustained 
engagement between Heidegger and these authors I will have to defer to another life. 
14 The multitude, as in Hardt and Negri’s influential book and revolutionary of that name, where “[t]he multitude gives 
the concept of the proletariat its fullest definition as all those who labor and produce under the rule of capital” (Hardt 
and Negri, 2005: p.107). 
15 See the two edited volumes by Randall Curren, A Companion to the Philosophy of Education (2003), and Philosophy of 
Education: An Anthology (2007). 
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evidenced by his engagement with key writers of the Romantic Movement such as Fichte, Goethe 
Hölderlin, Kant, Novalis, Schelling, and Schleiermacher16. Secondly, his style of writing, namely his 
catachresis, his strained use of words as a hallmark of his writing, is a standard trait of German 
Romantic philosophy17. Thirdly, the proximity of his method of “formal indication” to Romantic 
irony, as I have explained at length. And lastly, his sustained engagement with ontological idealism 
in Being and Time, where it is the responsibility of the individual Dasein to recover her being and 
her time. I’m not alone in finding this idealism discomforting, which necessitates an explanation of 
how we may possibly be ascribing the wrong type of idealism to early Heidegger. How then do I 
square William Blattner’s positing of Heidegger’s idealism with my charge of Romanticism?  
The two main, but opposing, scholars of Romanticism of the present age are Manfred Frank 
and Frederick Beiser. Their bone of contention surrounds the undesirability of Fichte’s18 
subjectivism, his founding of idealism on an absolute “I”, and the extent to which Romanticism 
should be distinguished from idealism as a result. Frank contends that German Romanticism was a 
realist movement, and is opposed to any form of absolute whatsoever. Beiser, on the other hand, 
believes that the idealists and Romantics held many similar views. I side with Beiser, in support of 
William Blattner, since by Manfred Frank’s account my resource to Romanticism would be 
unfounded via Blattner. I quote in full Beiser’s rueful summary of the disagreement between 
realists and idealists: 
 
The basic error behind the subplot, and the subjectivist interpretation in general, has been 
its failure to distinguish between two very different versions or forms of idealism. The 
conflation is understandable, given that the idealists themselves sometimes failed to 
disentangle them. The two versions of idealism correspond to two senses of the term ‘idea’; 
the ideal can be the mental in contrast to the physical, the spiritual rather than the material; 
or it can be the archetypical in contrast to the ectypical, the normative rather than the 
substantive. Idealism in the former sense is the doctrine that all reality depends upon some 
self-conscious subject; idealism in the latter sense is the doctrine that everything is a 
manifestation of the ideal, an appearance of reason. This second sense is perfectly 
compatible with the equal and independent reality of the mental and physical; and it has no 
difficulty in ascribing reality to a physical world. The problem with the subjectivist 
interpretation is that it stretches the mental and the subject to do the work of the ideal or 
the intelligible, so that it becomes the reality of the entire world; but then the concept of the 
subjective is in danger of losing all meaning (Beiser, 2002: p.6) 
 
I contend that Heidegger subscribed to the second of Beiser’s doctrines of ideal, as per the opening 
epigram, where “that which is ‘transcendental’ for every entity” (Heidegger, 1962: p.251) 
                                                          
16 Rüdiger Safranski’s Martin Heidegger: Between Good and Evil (1998), along with Theodore Kisiel’s The Genesis of 
Heidegger’s Being & Time (1993), detail these connections. 
17 See footnote 2 of Chapter 5. 
18 From Johann Gottlieb Fichte’s Foundations of Natural Right (1797). 
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corresponds to the idealist doctrine “that everything substantive is a manifestation of the ideal” 
(Beiser, 2002: p.6) or normative. The question is, which of these doctrines of idealism does Blattner 
subscribe to, and will one or the other of the idealist doctrines negate his bummer of a conclusion 
regarding the failure of Heidegger’s temporal project? Along with Peter Gordon (2013: p.223), I 
assume Heidegger was just as uncomfortable with the first of Beiser’s subjectivist doctrines of 
idealism as many commentators are with Blattner’s overall idealism thesis itself, assuming it to be 
of the Fichtean absolute “I” variety and distasteful to boot. In Being and Time, where Heidegger 
has “Being and Reality are only ‘in the consciousness’” (Heidegger, 1962: p.251), those scare quotes 
around “in the consciousness” signal his discomfort, I’d say, with the subjectivist sense of idealism 
(Gordon, 2013: p.223): which leaves me assuming that Blattner would not ascribe to the 
subjectivist sense, only to the second of Beiser’s doctrines of idealism, that our substantive, or 
everyday appreciation of time is really a manifestation of a normative appreciation of time: that 
our everyday, pragmatic, sense of time is dependent on originary temporality, and is just a 
manifestation of this ideal. As a restatement of what Heidegger claimed of non-sequential 
primordial temporality, Blattner’s articulation is correct. As Hubert Dreyfus’s précis of an earlier 
draft of Blattner’s book19 has it, “the special nature of the originary present is such that the entire 
structure of everyday temporality – past, present, and future – is incorporated within it… Originary 
temporality is non-sequential and so does violence to our ordinary sense of time” (Dreyfus, 1992: 
p.10). This originary present equates to what I’m calling Kairotic time, and our everyday 
appreciation of time, or pragmatic time as Blattner called it here, equates to my chronic time. That 
fact that Blattner concluded (albeit in parentheses) that Heidegger was not a pragmatist indicates, 
rather contentiously, that for Heidegger Kairotic time is more important than chronic time. More 
than that, and in distinction to Felix Ó Murchadha’s argument in The Time of Revolution: Kairos and 
Chronos in Heidegger (Ó Murchadha, 2013), who does not engage with the idealist thesis head on, 
it is not enough just to posit these two types of time, even to uncover Kairotic time’s revolutionary 
potential: it is feasible to claim, albeit with Blattner’s bummer of a conclusion, that chronic time is 
dependent on Kairotic time, given the foregoing. All the same, my argument is a weaker statement 
of that dependency, satisfying myself just with Heidegger’s endorsement of the Kairotic: that it is 
only in a perpetual oscillating back and forth between the chronic and the Kairotic, in the fashion 
of Schlegel’s model of irony, that the executive in this study benefits in an educative manner. 
 
                                                          
19 My first encounter with the work of William Blattner was through his article “Existential Temporality in Being and Time 
(Why Heidegger is not a Pragmatist),” in Hubert Dreyfus’s book Heidegger: A Critical Reader (Dreyfus, 1992). It was this 
article which made me decide to study Heideggerian temporality, and which led to this thesis. 
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7.5 Ironic Productivity 
So what does this look like, and what are these benefits? To help with this I enlist Richard 
Rorty’s use of the term “ironist” in his building a case for pragmatism, from his book Contingency, 
Irony, and Solidarity (Rorty, 1989), as well as by reminding ourselves of Kierkegaard’s20, Schlegel’s 
and Frank’s definitions of irony, outlined in the previous chapter and earlier in this chapter. 
As the Romanticist Manfred Frank says, “[s]omething is uttered ironically when the way of 
saying it neutralizes the determinateness of the content” (Frank, 2014: p.24, emphasis in original) 
and brings it into suspense. With “suspension” in mind, reconsider now how Kierkegaard’s concept 
of negative freedom chimes with this suspending of the determinateness, or the reality of, the 
content. When using irony, “[i]f… what I said is not my meaning or the opposite of my meaning, 
then I am free in relation to others and to myself” (Kierkegaard, 1989: quoted in Prickett, et al, 
2014: p.293). Combining these two characteristics of irony one can say of someone who is an 
ironist, as Rorty does, that she is necessarily a nominalist as well, in that she is willing to neutralise 
objectively existing content, or reality, in favour of its suspension in lieu of an alternative, or a range 
of many other alternatives. For an ironist, the determinateness of “reality” is on permanent hold; 
or as Rorty says, “[s]he thinks nothing has an intrinsic nature, a real essence” (Rorty, 1989: p.74), 
and that ironists “do not take the point of discursive thought to be knowing, in any sense that can 
be explicated by notions like ‘reality,’ ‘real essence,’ ‘objective point of view,’ and ‘the 
correspondence of language to reality’” (ibid: p.75). On this last point, an ironist is someone who, 
in Rorty’s view, is also a historicist, in that they believe our language is historically determined, 
rather than believing there to be an absolute value system on which our language is ultimately 
based. In short, our ironist believes firmly in contingency.  
You can see how Rorty is indebted to Heidegger here: though as we saw with Blattner, 
Heidegger was not a pragmatist. Heidegger did not hold with the form of temporal contingency 
that Rorty is advocating, but instead believed – and believed he’d demonstrated – that an ordinary, 
common, homogenized, or levelled-off sense of time was entirely dependent, causally and 
logically, on originary time. As the famous quote from §65 of Being and Time has it, “[i]f, therefore, 
we demonstrate that the ‘time’ which is accessible to Dasein’s common sense is not primordial, 
but arises rather from authentic temporality, then, in accordance with the principle, ‘a potiori fit 
denominatio’, we are justified in designating as ‘primordial time’ the temporality which we have 
                                                          
20 In a footnote in Kierkegaard’s (1841) essay The Concept of Irony  he introduces the fabulously relevant-sounding 
“executive irony” (“executiv Ironi” in the original Danish), of which he offers the alternative name of “dramatic irony” 
(“dramtiske Ironi”), after which he stops using the term “executive” (Kierkegaard, 1841: quoted in Prickett et al, 2014: 
p.299). Dramatic irony is “a feature of narrative and drama, whereby the audience knows that the outcome of an action 
will be the opposite of that intended by a character” (Norton Anthology of English Literature, Greenblat, 2012: p.A14). 
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now laid bare” (Heidegger, 1962: p.377, emphasis in original).  Notwithstanding the obscure Latin, 
this is the passage where, metaphorically speaking, Blattner sees Heidegger’s ship hit the iceberg: 
whilst it sailed on for quite a distance, it was only a matter of time before it sank beneath the 
waves. To continue the metaphor, Blattner was generous enough to credit Heidegger’s course, his 
destination, and the purpose of his philosophical enterprise with coherence, nay brilliance; 
nonetheless, Blattner blamed the ship’s unseaworthiness on its flimsy idealist construction. If only 
the temporality Heidegger was referring to actually existed in reality, his venture would never have 
foundered. 
Mine is not a completely pragmatic resolution to this foundering, in that I’m still advocating 
dancing with the fairies; something I don’t believe Rorty would have sanctioned21. My 
pragmatically-tinged salvage of Heidegger’s primordial temporality promotes the suspension, not 
the outright negation, of determinate content. With respect to being a temporal ironist, using the 
above formulation and assuming the guise of our tame corporate executive, Sanjay, his temporal 
irony manifests in his being willing to suspend his commitment to the ordered passage of time – as 
his colleagues ordinarily understand clock-time – in preference for parcelling it up in as many 
different ways as he can. Clearly he still has deadlines, probably wears an expensive watch, and his 
day is not whimsically atemporal, Lewis Carroll fashion. All the same, Sanjay’s productivity emerges 
from basing his executions on his freedom – and determination – to imagine parallel times, or 
rather, corresponding vertical times; working with his teams, and the wider corporation, to enact 
as many breaks, disjunctures and changes in tempo to different projects and processes as possible, 
under his not insignificant control. By inciting and motivating his team to draw from historical 
precedent – which is usually a stochastic selection determined by a combination of whim, 
predilection and inspiration – as well as expecting them to foresee as many future scenarios as his 
teams can predict in the time available to meet internal and external client requirements, securing 
a permanent position or a secondment into his tight-knit department is not easy, given what Sanjay 
expects and how flexible the candidates can be. He trusts his executants to deliver the highest 
quality of results possible, but in return his whole team shows an exceptional loyalty to Sanjay, and 
hence to X-Corp. Sanjay has gained the trust of his fellow X-Corp board members, who in turn are 
willing to equate the significant increase in firm performance, as indicated by the standard, and 
independently verified, metrics and benchmarks, in no small part to Sanjay’s highly competitive 
                                                          
21 Though Richard Rorty did have it in for “bosses,” of the sort my Sanjay figure represents. In response to a question 
about politics and the possible rise of a leftist cultural resistance to oppose right-wing neoliberal policies, posed by Derek 
Nystrom and Kent Puckett, in their Against Bosses, Against Oligarchies (2002), Rorty replies “I think nothing is going to 
happen until you can get the masses to stop thinking of the bureaucrats as the enemy, and start thinking of the bosses 
as the enemy” (ibid: p.33) 
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Human Resource strategy and the company-wide processes his department operates, even in the 
grip of the unsettling shifts in X-Corp’s stockholder base. 
Ever since he came over to Europe from his time as a call-centre manager in Gurgaon, right 
up to his promotion onto the X-Corp board and his time at Headquarters, Sanjay has been 
formulating his unique time-based approach to developing, training and educating his executives. 
In the call-centre, he had built his reputation on making sure his staff greeted and spoke to his 
client’s callers as if they were in the same time zone, which was often twelve-hours askance from 
theirs. The method pleased the clients and callers, and his division went from strength to strength. 
His speedy promotion was a chance for him to extend this reputation and successful culture. He 
realised time could be played with. His team of senior executives are important enablers of the 
highly successful, not to mention inimitable, culture that Sanjay has gradually built. Consequently, 
Sanjay has had to completely rethink how he recruits and develops his staff, especially his senior 
appointments. What one knows, working under Sanjay, is of little importance, despite him being 
able to attract the best quality graduates into the company: consequently techne-based 
programmes do not feature prominently in the portfolio of executive education opportunities. The 
manner in which Sanjay’s executives are willing to surpass their self-imposed limits is what matters 
most; executive education, for Sanjay, is all about one’s willingness to embrace the fantasy that is 
“temporal irony”. 
 
 
7.6 Elaborate Fiction 
How so? The only way to make real and embrace a fantasy is through fiction, just as the 
only way I’ve found to represent ironic temporality is through fiction. Yet, in the business world, 
nothing seems quite so “Romantic” – so unproductive, so foolish, so make-believe, so spendthrift 
– as an injunction to embrace fantasy. If the art of storytelling is adequate to the job of 
contemplating time, does it matter that any particular reality is actually represented in its mimetic 
act; does it matter that my staging of temporal irony is completely irresponsible? Mark Currie talks 
about “[t]he temporal structure of a present lived as if it were the object of a future memory” as 
the basis of his book About Time: Narrative, Fiction and the Philosophy of Time (Currie, 2007: p.11), 
a phrase which represents the usual intellectual panegyrics on the relationship between narrative 
and time. Though most of us just have to watch movies to grasp this relationship, with their seat-
clasping flash forwards and flash backs. Why can’t the executive’s educative event be as if he or 
she were at movie school? Answer: because their role is to improve their shareholder’s ability to 
make more money, and the movie school idea is just foolery. Umm… and making money for 
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money’s sake isn’t? Sorry: or where “helping to create the economic conditions for growth, where 
everyone can succeed and look after their own” – the well-rehearsed, so-called “trickle down,” 
defence of free markets from business leaders, economists and pro-neoliberal politicians in the 
face of overwhelming evidence that neoliberal policies aren’t working as stated – isn’t an elaborate 
fiction? Why can’t we use the event, the time, of executive education to rescript this particular 
(disaster) movie? With the make-believe character of the errant Sanjay I have attempted to offer 
an illustration of the suspense temporal irony requires and affords, in the face of idiocy, possibly 
as idiocy, but as a form of parallel idiocy we feel strangely drawn to, more attuned to, and thrilled 
by, even if we can’t quite pin down why. As if something were left over, some remainder or other. 
Where this fictive method fails is on the grounds of a confusion of its utility and 
responsibility. The manner in which I’ve framed Sanjay still assumes a neoliberal world order that 
is far from collapse. In fact, by placing him in that swanky golf resort and faceless corporate high-
rise, his clowning around – in these hardly revolutionary quarters – makes him no more than a 
tolerated jester at court. What agency can he have other than that of a fashion-setter at most, 
merely persuading us to switch to a different brand of coffee, or become a trendier consumer?22 I 
have him down as a patsy, providing quirky utility to the neoliberal order, rather than jamming his 
shoes in its cogs. He’s also irresponsible in his foolery, jeopardising viable shareholder return, 
humiliating the executive yoked to the capitalist treadmill, mocking the nobility of labour, and 
completely ignoring the Marxist argument’s potential for a more active liberation from capitalists 
than one of sitting on mamma’s lap listening to stories. I am guilty on all of these points of failure; 
as I suppose is Martin Heidegger, and his expectation of us to dig deep into his curious language, 
his neologisms and frustrating technical jargon, in order to find merit. Though I think his is a brightly 
coloured world, where time, among other things, becomes “purple” again – which is its own form 
of Romantic repayment to the considerable intellectual effort expended. We must dig deeper, as 
I’ve said before, since to be indulgent of philosophical whimsy, yet merciless to our own capitalist 
whimsy, is the first step out of the prison of our own Zeitgeist. 
 
 
                                                          
22 Such a consumerist-only swap out is nonetheless evident right now, according to Marc Spitz’s in his book Twee: The 
Gentle Revolution in Music, Books, Television, Fashion, and Film (Spitz, 2014), which comes tantalizingly close to my 
Romantic and melancholic rendition of Heidegger’s existential temporality. Says Anna Katharina Schaffner of Spitz’s 
book, writing in the Times Literary Supplement (TLS, 18 February 2015), “[t]wee, then, is a symptom of profound cultural 
exhaustion, a pop-cultural response to the death of grand narratives and radical politics: too weary to fight the corporate 
capitalist machine, the twee instead create hyper-stylized alternative worlds in which kittens play, ukuleles sound and 
childhood is eternal. Their basic disposition is melancholy rather than angry, and they will always opt for owl-print 
wallpaper over kicking against the pricks”. I won’t be offended if my efforts with this thesis are labelled twee. 
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7.7 Order-Execution Cognate 
The final remainder, my remaining explanatory remainder, concerns the placeholder that 
has been my abiding rationale for describing executive education, philosophically at least, namely 
the order-execution cognate; that thing, that descriptor, for the sake of which all offerings of 
amelioration of execution – all forms of education, training and development, and organisational 
culture development – are directed. Mine has been an attempt to jemmy this thing apart, even 
though I put it together in the first place. This somewhat solipsistic effort has been my experiment, 
in ontological miniature as it were, to replicate the full scale political rupture of bringing into 
question unchallenged hegemonies: a kind of corduroy clad version of Pussy Riot, but this time 
where the balaclava’d girls are dancing on a Board room table, that other sanctified high altar of 
respectability. As a staged stunt, mine may have fallen foul of a decadent excess of characters and 
a mannered style, at the expense of plot: “more matter with less art” opines Queen Gertrude, 
dryly, in Hamlet,23 as a relevant critique to a similar comic madness of my exotic staging. 
Far from agreeing with Plato (in books 2, 3 and 10 of the Republic, in Cooper, 1997) that it 
is necessary to distrust tragic poets, mimêsis, and theatre in general in order to tell the truth, I have 
been advocating deception, fakery, and elaborate and Romantically-inclined fictional conceit via 
my mimic, Sanjay, as a way to break into the chronic sequence that moves, seemingly inexorably, 
from order to execution, as my cognate has it. As Simon Critchley and Jamieson Webster ask about 
Hamlet, “[i]s the truth best said or perhaps only said in a fiction; that is, in a lie and a falsehood” 
(Critchley & Jamieson, 2013: p.17) when “[m]elodrama [a melancholy form of drama] is a 
fortification against the real act”? (ibid: p.62), the real act, in my case, of execution that fails to 
challenge the delinquencies and obscene inequalities of the capitalist order, or of mercantile-
predicated education that sanctions these obscenities and this order? If the order-execution 
cognate has any function at all, it should at least represent the tragic lethargy by which we accept 
the temporal sanctity of the order-execution cognate: an ontological lassitude and indifference to 
an ironic temporality that is the key to the cognate’s undoing; a state of sloth from which it is the 
job of executive educators to rouse the inert executive. The cognate – as a proxy for the tensions 
of precedence and antecedence between order and execution – has been the object of my senses 
of loss, yearning, despair, and horror in the face of this lethargy. 
For mine has been a predominantly ontologically-oriented investigation into the time of 
executive education; one that has offered its (Romanticised topoi) style as a window onto 
transcendent and transhistorical aesthetic forms, in which I have anchored a novel order of analysis 
                                                          
23 In act 2, scene 2 (line 95: in The Arden Shakespeare, 2006: p.244). 
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of Heidegger and Kairotic time, and with which I have contrasted the poverty of chronic 
conceptions of time: a novel order of analysis, and a redirecting of the field of the “philosophy of 
executive education,” which is not especially psychological, ethical, epistemological, 
organisational, nor financial – all of which one would normally associate with such a field – but an 
approach which considers an oscillating interplay of the orders of chronic and Kairotic time as a 
new means by which we should frame a new education for the management of our age: as new 
orders for executive education. 
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